


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MOBILIZING THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD FOR THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

Lessons and New Directions

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LT COL JAMES E. LIGHTFOOT



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Mobilizing the Air National Guard for the Persian Gulf War

Lessons and New Directions

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In Memory
of
Lt Col Stephen G. Schramm
and
Maj Barry K. Henderson

8 October 1990

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Foreword


During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm the Air National Guard, along with the other reserve components, vindicated Total Force Policy. Whether volunteering or called to active duty, our units and members responded with enthusiasm and a high degree of skill and readiness. Air Guard participants maintained the reputation of a world class organization.

Most of the Persian Gulf War books and articles printed shortly after the war were descriptive, offering little analysis or direction for the future. With time for thoughtful reflection and analysis, and with greater access to data, more recent works show greater depth. Unfortunately, few enumerate the contributions of America's reserve component forces.

Lt Col James E. Lightfoot's work offers greater depth and deals specifically with one reserve component organization, the Air National Guard. He describes historic precedents, legalities and details of mobilization, and then the method of mobilizing for the Gulf War. Coverage includes headquarters and units with descriptive case studies at the local level. This is carried to a logical conclusion by analyzing the organization and the reasons the mobilization was done the way it was.


Noting the success of the mission, Colonel Lightfoot also analyzes the areas needing correction. From this he extrapolates lessons and new directions for the Air National Guard. He emphasizes improving business process methods, including Quality and modeling methods in all ANG programs, even beyond mobilization.

This study belongs in the hands of ANG commanders and leaders at the national, state, and local levels. It also aids planners and leaders in the active duty Air Force to better understand the accessibility of the Air National Guard.



DONALD W. SHEPPERD
Major General, USAF
Director, Air National Guard

***About
the
Author***



Lt Col James E. Lightfoot

Lt Col James E. Lightfoot acquired his BS degree in geography at Bradley University in 1965 and taught in Peoria, Illinois, until he joined the Air Force in 1967. Commissioned through OTS in 1967, he served as a weapons controller, supply officer, and navigator until separating from active duty in 1974. He continued navigating in the Air National Guard (ANG) at Norton Air Force Base (AFB), California; Van Nuys Air National Guard Base (ANGB), California; Maxwell AFB, Alabama; and Memphis International Airport, Tennessee. At Memphis he was also deputy commander for Resources.

In 1978 he obtained his MS in geography at the University of California at Riverside. In 1985 he earned his PhD in geography at UCLA and embarked on a career teaching at the University of Central Arkansas. In 1990 he left for an ANG-sponsored appointment as a National Security Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. There he coauthored *Dynamic Response: Military Strategy and Structure into the 21st Century*. Upon completion in 1991 he was selected as the ANG Command-Sponsored Research Fellow at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, where this project was achieved.

His professional military education accomplishments include Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, and the Senior Officials in National Security Program at Harvard University.

He is married to the former Pamela Joyce Endicott of Perry, Oklahoma, and has two sons, Stephen and Philip.

Preface


In 1991, after Operation Desert Storm, Deputy Director of the Air National Guard, Brig Gen (now Maj Gen) Donald W. Shepperd needed a researcher for a special project. At the time I was finishing my portion of *Dynamic Response: Military Strategy and Structure into the 21st Century*, an endeavor coauthored by five of us as National Security Fellows at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.

General Shepperd wanted a work on the Air National Guard participation in the Persian Gulf War. Familiar with my background, he invited me to conduct this project as a research fellow at the Air University's Airpower Research Institute. Offering a tentative outline, he asked for a product focussing on the needs of ANG senior commanders. During Operation Desert Shield ANG leaders had little to refer to on past mobilizations, and General Shepperd did not wish to repeat this experience.

The project was aided by many other people. At Air University's College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE), Hugh Richardson, Joan Dawson, and Dr Lewis Ware edited for structure and content. Lt Col Tom Nowak ran interference and facilitated the paperwork side of CADRE. Dr David McIsaac provided insight into Air Force operation. Col Jay Mengel, the ANG advisor to the Air University commander, facilitated and guided me to contacts in the Guard.

A review of the bibliography gives an idea of the number of people in or associated with the Air Guard who contributed. Every effort was made to cover as many areas as possible—officer and enlisted, headquarters (national, state, and gaining commands) and units, flying and nonflying, operations and support, and a broad geographical distribution. Contractors (principally National Security Analysts, Inc.) were generous and forthcoming with information. Time to continue the research and writing was provided by the command section of the Air National Guard Readiness Center (Brig Gen Larry K. Arnold, Col Thomas Eichhorst, and Col Richard P. McCartney). Further writing at the Air National Guard Historical Services Division was aided by the advice and editing skills of Dr Charles J. Gross. The division also allocated time to complete the project. My special thanks go to General Shepperd, who saw the need for understanding and recording what is done in the Guard and how it is done.

On the home front, my family was quite understanding of the needs of the project, and my greatest appreciation goes to my wife, Pam. Her faith in my abilities, her warmth, humor, understanding, and prodding all influenced in a positive way.



Source: Air National Guard Reserve Component, director of operations (ANGRC/DO), briefing documents, 1990.

Map 1. Air National Guard Flying Units.

Chapter 1

Evolution of the Air National Guard

The Air National Guard (ANG) participation during the Persian Gulf War involved a military component effectively using its talents as part of the total force. Well-trained, high-quality people were using, with some notable exceptions, modern equipment compatible with that used by the active duty forces. When needed, the ANG was ready, willing, and able to do the tasks required.

This has not always been the case with the National Guard. The effectiveness of the ANG in operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was the result of changes and improvements over the years. At the macrolevel, the Air Guard achieved total force implementation with the Air Force. At the microlevel, it needed reforms to meet the challenge of a changing world order. To study and evaluate these changes, one must review the history and analyze the organization up to its involvement in the Persian Gulf War.

A study of the ANG participation in the war reveals what needed improvement and why. In the field units the operators responsible for carrying out the missions were proficient and enthusiastic. At the executive level (general officer) the organization carried out the vision of the leadership and generally adapted to changing defense needs. The executives did not, however, develop a system that would allow managers (all those between the executives and the operators) to carry out rapid changes or to adapt quickly to the post-cold-war era. An initial evaluation of the ANG suggests the most significant need for improvement was at the management level. The greatest number of problems involved confusing or contradictory guidance and direction from management.

Managers were not inept; rather, they often faced significant constraints on their ability to make decisions. These rules, directives, and even informal controls came from varied sources. Some imposed by the Congress, some by the administration or Department of Defense (DOD), and some of the ANG's own making. A few were even created by entities such as the Congress at the instigation of the National Guard. Generally, however, the managers were a hard-working group caught in a bureaucratic milieu that severely restricted their ability to correct problems. Their total product, then, was not equal to the sum of their individual competencies.

Correction of existing problems requires a change in the organization with the focus on simplifying procedures. Presently, management at headquarters and in the field is stifled by constraints with conflicting regulations and guidelines delaying simple decisions. Conventional wisdom in each of these

separate areas has called for more guidance and regulations to clarify the issues and correct problems. This fails to consider the "big picture." Rather than adding rules to correct current problems, those responsible for change must review the general structure and processes to simplify the rules.

To eliminate many constraints and make necessary internal changes, ANG leaders must achieve the cooperation of external influences such as the Congress and the United States Air Force. This is a difficult process and a vexing problem for the executive leaders of the National Guard and of the nation. A cooperative spirit, with simplified processes and rules, would make it easier to competently mesh the ANG with the post-cold-war active duty forces. Simplifying the procedures, if properly handled, would eliminate a significant portion of the middle management problems, thus leading to a more effective and usable fighting force.

Understanding the history of the Air National Guard helps in explaining the continuity of thought and gives a perspective on how the organization evolved to its present level. Analysis of the organizational culture of the Air Guard explains why the members deal with themselves and others in the way they do. It is a dynamic organization undergoing constant changes. There are some procedures and ways of working that are new and others that date to the inception of the organization and reflect the views of its founders. A review of this structure helps us understand why the Air National Guard functioned as it did during the war.

The Air National Guard, one of the two reserve components of the United States Air Force, evolved from the Army National Guard. Its roots go back to the colonial militia established in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636. The modern organization, however, developed during World War II and became a formal entity in 1946. As a civilian force in reserve, it trains to augment active duty forces as needed in emergencies. All training of the Air National Guard is either to meet state missions or to be prepared for military action.¹

Mixed historical reviews of the Guard's performance recognized that circumstances were often beyond the Guard's control. The call-up of the National Guard just before American involvement in World War II displayed problems that were to plague the Guard for many years. At the time, reserve components comprised 320,000 members (200,000 National Guard; 120,000 Organized Reserve Corps), while the regulars totaled 187,000.

When mobilization began, the response of both reservists and regulars was not all positive. The regular establishment was so skeptical of the quality of the Guard that original plans in 1940 limited Guard involvement. Only with the institution of the draft did the General Staff begin to plan to incorporate the Guard.² Guardsmen were also unhappy with the situation. Between July 1940 and June 1941, approximately 96,000, or almost 40 percent of those recalled, were discharged for a variety of reasons.³ The Army replaced nearly all reserve officers in the grades of lieutenant colonel and higher and many of lower grades. Often poorly equipped and trained, guardsmen were not ready or prepared with a plan of action.⁴ Much of this was due to neglect in the

prewar era, when plans were the responsibility of the active duty forces, and to bitter rivalries between the Guard and active forces over scarce resources.

Though played down in the early years of the war, this rivalry did not disappear and was quite apparent when victory was in sight. In 1944, Lt Gen Lesley J. McNair, backed by Lt Gen Ben Lear, commander of Army ground forces, recommended the Guard be abolished or assigned domestic missions.⁵ McNair wrote:

1) One of the great lessons of the present war is that the National Guard, as organized before the war, contributed nothing to the National Defense. . . . Dependence on this component as a great part of the Initial Protective Force of our nation was a distinct threat to our safety. . . .

2) The history of the National Guard, since its last induction into Federal Service and until sweeping reforms were made, was one of unsatisfactory training, physical condition, discipline, morale, and particularly of leadership. As a reserve component, the National Guard provided general officers who were not professional soldiers and who, almost without exception, were not competent to exercise the command appropriate to that rank. . . . It is common knowledge that, during the mobilization period preceding Pearl Harbor, the most serious factor in the low state of morale among the enlisted men of the National Guard was lack of confidence in the ability of their officers. . . .

3) The training experience of this headquarters for nearly four years has its most important lesson in the inadequacy of the National Guard in practically every essential. . . .⁶

The Guard could handle political problems by dealing through Congress, a traditional ally, but it was difficult to handle the real and pervasive contempt for the Guard by the regulars. The general view of the Guard by active duty members was that it was a collection of amateurs ill prepared for command and that it allowed political hacks to share the same uniform as they. Since the Guard did want to be part of the military, although in a part-time role, the normal Guard reaction was defensive, with a strong denial of any inferiority.⁷

If the active duty forces opposed the National Guard, how could the Guard continue to exist? First, law and tradition helped. The constitutionally mandated militia has a long-standing involvement at the state and local level. Also, the military does not control the military; civilian executive and legislative branches of the government are the controlling agents. Second, because of this, politics is an important element in the decision. The Guard developed a strong political base involving the state governors and local officials, and this political power makes them appealing allies to members of Congress. Third, the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) is a strong advocate of the Guard. NGAUS is not part of the federal government or hierarchically associated with the National Guard. It is a well-disciplined advocacy lobby that greatly influences political matters affecting the Guard.

In the early postwar era, two men greatly influenced NGAUS: Maj Gen Ellard A. Walsh, its president, and Maj Gen Milton J. Reckord, chairman of its legislative committee. In the Walsh-Reckord era, the National Guard

Association became the focal point of decision making relating to the Guard. Congress at the time had minimal staffs, and even the executive branch had dispersed much of the formal authority. NGAUS stepped into the vacuum with a concentrated, quasiformal authority that Walsh and Reckord exercised with enthusiasm. Walsh referred to the power structure of NGAUS as an "empire within an empire." The power it accumulated transcended the constitutional powers accorded to federal-state and executive-legislative divisions.⁸

In the 1946-49 period, NGAUS took a defensive view. It adamantly opposed the federalization of both reserve components, an idea proposed by the Air Force and endorsed in 1948 by the Gray Board. This board was set up by Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) James V. Forrestal and chaired by Secretary of the Army Gordon B. Gray to study military reserve programs.⁹

Congress protected the National Guard. In 1947 the War Department attempted but failed to remove half of the ANG appropriation. In 1948 Congress cut all DOD branch requests, held the reserves even, and—thanks to NGAUS—increased funding to the Guard.¹⁰ Members of Congress knew of the Guard's constitutionality, its patriotic character, its worthy purposes, and its political connections in state capitals and home communities, and they were predisposed to act in its behalf. National Guard leaders were quick to exploit this relationship. They also benefitted from the legislative/executive rivalry, and both Congress and the National Guard gained when NGAUS asked Congress to assert itself at the expense of the DOD.¹¹

The military picture in the early postwar era was troubling for the Air Guard. The Army had not prepared detailed plans on how to effectively use the assets of the Guard. As the Air Force evolved, formation of ANG units had little to do with strategic planning and was fraught with bickering with the active duty component. The early mission of the Air Guard was air defense of the United States, and the equipment was World War II surplus fighters. The active force transitioned to jets, rendering the reserves' older propeller-driven models obsolete. Appropriations for the Guard included little for maintaining and almost nothing for updating the fleet.¹²

Although control of the reserve forces was ostensibly given to the Air Defense Command, there was still frustration with the command and control situation. Lt Gen George E. Stratemeyer, ADC commander, was to train and equip the ANG, yet with few resources and little organizational control. The choice of locations for placing aircraft was not left to the Air Force but to the states, which often collocated the units with existing metropolitan airports. ADC could not require training in garrison units without the concurrence of each state involved.¹³ By the latter 1940s, the Air Force was seeking ways to control the Air Guard, which was fighting this control, and neither side was gaining nor meeting its basic needs.

Events at the end of the decade quickly overcame the jealousies and forced Air Force and ANG planners to recognize the importance of other problems. When the Soviets detonated their first nuclear weapon in 1949, the need to stop a foe with nuclear capability was far greater than the challenge that had

faced the Guard in 1946. The invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950 proved the immediate need for mobilizing trained, capable airmen to respond to this aggression.¹⁴

The first major mobilization of the Air National Guard came during the Korean War, providing an early lesson in the need for preparedness. The poorly equipped and trained ANG was not ready for the recall. Given only outdated fighters by the Air Force, the Guard pilots were generally not trained in the jets needed for combat in 1950. Most, however, were combat veterans of World War II, and their experience offset the lack of training. Embarrassed Air Force leaders noted the poor planning on their part, the lack of a mobilization plan, the lack of a list of requirements, and absence of solid direction. The haphazard mobilization had been a debacle.¹⁵

Civilian defense officials, prodded in part by the Air Guard and its political allies, ordered the Air Force to take a pragmatic approach with the Air National Guard. By late 1950, the Air Force agreed to stop the fight to federalize the Guard and to look at the ANG role. Cold-war developments, along with the Air Guard providing much of the interceptor force protecting the United States, forced the building of an effective ANG.¹⁶

The Korean War recall showed the flimsiness of the Guard's claim of being a first line of defense. Sixty-six of the Guard's 92 tactical fighter squadrons were recalled, along with many support elements, and though most personnel had done well, the organization had not been impressive. There was much confusion and delay in preparing for active duty service. The ANG was an aberration to Air Force planners because it lacked any immediately deployable combat capability. Efforts to build and train the force had floundered badly, and the operational readiness tests given by the Continental Air Command gave the impression that ANG operational readiness was low.¹⁷

The start of the Korean War caught the Air Force in the bad situation of needing aircraft and crews immediately. The Air Force expanded from 411,277 in June 1950 to 788,881 one year later. Mobilization of the Guard revealed serious structural weaknesses. The idea of the time was mass mobilization of the reserve components, as in World War II. They could be recalled to augment the active duty after brief postmobilization training. All this was predicated on ample strategic warning with an appropriate buildup of forces. There was no partial or selected mobilization planning. The Air Force lacked facilities for ANG personnel and equipment and had no plan for mobilization. The first plan, AF Mobility Operating Procedure (MOP) 2-51, was completed in April 1951.¹⁸

Mobilization started with volunteers on 7 July 1950. By 19 July involuntary recall was necessary to provide the numbers of people and equipment required for the war. As it was, up to 10 percent of those recalled were released for hardships and other problems, and it took nearly seven months to get to Korea following the mobilization. Army and Air Force leaders reportedly spurned initial urgent requests from National Guard officials to activate ground and air units.¹⁹

In response, the Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, with the general purpose of strengthening the Guard's rival, the federally controlled Reserves.²⁰ In reality, the act led to improvements for both the Guard and Reserve. Between 1953 and 1960 ANG-assigned strength increased, military (part-time) from 35,011 to 70,820 and technicians (full time) from 6,017 to 13,163 personnel. Appropriations increased significantly, from \$106 million in 1953 to \$223.4 million in fiscal year 1960.²¹

With the advent of the cold war, relations between the active duty and reserve components began to improve, and the period from 1953 to 1960 was one of growth, modernization, and increasing integration with the active duty forces. The Guard relinquished some of its state autonomy, improved its training, and gained a greater voice in Air Force planning. The Guard was brought into the long-range planning process and into the development of policy, plans, and programs relating to reserve component issues at the Air Staff and major command levels. The status of organization, training, and operational readiness came into line with applicable Air Force regulations. Equipment was upgraded, and active and reserve units flew together in exercises. For the first time the Air Force tried to ensure that the composition and strength of both reserve component programs connected directly to actual defense requirements. Though still manned and equipped for a training mission, the Guard was beginning to gain limited operational capability.²²

During the Eisenhower administration, the basis of national defense, as spelled out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council in NSC-162, remained containment, with a focus on nuclear deterrence. The Air Force was the big winner among the service components and became generously funded to expand the number of strategic bombers, fighters, and other equipment. Congress supported the transfer of surplus active duty aircraft to the reserves.²³

The cold-war expansion of the active duty military made the Guard's job of justifying its existence more difficult. It developed a sophisticated organization, improved internal publications, and pursued a major lobbying effort. With the expansion of the Pentagon bureaucracy, ANG leaders found it difficult to gain an audience with their active duty counterparts.²⁴ They turned to the ANG's traditional ally, Congress. Congress responded with the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, which significantly expanded both reserve components and increased drill-pay eligibility to more people than ever before.²⁵

Militarily the ANG accepted more responsibility in defense forces of the fifties, particularly in the air defense community. Air Defense Command began to use the Guard on alert in 1953 but could not do so universally because outdated aircraft like World War II P-51s were not usable (though they remained in the inventory until late 1957). The greatest problem in accepting responsibility concerned the Guard's acquisition of new equipment. In this effort, the ANG faced stiff opposition, such as that from Lt Gen Joseph H. Atkinson, commander of Air Defense Command (ADC), who wrote to Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Thomas D. White that:

Reserve forces should have no role in the air defense fighting forces. . . . I vigorously oppose giving them first line weapons. . . . I put little dependence on the Air National Guard as an emergency interceptor augmentation. Reserve forces belong in minimum cost, minimum support missions which do not materially compete with us for resources.

The more politically astute White responded:

I must consider that the administration and the Congress expect our reserve forces to perform functions in U.S. defense. Any action to completely deny Air National Guard participation in air defense with newer weapon systems would meet with considerable opposition.²⁶

White's vice chief of staff, Gen Curtis E. LeMay, showed that Atkinson was not the only person to question the effectiveness of the reserve components. He argued that the increasing complexity of Air Force equipment put it beyond the capabilities of part-timers to maintain. He also proposed the combining of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard. Secretary of the Air Force James H. Douglas, Jr., found it necessary to clarify the remarks by pointing out that they were only meant to stimulate "dynamic thinking" and were not the view of the Air Force.²⁷

On a positive note, the Air Force in 1960 set up a program to have reserve forces come under their gaining command. This facilitated training and simplified procedures for standardizing and evaluating unit performance. It also made command and control simpler and more sensible than the old method of going through Air Defense Command. It also recognized the growing diversity of aircraft in both reserve components, as the ANG added its first Military Air Command transports that year.²⁸

By the early 1960s, the world situation was beginning to change. The Kennedy administration changed defense policy, declaring nuclear deterrence an impractical all-or-nothing approach, instead proposing "flexible deterrence" and the ability to scale the military response to meet the threat. The renewed interest in conventional warfare was an assist to the ANG, which had no nuclear weapons. In early 1961, 35 of 38 ANG units reporting maintained a C-1 or C-2 rating (fully or nearly fully combat ready), suggesting the Guard could be a valuable player in flexible response. As it turned out, these exaggerated reports quickly proved a detriment to these units.²⁹

President John Kennedy and SECDEF Robert McNamara had the opportunity to use the reserves in 1961. Following Soviet threats to force the Western powers out of Berlin, the president's advisors favored a program of facing the Soviets down with a show of strength. To respond, Kennedy ordered a call-up of the reserves in the fall of 1961 by implementing Public Law 87-117 to activate 148,000 reservists: 113,000, Army; 27,000, Air Force; and 8,000, Navy. Between October 1961 and August 1962, one-third of the ANG strength—almost 21,000 people—was mobilized.³⁰ The mobilization revealed short comings in the Air Force program, and its limited success was the product of improvisation, not a cohesive plan. Forces were manned, equipped, and organized for training, not operations. The Air Force still lacked concepts

and well-developed plans for using reserve units in situations short of general war. The Air National Guard was still a doctrinal orphan in an Air Force committed to nuclear deterrence and space applications.³¹

In contrast with the Korean call-up, less than one percent of the air guardsmen were lost to hardship or other discharges, and the forces were in Europe within 30 days. There were, however, problems. First, units had been held to 83 percent manning as a cost reduction. When recalled, they were augmented by 3,000 individual Air Force Reserve augmentees. Many of those recalled were not trained for the jobs assigned, and Air Force personnel manning documents requirements changed at least six times between call-up and deployment. Up to 30 percent of the personnel deployed in some units were assigned positions for which they were not trained. Adding to the problems was the fact that the introduction of a split-wing concept had already caused the loss of a good portion of experienced leadership in many units. This concept called for having a headquarters at home and at the deployment site in Europe so the unit could operate on the front and be augmented later. This caused a dilution in much-needed leadership at the front and at home.³²

Original plans called for units to go to active duty bases. They actually deployed to inactive dispersed operating locations in France ill equipped to receive them, causing units to experience serious morale problems while they built up these bare bases. Those arriving in aging F-84F or F-86F aircraft found no stockpile of spare parts, no parts in the theater, and no logistics system oriented to their needs. This situation came about because in the latter 1950s reserve component modernization was to follow active duty force modernization.³³ Even the F-104s airlifted to Europe experienced major problems and were repeatedly grounded for safety and maintenance reasons. Few pilots were trained for aerial refueling, a requirement to get the aircraft to Europe. Even the basic mission was confused, and units ostensibly trained for a nuclear role had to retrain for a conventional conflict. Never allowed to handle nuclear weapons in earlier training, the mission of these units was already questionable.³⁴

Stair Step, the name given the deployment to Europe, was a technical success. The Guard arrived in Europe as directed, yet it experienced problems. The generally experienced pilots did well. Serious weaknesses were apparent in wing operations centers, premission briefings, and ordnance handling. Aircraft turnaround time was unacceptable. Wings could not maintain the launch sequence rates called for in exercise plans.³⁵

The Air Guard received public praise for military performance and patriotism, but the active duty Air Force remained skeptical as to the quality of help. National Guard leaders saw the Berlin mobilization as a vindication of the ANG while high-ranking regulars saw little improvement. The latter viewed guardsmen as amateurs in an era that demanded high standards of operational performance. In their assessments, they generally neglected to address the issues of obsolete aircraft, inadequate funding and manning levels, and poor planning.³⁶ The popular press tended to lump the Army and

Air National Guard together, and to associate the air side with problems derived from the disappointing showing of the Army National Guard. The latter required up to nine months of training, or six months more than planned, to bring high-priority units up to acceptable levels of readiness.³⁷

After the Berlin mobilization, SECDEF McNamara emphasized a stronger conventional force and a select force within the reserves of immediately deployable units. The Air National Guard had already been moving in this direction and had even been expanding its role beyond air defense fighter units to the addition of transport aircraft. The size of the Guard increased and the mission significantly broadened. In 1963 the Air Force issued AFR 45-60, which described the objective of Air Reserve programs as no longer the creation of M-day forces that required extensive postmobilization training. Rather, it said that "the objective of the Air Reserve forces is to provide operationally ready units and trained individuals that are immediately available to augment the active duty establishment."³⁸ Following these goals, the ANG fleet shrank from 2,269 in 1960 to 1,525 in 1965, but significantly updated the aircraft. The secretary also tried to merge the reserve components into the Guard. This time the Reserve Officers Association (ROA), the lobbying arm of the Reserves, brought the legislative effort to a halt.³⁹

In 1965, as the Vietnam War escalated, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced a decision not to use the reserve components. Guard and Reserve leaders asked to participate; their request was declined, and their components experienced major problems. The self-image, military utility, and political acceptability of reserve programs came into question. In a time of national turmoil the Guard was perceived as a white, middle-class bastion and a haven for draft evaders. In quelling disturbances of the era, they were accused of being trigger happy, undisciplined, poorly led, and ineffective. This threatened the very political support that was the foundation of their existence.⁴⁰

In 1967, at the insistence of Dr Theodore Marrs, undersecretary of the Air Force for Reserve Affairs, the Air Force had become concerned enough about the role of Air Reserve forces to commission a study. The result was an exhaustive 10-volume work by the Rand Corporation of future roles of the reserves. It recommended direct purchase of new aircraft for the reserve components and wider roles. It also looked at the appropriateness of missions and roles assigned to the reserve components. The study produced little in the way of legislation but did provide a sound foundation on which to build many legislative requests and on which to base future policy.⁴¹

Despite the policy decision in 1965 not to use the reserves, the Johnson administration faced a grave problem in 1968. With the United States military involved in Vietnam, the North Koreans seized an American naval vessel, the USS *Pueblo*. The administration's initial response was to negotiate for the release of the vessel and its crew. When this approach was revealed, the South Koreans announced they would begin substantial withdrawal of forces from South Vietnam to protect the homeland from a North Korean threat. The administration, not wanting this action, immediately issued Executive Order 11392, ordering 14,000 reservists, including 9,343 air

guardsmen, to active duty. This, the third major mobilization since World War II, occurred only 48 hours after the seizure of the *Pueblo*, so virtually no warning was available to the units. Eight tactical fighter groups, three tactical reconnaissance groups, and three wing headquarters were mobilized with approximately 350 aircraft. The tactical fighter units were part of the Combat Beef program.⁴²

The recall went more smoothly than the Berlin recall, and 95 percent of the assigned personnel were ready to deploy within 36 hours of the issuance of the recall order. It was not, however, without problems. For example, the three tactical reconnaissance groups were not combat ready, but they could be within 30 days of recall. Also, DOD mobilized entire units when only parts of units were needed, and ANG organization allowed selective recall. Only flying units were needed, and the support elements were simply scattered through the Air Force as filler.⁴³

Organizational changes also hindered the effectiveness of integration with the active duty units. Because of the Berlin call-up, tactical flying units were reorganized so maintenance and support elements were collocated with flying squadrons, allowing the flying squadron to operate autonomously from home base. This worked well in ANG units, where squadrons were often isolated, and the structure geared to moving to a bare base. The problem was that several years earlier, TAC had changed to a wing-integrated squadron concept that centralized support services at the wing level while decentralizing maintenance to the squadron. This dual system was the most economically feasible peacetime system for each organization. Unfortunately, it complicated the integration needed for combat and required retraining of ANG support personnel to fit into the new structure.⁴⁴

Another problem was the actual deployment. An example is the 121st Tactical Fighter Group, Lockbourne AFB, Ohio. After being recalled and prepared for immediate deployment, the Air Force held the unit at home station for four months, ready for the departure with much of its support gear packed. Two weeks before deployment, without consulting either the unit or National Guard Bureau, TAC reorganized the unit along the wing-augmented squadron concept. The original 900-man group was reduced to a 410-man squadron, with surplus personnel scattered through the Air Force. The unit was then sent to a bare base in Korea, stripped of essential personnel. Other units reported similar circumstances.⁴⁵

Units arriving in Korea generally did not integrate smoothly. Sent to bare bases with inadequate support, they were constantly trying to catch up. The F-100 units had problems getting parts, items not maintained in Korea; thus readiness dropped below Air Force minimum standards. They lost four aircraft, one pilot, failed an operational readiness inspection (ORI), and were criticized for flying nonstandard formations and achieving poor bomb scores. The results suggested lax training, which, combined with external problems created low morale in the organization.⁴⁶

On 11 April, a follow-on call-up was announced shortly after the Tet offensive in Vietnam. In this instance, 1,333 air guardsmen (out of 20,000

reservists) were called up, and flying units were sent without their support and maintenance personnel. The units immediately deployed to Vietnam and engaged in combat missions within days of arrival. Recognized for their accomplishments, they could claim the combat-ready status the Guard had sought since 1945. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1973, Gen George S. Brown testified:

"I had . . . five F-100 Air National Guard squadrons . . . Those were the five best F-100 squadrons in the field. The aircrews were a little older, but they were more experienced . . ."

Combat performance of the Guard was now unquestioned, and publicly acknowledged.⁴⁷

By the 1970s, changes in the nation and the national strategy were beginning to help the reserve components, even if inadvertently. The Vietnam War was going poorly, the pressure at home was to get out of the conflict, and antiwar sentiment was increasing. As a partial remedy to domestic complaints, the administration of President Richard M. Nixon sought to implement the All Volunteer Force (AVF). Part of the proposal eliminated conscription into the armed forces and increased salaries to make the military competitive with the civilian sector. Faced with steady needs for personnel, a declining budget, and demographics pointing to a shrinking manpower base, the DOD made several changes. One was to allow more women in the service to fill roles traditionally filled by men. Another was the transfer of part of the responsibility for manning the DOD to the reserve components.⁴⁸

As better paid volunteers replaced the low-paid conscripts, personnel costs became a significant factor. Transferring personnel to the reserve component was fiscally advantageous to the Department of Defense, and a new policy was necessary. This could not be done with the readiness level of the reserves of the earlier era. In 1970 the response of SECDEF Melvin Laird was the articulation of a "Total Force" concept. Formally adopted as DOD policy by SECDEF James Schlesinger in 1973, the Total Force Policy attempted to balance America's responsibilities as a world power with fiscal and demographic realities.⁴⁹

Total Force Policy was never intended to make the reserves identical to their active duty counterparts. In terms of readiness and capability, this would have been unrealistic. Rather, the policy had two principal tenets: reliance on the reserves as the principal augmentation to the active force, and integrated use of all available forces, whether active, reserve, civilian, or allied. Over the years, the emphasis of Total Force Policy has been on the use of reserve components.⁵⁰ It also brought about a change in acquisition attitudes because the mission of the reserves included rapid response to conflict, and the equipment could no longer be simply the castoffs of the active duty establishment.

Implementation of the Total Force Policy brought with it an upgrading of the mission and equipment of the Air National Guard. As American participation in the Vietnam War wound down, equipment brought back was

often transferred to the reserve components. In the 1970s, the Guard phased out the C-124 Globemaster and the C-121 Constellation cargo aircraft, replacing these older piston-engine machines with the turboprop C-130 Hercules, the same aircraft that is the backbone of tactical airlift for the regular Air Force. KC-135 Stratotanker refuelers began to replace the aging fleet of KC-97s, and with the gained aircraft came an assigned mission of standing nuclear alert for SAC bombers, and being prepared any time to accomplish conventional refueling missions. A-7D, A-10, and F-4 aircraft were added to replace F-101s, F-104s, and F-106s, and the Guard mission began to expand into the tactical air role and away from a purely air defense configuration. The improvement of support equipment such as communications gear also affected the state mission. Guard units became increasingly useful as communication centers during natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes.⁵¹

By the mid-1970s, the national sentiment had changed priorities and military procurement had dropped in importance. During the early part of the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the funding of the active duty forces dropped precipitously, and threatened the modernization program of the reserve components. Air Guard leaders sought new F-15 and F-16 aircraft as replacements for the aging F-4 aircraft. These leaders also shared concerns about receiving the active duty F-4s being replaced by the newer aircraft. This would again leave the Guard with outdated equipment that could not be maintained by the active duty logistics system. Knowing they were operating outdated equipment the leaders were forced into advocating the opening of training facilities within the ANG to train members using equipment, such as the F-4 and A-7—no longer in the active duty forces—while requesting updated equipment that would render such “schoolhouses” obsolete.⁵²

In 1980, the House Armed Services Committee appointed a special investigative panel, charged in part to describe the state of the armed forces. The panel reported:

We are not buying the required ammunition, equipment, and weapons systems to fight even a short war. Even a cursory look at the equipment currently in the hands of our troops, at our war reserve materiel stockpiles, and at our five-year defense program, is proof positive of this claim. Our troops are outmanned and out-gunned at almost every turn. Plainly and simply, we are not prepared.⁵³

The report reflected the concern of a growing number of government leaders. At the beginning of the administration of President Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s, the legislative and executive branches of the federal government cooperated to substantially increase investment in the armed forces.

In its *FY 1981 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components*, the Reserve Forces Policy Board prodded the DOD to increase the equipment expenditures in the reserves. On 21 June 1982, the secretary of defense responded with a memorandum to all service secretaries and to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Among his points were the following:

The long-range planning goal of the Department of Defense is to equip all active, Guard, and Reserve units to full wartime requirements . . . units that fight first

shall be equipped first regardless of the component. You must ensure equipment compatibility among Guard, Reserve, and active units which will serve together on the battlefield. . . . Equipment inventories adequate for effective training are also essential.⁵⁴

Follow-on reports offered further encouragement. In September 1982, Gen Charles A. Gabriel, chief of staff of the Air Force, told a National Guard conference, "We're committed, of course, to modernizing the Guard as fast as we can. Guard modernization will include the newest, most capable aircraft in the world." In November 1982, the president's Military Manpower Task Force related the need for equipment modernization in the reserves, noting the total cost of these units was substantially lower than maintaining active duty forces. They also noted the need for better equipment to do the required tasks.⁵⁵

Guard leaders appreciated the comments but had heard them before. The Gray Board had suggested the same thing in 1947 and little had changed. Proposed improvements were often planned for future years and then lost as higher-priority requirements were identified. Slipping "get well" dates had become routine. Without its congressional support, the Guard would not have been a viable entity, and the rhetoric from the DOD needed backing with deeds.⁵⁶

In the early 1980s, the increased spending on the military removed some funding pressure that had restrained past modernization attempts. In this atmosphere, the Guard fared well as war readiness kits were restocked, new aircraft acquired, the force expanded and modernized, and readiness levels significantly increased. MH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters were acquired for special operations and rescue and recovery units. F-15 Eagles and F-16 Fighting Falcons replaced aging F-4s and even older aircraft. A-10 Thunderbolt IIs and A-7s were added to the inventory. By congressional direction the Guard returned to the strategic airlift mission with the addition of a squadron of C-141 Starlifters and a squadron of C-5 Galaxies. More new C-130s were acquired, and more KC-135s were transferred from active duty. New C-26A and C-21A aircraft were attached as operational support aircraft.⁵⁷

Support areas experienced significant growth, as the Air Force transferred more responsibility for selected units to the reserves. Civil Engineering and Services missions grew in the Air National Guard. ANG Prime RIBS (Readiness in Base Services) units expanded to provide 40 percent of Air Force needs in deployable food and base services. Training significantly enhanced runway repair and other operational support functions.⁵⁸

By the latter 1980s, the markedly improved Guard was even identified and sought out for more missions. Its efforts in nation building, building schools, providing medical care, and improving the transportation infrastructure in Latin America were well received. Congress passed enabling legislation, and in December 1989, the SECDEF approved expanded military involvement in drug enforcement. The Guard became involved in eradication of domestically grown marijuana and interdiction of imported drugs. Authorizing \$450 million for DOD antidrug activities, Congress earmarked \$6 million for ANG radar operations.⁵⁹

Markedly improved in its more traditional military roles, the Guard was ready to respond. In December 1989, Operation Just Cause, an action to protect American interests and to remove the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega from power, tested the ability of the Guard. Air National Guard A-7 Corsair II fighters stationed in Panama on Coronet Cove rotation since 1978 flew close air support sorties aiding ground troops. Tactical airlift forces, also on Volant Oak rotation in Panama since 1978, airlifted personnel and equipment. Missions were flown into Howard AB, Panama, bringing ANG aircrews directly into the line of fire from Panamanian combat forces loyal to Noriega. ANG C-141s and C-5s brought cargo and troops to Panama. Mobile Aerial Port personnel volunteered to augment active duty personnel at Pope AFB, North Carolina, the principal debarkation point.⁶⁰

By the 1990s, the Air National Guard was ready for a test, and this opportunity was provided by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Responding to the invasion, President George Bush and SECDEF Richard Cheney, along with Gen Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed military force was necessary. The call-up of Selected Reserve units would be essential to structuring this force. The stage was set for testing the Total Force Concept.

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Chapter 2

Developing the Plan for the Call-up and Mobilization

Most of the daily activity in the Air Guard involves training for combat. The call-up or mobilization for active duty is the transition step from the training to the combat phase. All the previous training is designed to integrate the reserve forces with the active duty forces at this point. Prepared for armed conflict, the participating ANG assets usually operationally transfer to their gaining command in the active duty Air Force.

The call-up and mobilization for Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm were, by comparison with past efforts, exemplary. Acceptance of the units and personnel, the quality of the training, the equipment, the availability of command and supervisory positions, and the level of enthusiasm of the members were well beyond any previous call.

In the Persian Gulf War, the transfer of operational units and personnel went fairly smoothly, but problems existed in the support areas. Some identified and foreseen difficulties remained unchanged. Such difficulties are the result of system and process problems in the ANG, the DOD or even broader areas of responsibility. If one identifies areas for corrective action, it is easy to conclude that the operation did not go well. This would be inaccurate. The operation went well; but the system and the processes, particularly in support functions, needed corrective action.

In the events leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, few security analysts in the United States accurately assessed the situation in time to prepare for any significant response. Fewer still predicted involvement of US forces or mobilization of the reserve components. Either Western intelligence did not have a clear picture of the threat or Western leaders did not take Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein seriously. For whatever reason, the armed forces of the United States were not expecting this conflict.

This repeats several earlier scenarios. At the start of the Korean War, the invasion caught American intelligence off guard. In 1961, the response to the Berlin crisis was equally unexpected. In 1968, many problems in Vietnam were preexisting, but the *Pueblo* crisis in Korea came as another surprise. Even smaller flare-ups like Grenada, or the invasion of Panama, and the bombing incursion into Libya, were unexpected. In 1990, the world had many areas of potential conflict, and planners could anticipate possible US involvement in either Lebanon or Israel or even in the civil war engulfing

Liberia. The problems between Iraq and Kuwait were recognizable, but very few analysts predicted armed conflict.

The Air National Guard's organizational response to the invasion of Kuwait mirrored the confusion that accompanies the transition of armed forces from their peacetime to wartime roles. The small number of constraints aided the positive and admirable operational action.¹ In other areas, particularly support, the program worked through the effort of individuals overcoming confusing or conflicting plans and rules.² The greatest problems were a mind-set and regulations geared for a past scenario, systemic and process constraints in support areas, and mistakes (fortunately few).

Despite the lack of preparation for this specific contingency, Guard leaders displayed an adaptability and an understanding of the direction of world events. They considered the changing nature of their organizational mission and core tasks, and in doing so, sought to retain their autonomy. This change was not a sudden reaction to the end of the cold war; it was part of a continuum that had accelerated with the coming of Total Force Policy. However, even with the need for change some areas, especially support functions, had difficulty making these transitions.³ They faced organizational resistance, or lack of recognition, or change so swift that appropriate mechanisms or constraints could not keep pace with necessary adjustments.⁴

The general mission of the organization had changed little since its inception—to train, equip, and provide part-time personnel to augment the active duty Air Force as needed to provide for the national defense. Still, changes started, and even national defense began transforming to national security. Formerly resisted missions such as nation building assistance to the third world and drug interdiction came inside the national security purview. With the acceptance of these and other roles, the distinction of the military versus the civilian community blurred.

The operational environment was changing markedly. The cold war was gone, yet the possibility of dealing with contingency operations was realistic. Core tasks had, however, undergone significant change since the call-ups in 1961 and 1968, the latter being the last call-up of reserve components for potential military conflict. Alterations affected areas of responsibility and methods by which the organization functioned. The ANG changed from primarily air defense fighter interceptors to a broader force including higher proportions of reconnaissance, tanker, airlift, special operations, and other aircraft. The nonfighter resources absorbed more of the mission and contained the majority of reserve component forces needed in most contingency operations.

In the 1960s, ANG members were all volunteers, but a large proportion, particularly lower-ranking enlisted positions, joined to escape the draft. As the draft disappeared, these airmen were generally replaced by less formally educated yet more motivated all volunteer forces. The transition to an AVF allowed ANG leaders to progress into a more participatory style with greater say from the operators. With an active role for the operators, the commanders

operated better organizations, and members' involvement increased in the function of their units.

The arrival of Total Force Policy in the 1970s created an environment in which the quality of units could improve. As Congress sought a greater role for the reserves and ways to cut spending on full-time military members there was an increase in training, equipment, the number of reserve personnel and morale. Addition of thousands of seasoned Vietnam veterans improved the force. This period of growth and positive support enhanced the Air Guard reputation.⁵

However, certain aspects of change were either overlooked or did not keep pace with developments. Both the military and Congress developed constraints that slowed some needed corrections or modifications. Laws relating to call-up and mobilization of the ANG provide a starting point in understanding initial organizational reaction to prosecution of the Persian Gulf War. There were difficulties dealing with out-of-date publications ignored or in the replacement process for years. Some were designed to handle the involvement of the ANG in a central European scenario. Some display efforts by the National Guard and its allies to avoid past errors, which did not fit the situation of the Gulf War. Despite many regulations, planning, and training for the eventuality, problems confronting Guard leaders at the local, state, and national levels included how do we do this, when do we mobilize, and who is in charge.

With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it became evident the American military would become involved, and an important question was if the reserve components would be used and how. Even before the call-up or mobilization could occur, the government had to decide if it was going to use its reserve components. Factors included politics, legal questions, history, rights, control, equity and fairness, and methods of implementation. This was not simply a matter of how the generals would run the war. It involved a normal American process of deciding whom in a democratic and federal government has authority.

The Congress, the administration, and the reserve components had early concerns for the political ramifications of using the Guard and Reserves. Politics can be a sticky business, and in an elective government, political concerns are paramount.⁶ Many questions about the use of reserve components had to be answered, and quickly. In the framework of history, there were obstacles to implementing the use of reserves. Historically, reserve component executives supported the call-ups, while many operators were displeased by perceived inequities or disruptions that seemed to serve little purpose. In the Korean War, many troops called up were upset. They had served in World War II and faced combat again before a new generation of Americans came into harm's way. Reported in depth by the news media, this seemed inequitable to many. In the Berlin call-up, some reservists attempted to elude the call-up and many who went complained, this time about going to a nonwar. They were disgruntled about going to bare bases in Europe with inadequate and unsupportable equipment and simply sitting and waiting. In

the *Pueblo* call-up, they were irritated because they were broken into smaller units and farmed out through the system instead of being called up as a unit. Others were annoyed because they were called up as a unit when only selected elements were needed. By the Vietnam era, SECDEF McNamara felt the call-up of reservists was a matter of last resort.⁷ Many in Congress and the administration remembered the past and shared this view.

At the outset of the Persian Gulf crisis, reserve leaders knew that if their components were not used in this war they might not be thought of as useful in any conflict.⁸ They were aware of the adverse effect on popular support caused by the low level of reserve participation in the Vietnam War. The residual carryover was still apparent in the election of 1988, when vice presidential candidate Dan Quayle was maligned for his service in the Indiana National Guard, and few people came to his support in this matter. At all echelons in the ANG, there was a desire to participate, or in the vernacular of the moment, to "lean forward."⁹ To be "part of the hunt" would vindicate and justify the program and give a feeling of worthiness and self-respect.

In that environment, the leaders of the National Guard and other reserve components understood the constraints and capabilities at hand to deal with the situation. The most basic factor was how to mobilize the reserves, and this was no simple issue. The methodology for calling up or mobilizing the reserves was unclear at the outset of the war and changing as the services adapted to the new world situation. Many plans were predicated on the use of reserves in a general conflict in Europe, a conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies. Possibility of such conflict decreased when the Warsaw Pact imploded. Planners set about rewriting the regulations and rethinking the possible scenarios of involvement. Nonetheless, at the outset of the confrontation, the rules were essentially prepared for a European conflict.

Many modern laws on mobilization had their background in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. They were written to constrain the forces that brought the military into that conflict. In developing Total Force Policy, a principal concern for Army planners was to make certain the reserves were involved in any future conflict. The purpose, according to Gen Creighton Abrams, was to intertwine the active duty forces and reserve components so completely that any president wishing to involve the armed forces would have to have the support of Congress and the people of the United States.¹⁰

Call-up regulations are embodied in federal law, and access to reserve component forces remained uncertain due to legal ambiguities and the historic reasons for which the rules were written. The regulations consider two basic categories—voluntary and involuntary. *US Code* (USC), Title 10, subparagraph 673(b) covers the involuntary category. Use of volunteers is covered under 10 USC 672(d). The laws contain varying rules depending on whether the United States faces external threats or not and in the face of threats whether there is a national emergency or declared war.

The modern involuntary call-up option had its inception in the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973. Then, the Americans resupplied the Israelis through a

massive airlift—or one that had many problems. At the time, many traditional American allies did not wish to cooperate since the Arabs had control of much of the oil flowing to Europe. In assessing the ability of the United States to aid its allies and to project its power in similar contingencies, the Air Force studied the capabilities of the Military Airlift Command (MAC), the agency tasked to provide the airlift. Following Air Force recommendations, the DOD submitted in the fiscal year (FY) 1974 budget a request to increase the number of personnel assigned to MAC by 10,000.¹¹ The Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel turned this down, suggesting the Air Force use ANG and AFRES personnel to meet any surge requirements. The Air Force countered that existing federal statutes forbade accessing reserves for contingencies and limited their use for declared national emergencies or wars. With the growing reliance created by Total Force Policy, it became necessary for Congress and the administration to look more closely at the statutory provisions for using reserve forces.¹²

The subcommittee directed the DOD to find better ways to access the reserves, specifically by using the new legislative authority in two basic ways. The first would be in “minor situations requiring short-term use of capabilities which are unique to the reserve components or which only exist in the active force in small numbers.” By allowing their use, the plan envisaged a greater use of special purpose capabilities in the reserves. The second way was to provide for advanced prepositioning of reserve units in times of international tension but prior to a major conflict or declaration of national emergency.¹³

The DOD forwarded this information as requested, and hearings were conducted by the Senate in July 1975. After actions over the next several months by the Senate Armed Services Committee and its Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, the new legislation was recommended for two reasons: to enhance credibility of reserve forces and to improve the efficiency of the Total Force Policy. The legislators already knew the president had greater authority and could authorize up to one million members of the Ready Reserve to active duty for a period of up to 24 months under a national emergency declaration. The need to declare a national emergency had the adverse effect of disallowing the use of reservists in lesser contingencies. It also created a tendency to make the reserves a carbon copy of the active forces rather than carefully tailoring their missions to complement active-force requirements. This would lead to less efficiently designed and realistic missions for the reserve components.¹⁴

Many active duty and reserve component leaders agreed to this legislation while expressing some concerns. William K. Brehm, assistant secretary of defense for manpower and reserve affairs, warned in his approval that reserve forces “must be trained and equipped to perform their missions promptly, and they must be available for rapid and selective mobilization, regardless of the political situation.”¹⁵ Maj Gen Duane Corning, president of the National Guard Association of the United States, emphasized the need to

augment active forces on a smaller scale than all-out mobilization, but he warned of the political risks if any president were to call out the reserves for too many call-ups for less than urgent reasons or if there was no clear and apparent need. Congress passed this legislation, 10 USC 673(b), in 1976, three years after identification of the problem.¹⁶

Provisions in the new legislation provided reserve component support for the active forces during contingencies without a declared war or national emergency. The legislation would permit the president to call up the Selected Reserve when necessary to augment the active forces in any operational mission, and the president could authorize the secretary of defense, without the reservists' consent, "to order to active duty any unit, and any individual not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the Selected Reserve." Requirements specified that any unit called up would have to be called up as a unit but failed to specify exactly what a unit entailed. Most planners assumed this either meant the individual units or, the more common interpretation, that it meant using unit type codes (UTC) to identify specific groups of people to be called up for given types of call-up needs. At no time was it interpreted by planners as meaning individuals. The active duty time was limited to an initial call of 90 days and, if the president deemed necessary, for an extension of another 90 days. Originally, a cap was placed at 50,000 reservists, but in subsequent amendments, this was extended to 200,000 reservists at any one time. This became known as the 200K call-up authority.¹⁷ The statute also carried a requirement that when it was implemented, the president must notify Congress within 24 hours and provide a written report explaining the circumstances necessitating the action taken and describing the anticipated use of reserve units or members.

Conceived near the end of the Vietnam War, the statute was intended to be subject to the War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973. Congress had established this resolution in response to the perceived loss of congressional power during the war and, as stated in the WPR, to preclude "another situation when the president could gradually build up America's involvement in a foreign war without Congress's knowledge or approval." The WPR required that Congress be notified within 48 hours of involvement in hostile or imminently hostile situations. Moreover, Congress could then force the return of the troops within 60 days, with a possible 30-day extension to that 60 days. In this way, Congress, if it did not concur with the presidential action, could cancel a recall of reservists under 10 USC 673(b).¹⁸

Intended to provide the total force with a flexibility not previously available, 10 USC 673(b) received a mixed review of its effectiveness. As a means to provide successful planning for total force and to justify equipment and training for reserve forces, it was successful. As an outgrowth of an Air Force problem, it led to greater acceptance within the Military Airlift Command of a role for reservists, and the Air Force hierarchy saw little threat in expanding the role of reserve components in support areas. It had less impact in the Navy and the Army on planning and in integrating reserve

forces. As a tool to implement recall of reservists it was of limited value and would not be used by any president until 1990.¹⁹

There are several reasons for the reserves not being recalled during this 15-year period. One was the long-standing defense policy concept of graduated mobilization response. This called for consideration of political, economic, and military actions and for an incremental response where feasible to achieve desired deterrent effect. Reserves would only be called up when a demonstrated need developed and then would serve the dual role of augmenting active forces and sending adversaries a message about American resolve.²⁰

This policy essentially aided in precluding the call-up of reservists for contingencies such as Operation Just Cause. This action, taken in December 1989, removed Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega from power. At the time, the theater commander requested the call-up of reserve units and individuals. One organization sought was the Air National Guard's 193d Special Operations Group, which provides a psychological warfare capability not available in the active duty. Higher-level military authorities, apprehensive about the message sent with an involuntary call-up, denied the request. Since unit resources were available through volunteerism, there was no pressure to change the rules regarding call-ups.²¹

While some reservists have conjectured that this lack of use of 10 USC 673(b) is conspiratorial, there are some logical reasons for it. One is to preclude the administration from coming under the constraints of the War Powers Resolution. Air Force regulations require a 24-hour advance notice for reservists to report to their units. With this notification, Congress would be aware before units departed home stations. The WPR requires notification of Congress within 48 hours after forces have been placed in real or potential conflict. In attempting a politically sensitive mission such as Just Cause, administration officials might not want the complications attending congressional involvement. The involuntary call-up under the 200K authority can lead to such a political problem.²²

Another politically sensitive reason stems from historical factors. The involuntary call-ups of reserve units in the past were often supported at the executive and managerial levels in the reserve community, yet were resisted by many reservists. Recollection of the problems during the Korean War, the Berlin crisis, and even following the *Pueblo* crisis demonstrated the political damage when the reserves are recalled. Each of the crises brought memories of the problems of disrupting lives and sending people into harm's way or simply to sit. The negative media coverage and political fallout were clear to both administration and congressional observers. Supporters of a call-up could cite the changes wrought by Total Force Policy, by the All Volunteer Force, and by massive modernization and reorganization programs, but the reality facing the politicians was that in no recent instance had call-up of the reserves generated popular support for a policy.²³

At other times, such as Operation Just Cause, the urgency of calling up reservists was negated by the availability of volunteers. Title 10 USC 673(b) pertained only to reservists called up in an involuntary status, but another

subparagraph of the statute, 672(d), dealt with the use of volunteers. This subparagraph had its origins in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, which had been drafted in the light of experience of massive call-ups for World War II and Korea and which allowed the recall of members without the need for declaring a national emergency. The 672(d) legislation further allowed the service secretary to order to active duty a member with the consent of that member, and in the case of guardsmen, the consent of the governor.²⁴

In 1986, the Montgomery Amendment, named for its author and sponsor, Congressman G. V. ("Sonny") Montgomery (D-Miss.), eliminated the need for the consent of the governor in the case of overseas training on the basis of his or her objection to the location, type, purpose, or schedule of such training.²⁵

Viewing it as a threat to the authority of the states, Gov Rudy Perpich of Minnesota and five other governors challenged the constitutionality of the Montgomery Amendment in the courts. In *Perpich v. Department of Defense*, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously decided that the militia clauses in the Constitution are subordinate to Article I, Section 8, which authorizes Congress to make rules for the governance of the armed forces. It ruled that National Guard members have dual membership in the state militia and the National Guard of the United States, and the latter has precedence. With the finding of the constitutionality of the Montgomery Amendment, few state powers restricted the use of the National Guard.²⁶

Subparagraph 672(d) provides for the use of reserve volunteers and has been the authority for the use of thousands of reservists over the years. It offers advantages to the services and the administration not found in 673(b). Most meaningfully, it does not require a presidential decision as responsibility is delegated to the secretary of defense and, in the Air Force, down to the level of the gaining major command.²⁷

Prior to the Persian Gulf War, another perceived advantage of the volunteer option was the ability to use less than a unit. Under the involuntary call-up, only a unit could be called, while with volunteers, parts of a unit could participate. Volunteers also were not subject to the limitation of 90 days and the 90-day extension, nor did their use trigger the requirements of the War Powers Resolution.²⁸

An example of the advantage of using volunteers is in Operation Just Cause. Though no involuntary call-up was initiated, the volunteers were requested at the outset, and, even though it was during the Christmas holidays, they came forth in quantity. Eighteen ANG units participated in or were alerted for possible action. A-7 fighter aircraft flew 76 fighter sorties; C-130s provided 178 tactical airlift sorties, moving 3,000 personnel and 550 tons of materiel; C-5 and C-141 strategic airlifters flew in over 1,900 people and 1,400 tons of cargo; and special operations C-130s flew 19 sorties. Prior to this conflict, some questions had been raised about how much reserve medical personnel would be willing to participate. The New York Air National Guard's 139th Aeromedical Evacuation Flight was notified of the need for the unit at 0300 hours on 20 December 1989. By 1130 hours, they had 16 mission-ready crews, a call-up response of 100 percent, and all as volunteers.²⁹

Volunteerism's greatest disadvantage came from a planning standpoint. Air Force planners did not wish to make plans around volunteers showing up for a war, preferring to deal with the greater guarantee of statistics dealing with active duty resources. Volunteerism is described in the War and Mobilization Plan, Volume 1 (WMP-1) as:

force expansion option . . . [that] could be used on a selective basis to gain access to the Reserve Components in the initial phase of a crisis Volunteerism provides a response capability, short of using the Presidential Reserve Call-up Authority, to support the expansion of missions during a measured increase in DEFCON status or for the use of other operational forces as deemed appropriate.³⁰

Though volunteers had been used in many contingencies and had never failed to materialize when needed, there was no way of convincing planners that in a crunch they would be there.

At the outset of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, Air Force and Air National Guard plans called for mobilization to be guided by Air Force Regulation (AFR) 45-1, *Purpose, Policy, and Responsibilities for Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve*, 2 January 1987, and more specifically by AFR 28-5, *USAF Mobilization Planning*, 29 May 1980. With the focus of most cold-war era planning on conflict in Europe, little was done to prepare for a contingency operation. As the cold-war threat declined, need for a new AFR 28-5 became apparent, and a draft was wending through the tortuous process involved changing a military publication. Changes in regulations, particularly if they involve agreements between branches of the service or various components within a branch, can take years to complete. At least one senior Air National Guard advisor to a major command was assured that the gaining command had no need for mobilization of the Guard. In that environment, getting command concurrence on the regulation was an even slower process than normal.³¹

From the end of the cold war to the Iraqi invasion, the ANG system of mobilization was confusing and in need of repair. While volunteerism had been used in earlier conflicts and was reasonably well understood, the presidential call-up had not been invoked and was not easily understood. Official guidance and policy statements were inconsistent. Opinions even varied on whether presidential call-up was a form of mobilization, and this was important because regulations and implementing directives differentiate between mobilized and nonmobilized status and who assumes varied responsibilities for operational and administrative control.

The Government Accounting Office (GAO) report, *Reserve Force: DOD Guidance Needed on Assigning Roles to Reserves Under the Total Force Policy*, December 1989, cited 673(b) as a mobilization authority, and even with DoD nonconcurrence, published the report without resolving the differences. The report states, "The most readily available authority for such mobilization is found in 10 USC 673(b), which authorizes the President to activate up to 200,000 selected reservists for up to 90 days" It lists in a table the "Presidential 200K Call-up" as an option for mobilization. Though not concurring with it, the GAO report also publishes the DOD opinion that the

200K is "not considered a mobilization authority. The statute was intended to provide accessibility to reserve forces without mobilization" ³²

The law, 10 USC 673(b), does not use the term *mobilization*. Its principle aim is to give the president access to reserve forces without having to be in a war or national emergency. ³³ AFR 45-1 shares the perspective that the call-up is not a mobilization. It states, "Command jurisdiction of all non-mobilized units of the ANG is vested in the governor" and goes on to say that "under a Presidential Call-up issued pursuant to 10 USC 673b, administrative jurisdiction will remain unchanged. Operational control will be transferred to the commander of the gaining command." It then covers mobilization: "Under mobilization authority, command jurisdiction will transfer to the commander of the gaining command." ³⁴

Then, confusing matters further, AFR 28-5 lists 673b as one of the statutory authorities for mobilization by the president under the category of Limited Presidential Mobilization. Lest there be any doubt, it goes on to make clear that this is the presidential call-up, and even the chapter covering this subject was titled "Limited Mobilization." ³⁵

The draft version of AFR 28-5 making the rounds of the Pentagon in 1989 and 1990 had eliminated the term *limited mobilization* and separated the call-up into another chapter. Still, in paragraph 2-2, under "Statutory Authorities for Mobilization," it lists "Section 673b . . . 200,000 call-up." ³⁶

The process for the call-up of the Selected Reserves had been reviewed and was reasonably sound. The theoretical aspects at the headquarters level were reasonable, and at the unit level had actually been practiced on an individual basis. Units had practiced their mobility processing as a part of mobilization and had even simulated deployments to their designated overseas bases or had deployed to stateside locations.

The actual plan for the Selected Reserve call-up process was to be implemented at various levels. The president signs an executive order to authorize the secretary of defense or secretary of transportation (for the Coast Guard) to call up. The secretaries then issue letters to the service secretaries and to the commandant of the Coast Guard. The service secretaries then provide authority to their service to call up units. The services then begin calling up units, notifying commanders and units and, in the case of the National Guard, the governors of affected states. Individuals not in units (not a factor in the ANG) are also notified. If dealing with volunteers, the governor must concur, but in an involuntary call-up (200K or mobilization), the unit is directly notified and the governor informed. ³⁷

In the planning, the lowest level of call-up was a unit. The concept here was "Train as a unit, call as a unit." To many guardsmen, this meant the call would be for their squadron or the unit in their community. Air Force wartime planners had long been thinking at a different level, using the unit type code (UTC), a different category. A UTC groups personnel into clusters of skills that can be used in wartime tasking to meet the needs of a particular war plan. They vary in size from a few people to groups of several hundred, depending on the tasking. Units such as a squadron can be broken into

several UTCs, and the UTCs can cross subsection or squadron boundaries. Many members of a unit have no UTC tasking but can be backfilled into an existing UTC as the need arises. (See fig. 1 for a typical tactical fighter unit UTC tasking.) DOD plans envisioned the use of UTCs as meeting the statutory requirement for involuntarily called units. This requirement did not apply to volunteers.³⁸

In implementing the call-up within the Air Force, Headquarters Air Force (AF/XOO) alerts the major commands and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). NGB in turn notifies the governors and/or the adjutants general. Units and individuals are notified by their chain of command. Headquarters Air Force then issues an executive order to MAJCOMs and the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC), and the ANG, ARPC, and commands publish orders.


From an operational standpoint, the decision as to whom is needed is coordinated by the commander in chief (CINC) of the theater of operations through the DOD chain of command (fig. 2). The CINC identifies his needs to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who then coordinates with his legislative and legal counsel, and for the operation with his subordinate directorates through the director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁹

At the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the J-1, or Manpower and Personnel section, provides the individual head count. This is done by monitoring the Military Manpower and Accession Status Report (MOBREP). This information gives the daily status of the services and is reported by the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN). It contains only individual data and does not give unit status. It does, however, break the information down into categories.⁴⁰

The J-3, or Operations section, provides the "big picture" needed. It uses the status of resources and training system (SORTS) to assess the total force status. It obtains this information from the services, who have generated it from the units through the chain of command. It also uses the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data System (TPFDDS) and daily situation reports (SITREPS) to show the flow of forces into the area of responsibility (AOR). This information is given in the daily operations intelligence report.⁴¹


The J-4, or Logistics section, monitors the unit status through the use of the force augmentation planning and execution system (FAPES). This system forms the baseline of the mobilization process providing readiness status of reserve component forces. It identifies the status of units ordered to active duty and monitors the status or progress of unit mobilization. It generates a variety of unit status reports, identifying unit readiness, types, location, and even data by state.⁴²

In the implementation phase the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) works closely with the Joint Staff. Numerous DOD agencies and offices are involved in the mobilization process. The OSD provides the policy guidance, notifies individual congressmen, and initiates the public affairs program. The Joint Staff monitors the process, with J-1 tracking the personnel strengths and policy issues; J-3 working with the services, Joint Staff, and CINCs on phasing and deployment; and J-4 monitoring unit status and requesting



Source: Col Michael N. Killworth, ANG, The Silent Call-up Option (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press), 8.

Figure 1. A Typical ANG Tactical Flying Unit



Source: Operation Desert Shield/Storm Reconstruct of Naval Reserve Call-up, vol. 2, Naval War College, 3 April 1991, C-III-7.

Figure 2. Reserve Requirements Coordination

additional allocations or a 90-day extension from the SECDEF if needed. The legislative and legal counsel collaborates on SECDEF requests.⁴³

Within the Air Force, the chief of staff issues the alert order. The theater CINC is then notified of the units and capability available. The CINC then establishes the latest arrival date (LAD) and the CINC required date (CRD) and passes this information to the Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM or TRANSSCOM) or the USAF major command. TRANSCOM and the major commands do backward planning and establish a call-up date. Headquarters USAF publishes the executive order and ANG and AFRES publish orders. The units then report for duty and are readied for deployment. Within the Joint Staff, J-3 prepares the deployment order and J-4 reviews them. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then signs the deployment order and the unit deploys.⁴⁴

Based on learned lessons from past conflicts, the mobilization methodology for 1990 was far from haphazard. It was, however, out of date and inadequate to meet the Desert Shield/Desert Storm scenario requirements. The regulations were reasonably clear as to how a full mobilization would occur. They incorporated directives from the administration, the Congress, requests from the National Guard Bureau, from the Air Force, and other elements of the Department of Defense. Planners suffered from planning flaws, failing to take into account basic elements such as the use of volunteers. They were prepared for a massive war in Europe, not a contingency operation. Defense planners were well aware that the cold war was over and that future conflicts would probably be regional, but had never changed their plans. The awareness at one level did not transfer to all others in part because of complex and cumbersome systems required to affect change. Just as it took almost three years for Congress to go from recognition of the problem to implementing 673(b), it also was a slow process making the change to the new scenario. In many ways, the subtlety of the accepted cold war mentality was difficult to overcome.

Notes

1. Brig Gen Donald W. Shepperd, NGB/CF, The Pentagon, interview with author, 12 December 1991.

2. Col Robert Lutz, ANGRG/LG, Andrews AFB, Md., interview with author, 13 April 1992.

3. Lt Col Howie Derrick, ANGRG/FM, Andrews AFB, Md., interview with author, 15 April 1992.

4. James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy, What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Basic Books), 1989, 107-9.

5. Department of Defense, *Total Force Policy Report to the Congress*, December 1990, 13.

6. Wilson, 120-22.

7. Charles J. Gross, *Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard, 1943-1969* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1985), 158-63.

8. Maj Gen Philip G. Killey, NGB/CF, The Pentagon, interview with author, 12 February 1992; General Shepperd, interview with author, 17 September 1991; and Col Herbert R. Horn, Jr., USAF, Retired, former TAC/RA, interview with author, 2 June 1992.

9. Killey interview with Dr Charles J. Gross, NGB-PAH, 7 January 1993; and Brig Gen Donald W. Shepperd, interview with Doctor Gross, NGB-PAH, 11 January 1993.
10. Charles E. Heller, *The New Military Strategy and Its Impact on the Reserve Components* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College), 7 December 1991, 12; and Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," *Parameters*, vol. 21 (Summer 1991): 48.
11. Col Michael N. Killworth, *The Silent Call-up Option: Volunteerism in the Air National Guard*, (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, January 1992), 13-14; and Sen Sam Nunn, "Senator Nunn's Statement on Reserve Call-up Decision," press release, 22 August 1990, published in *Operation Desert Shield/Storm Reconstruct of Naval Reserve Call-up*, vol. 2 (Naval War College, 3 April 1991), C-VIII-4.
12. Killworth, 14.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. William K. Brehm, "Why DOD Needs New Call-up Authority," *Commander's Digest* 18, no. 14 (2 October 1975): 4. Cited in Killworth, 15.
16. Killworth, 15.
17. *US Code*, Title 10, subpar. 673(b).
18. Senate, *Report on Enabling the President to Authorize the Involuntary Order to Active Duty of Selected Reservists for a Limited Period without a Declaration of War or National Emergency*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1975, no. 94-562, calendar no. 538, 6; and Sen Sam Nunn, 22 August 1990, untitled press release.
19. Killworth, 16.
20. Frederick C. Oelrich, "Graduated Mobilization Response: Show of Force on the Arabian Peninsula," *ROA National Security Report*, October 1990, 25-27.
21. Killworth, 17.
22. Ibid.
23. Michael W. Davidson, "Vietnam Baggage: The Nonmobilization Option," *Military Review*, January 1989, 29.
24. Killworth, 18.
25. Norman Beckman, "Limiting State Involvement in Foreign Policy: The Governors and the National Guard in *Perpich v. Defense*," in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Summer 1991, 109.
26. Ibid., 119-20.
27. Killworth, 19.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 26-28.
30. National Security Analysts, Inc., *Air National Guard Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Lessons Learned Final Report* (Alexandria, Va.: NSA, Inc.), 7 January 1992, 7.
31. Ibid., 103-5.
32. Ibid., 107.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 108.
36. Ibid.
37. *Reconstruct of Naval Reserve Call-up*, C-III-11, 13.
38. Killworth, 8-9.
39. JCS Brief, undated, in *Reconstruct of Naval Reserve Call-up*, C-III-7 and C-III-11.
40. Ibid., C-III-14.
41. Ibid., C-III-15.
42. Ibid., C-III-16.

43. Ibid., C-III-17.
44. Ibid., C-III-27.

Chapter 3

Implementing the Call-up and Mobilization

When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, Air National Guard leaders faced significant mobilization-related problems. Since the last call-up had been in 1968, they had many new rules and regulations to consider, a new type of all volunteer force, and a host of new considerations. The need to deal with several different commands simultaneously, to alter standard operating procedures that had been in place for years, and to satisfy demands coming from many directions presented a major challenge. The mobilization would be acknowledged as a success, not only for the effort itself but for the upgrading of the reserve forces as a part of Total Force Policy. Appendix A lists the reserve call-up of key events.

Initial difficulties were not particularly serious for the executives or the operators, but fell principally on the managers. The principal decisions by executives were broad, entailing who should be mobilized, when they should go, and where. They dealt with decisions on the use of volunteers or involuntary call-up. The operators, most of whom were well trained at their tasks, responded to the taskings, following their directives, flying the aircraft, operating the communications, loading planes, providing security or medical treatment, or doing as required by the gaining command. The task of solving problems fell hardest on the managers. They were forced to plan the methods, to advise on how to implement new pay programs to merge active and reserve pay, to decide if the personnel evaluation (EPR/OPR) system should be merged, and to deal with other constraints and problems.

How, then, did the execution of the program compare with the plan? Preparations were for a World War III scenario. The level of conflict considered was so great that neither use of volunteers nor demobilization was seriously incorporated into the plans. Still, units had practiced, though more for mobility (moving the troops and equipment) than mobilization (being called to and incorporated into the active duty forces). Exercises had aided the units and commands in preparing to move the troops, but they also had given SOPs that were no longer valid when a unit was activated. For the most part, the operation went smoothly, helped by cooperation from almost every level and by a strong desire to make the mobilization and implementation of forces work. It also involved making significant changes to the plans as Operation Desert Shield evolved, selectively using regulations that conflicted with one another, and putting a completely new spin on some other directives.

Immediately after the invasion, ANG leaders, notified as they should have been, began to prepare for involvement of the Guard in a potential conflict. Their

first problem was how to go to war, and since the president had not declared a call-up, the reserve components could only provide volunteers. Anxious to participate, the ANG found some problems and challenges immediately.¹

In preparing for conflict, Air Force planners were reluctant to include ANG and AFRES volunteers in their plans, since there was no guarantee they would show. No one wants to be embarrassed by predicting X number of volunteers and then having nobody show up. As a result, AFR 28-5, the regulation guiding Air Force and MAJCOM planners on the use of reservists, contained absolutely no guideline on the accession or use of reserve volunteers.² Guard and AFRES leaders assured the planners that volunteers would be available as needed, yet the problem was how to guarantee a number for the planners to plug in. While figures of exact percentage of unit involvement were being discussed, no figure was being used by Air Force planners, so they would not incorporate the idea into plans.³

Prior to the implementation of the presidential call-up, the only way to readily access the reserve components was through use of volunteers. ANG leaders readily accepted the use of volunteerism, while accepting some negative effects in its implementation. In a national emergency, it was the fastest way to respond to the crisis, and as a branch of the military, the Guard wanted to be a participant in defending American interests. After consultation with the gaining MAJCOMs and ANG units, NGB requested volunteers from the units. The response was overwhelming, and messages had to be sent to units to control the numbers. The first volunteers were activated 3 August 1990, the day after the invasion. (See fig. 3 for a bar graph of ANG voluntary participation.) By 23 August, the day after the involuntary call-up started, the number of volunteers had peaked at 4,036, covering a wide variety of career fields and types of flying units, with the airlift, air




Figure 3. Operation Desert Shield/Storm Volunteers

refueling, special operations, and reconnaissance units most clearly involved.⁴ By 10 September the initial push had slightly subsided, and the number of volunteers declined to 3,035, while the number involuntarily called stood at 370. By 5 December, volunteers numbered 2,850, while those involuntarily called had increased to 1,204. They went to the Persian Gulf, to backfill in the states and overseas for active duty units deployed to the AOR.⁵

To handle the use of volunteers, the ANG had to set up a system to solicit and use them. This was initially authorized by a directive establishing the Contingency Support Center, which was to be guided by a draft regulation, "National Guard Bureau Contingency Support Center Concept of Operations." It was accomplished by filling positions with staff members at the Air National Guard Support Center at Andrews AFB, Maryland, only a few miles from the Pentagon and NGB headquarters. They worked through the Operations Center (ANGSC/DOC), making solicitations to the units on the basis of input requests from NGB. The staff available at the Support Center was quickly overwhelmed, especially since they were also required to perform their permanent jobs. They also had the difficulty of lacking authority since field units and even major commands lacked knowledge of their existence, had no directives on how to deal with them, and questioned their authority.⁶

To facilitate the operation, a request was sent by ANGRC operation to field units for volunteers to come and help the DOC handle the needs of both the Support Center and NGB. Response was immediate, and the Air National Guard Combat Support Center (CSC) was formed with about 40 volunteers from a variety of backgrounds who were able to communicate to many types of units. Essentially, they were to be the intermediaries between the field units and ANG headquarters. (See figs. 4 and 5.)⁷




Figure 4. Air National Guard—Command Control and Administration




Figure 5. Informal Information Flow

To operate the system, the CENTAF commander would report the needs in the area of responsibility to the chief of staff of the Air Force (CSAF). The CSAF would then notify the Air Force Combat Support Staff (CSS) and the MAJCOM to identify requirements. If the support needed was to come from the ANG, the CSS would notify a cell from the National Guard Bureau Planning Office (NGB/XOX) that would be located with the CSS and that would be giving ANG inputs. XOX would then notify the Air National Guard CSC of requirements, either formally through Headquarters NGB or informally by direct contact with the CSS. Often an informal, simultaneous request, or "heads up" warning, was coming from the gaining MAJCOM directly to the CSC. The CSC coordinated these requests through channels at the Support Center to contact the state National Guard headquarters and units in the field to assess their capability to support certain missions. The units in the field were also getting "heads up" information from the gaining MAJCOMs and even from individuals in the CSC prior to formal notification.⁸

Such informal contact and notification is a normal part of any business and need not be discouraged. There were, however, two problems. First, the information was often coming not as information but as a directive. This created confusion over who was in charge of giving orders. Units were perplexed as to whether they were to listen to the CSC, the gaining MAJCOM, or others in the chain.⁹ Second, it was too often shared by too many levels within the structure, and members were subjected to a dizzying array of requests that generated rumors and more stress than needed.¹⁰

The lack of a usable AFR 28-5 created immediate problems. The old volume was badly outdated and the interim draft was declared valid for the war. Unfortunately, dissemination was poor, and multiple versions surfaced. For a considerable time, none was available in the field, and even major commands had

no access to the interim volume. Receiving questionable or conflicting directives without a compatible source document gave units and commands a problem.¹¹

Questions also arose over who was in control at any given moment and what was known. The MAJCOMs often did not know what to expect from the volunteer packages or how to use them. As a result much of the early message traffic was spent debating this point. The lack of education on the ANG by the major command staff exceeded the Guard's capacity to educate.¹² Lack of a clear policy made it hard for units to respond and know what the future would hold. It also meant that without established policy there was a chance of missing a "checklist" item, such as approval of the governor, thus creating a potential legal problem and at least some embarrassment.¹³

Some states also opted to not participate in the volunteer program. At least one unit commander had to alter plans when a subordinate unit in a neighboring state was not available on a voluntary basis. The state headquarters in question had decided that unit integrity was more important and that the unit would be affected in the future if volunteerism had cut the ranks too much.¹⁴ In another state, the adjutant general tried to stop a wing commander from volunteering his unit, even confronting the commander publicly before a congressman from that state. In this awkward situation, the governor sided with the unit leader, and the adjutant general retired shortly after the confrontation.¹⁵

Though the ANG CSC was the principal communications hub for the ANG, it had no tasking authority. Unfortunately, some messages retransmitted by the CSC failed to identify the source and gave the impression that the CSC was doing the tasking. Also, lines of control were not certain, and agreement of which headquarters was in charge was uncertain at unit level. The lack of secure voice or fax communications compounded problems in communicating with some units and state headquarters and made communication of secure topics difficult.¹⁶

From the onset of the conflict in the Gulf, the lack of a clear and coherent policy was obvious. For example, in a voluntary call, the ANG would retain control over administrative matters such as pay and efficiency reports. However, when units shifted from voluntary to involuntary call-up status, they would shift to ANG control of administrative, but not of pay matters. In a full mobilization, they would shift to complete control by the gaining elements. Prior to conflict, this all appeared coherent but promptly changed when the real test started.¹⁷

When the first meetings were held to discuss the method of call for reserve components, Air Force representatives pointed out that because of legal problems, anybody held as a POW would have to be on active duty. This had apparently never been an issue in the creation of AFR 28-5 and was not discussed until the start of Operation Desert Shield. Managers in the finance area were given one of their first challenges. Could they allow members to come into harm's way without being adequately covered? ANG representatives from the ANG Support Center and the Air Force Accounting and Finance Center indicated that the reserve pay system (JUMPS-RC) could be merged with the active duty pay system (JUMPS) without significant

problems, as had been done on tests. The tests had not been extensive enough and when the massive merger of the files was attempted the transition was not smooth. A number of members had pay problems, checks were not issued promptly, and even a year later the problems created had still not been resolved.¹⁸ With erroneous W-2s, pay miscalculations, and assorted other errors, complaints about financial problems still reverberated at NGB and the Finance Center over a year and one-half after the end of the conflict.

This does not mean there was massive confusion in the operation. It does mean that there was confusion, particularly for managers in the support areas. The operators and managers in the operational units were almost always aware of the operational transfer to the gaining command and had little confusion in carrying out their mission.

The use of ANG volunteers varied considerably from one command to another. When the first calls came to request airlift and refueling units, there was no effective plan for the use of these elements in a voluntary status. Fortunately, the laws allowed their use, and ANG volunteers in MAC, SAC, and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC)-gained units had prior experience in Grenada, Libya, and other minor contingencies of the eighties. The concept was not a problem. In MAC, two-thirds of the C-130 fleet was in the reserve components, and a significant portion of the C-141 and C-5 assets, although most of the latter were in the Air Force Reserve rather than the Air Guard. For MAC, the use of reserves was natural and mandatory. In SAC the use of the KC-135E tankers was equally necessary, and though not as routinized as in MAC, the system was not difficult to adapt to. The smaller AFSOC was quite used to dealing with volunteers in the 193d Special Operations Group (SOG) at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, its only ANG asset. The 193d had a special state agreement that allowed the accession of volunteers without having to gain gubernatorial consent. Members had been accessed for Grenada and Panama without having to contact the state for permission. This simplified procedures and offered reassurance on the command's ability to gain members of the unit when needed.¹⁹

Though MAC, SAC, and AFSOC depended on reserve components to carry out their mission, the situation at TAC was different and elicited a different response from the Air Guard executives. At TAC, the number of aircraft available through internal sources was sufficient to meet the needs of the conflict. Here the problem was more a need of the ANG culture than a requirement of TAC. Recognizing the fighter/interceptor role as part of the core of the guard culture, the executives were anxious to affirm the viability of TAC-gained units. Immediately after the invasion, Maj Gen Philip Killey, director of the Air National Guard, contacted Gen Robert D. Russ, commander of TAC, requesting the use of ANG volunteers. A balancing act was required since the Guard had long contended that support aircraft can be called up in small packages but fighter units must be called as a unit because of the nature of the interaction between pilots. Getting an entire unit of fighter pilot volunteers for an unknown duration would be a problem. The politically astute Russ acknowledged the request, and after consulting with the

CENTAF commander did not call fighters. Rather, he requested TAC gained aerial reconnaissance RF-4C aircraft.²⁰

This example involved the 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Birmingham, Alabama. Only two days after the invasion, and before involuntary call-up authority was available, unit leaders were asked to organize and deploy an element in support of Desert Shield. This was justified by recognition that most of the Air Force reconnaissance capability is in the Guard, and the Birmingham unit possessed unique camera system capability that would be useful in-theater. (In point of fact, most TAC staff had wanted to use active duty resources available at Bergstrom AFB, Texas, and the camera capability was not even an issue until after the unit had deployed to the Gulf. Selection was on the basis of needs perceived by the ANG executives.)²¹ The governor and ANG leaders in the state supported the request. The unit called for volunteers, and received well in excess of the 115 needed to accompany the six airplanes to deploy.²²

The request required the unit to tailor the UTC to meet specific needs. Traditionally, TAC-gained units are structured to include most of the organization in a deployment of the flying unit. Making a change requires an alteration of the entire list of requirements, of who would be needed, how much support, and a variety of other questions that needed to be answered. The staff at TAC had not practiced this mission. They asked the unit to tailor its own UTC when it is the responsibility of the gaining command to create and maintain the requirements for the UTC.²³

TAC headquarters participated in a number of ANG deployments to Europe, and staffers and units know the Guard provides much of its own support on a deployment. This is true when deploying on internal training, but not when activated, even voluntarily. It now became the task of the gaining command but it went counter to the standard operating procedure (SOP) of prior experience. Rehearsals prepared the unit to move operationally but did not familiarize it with requirements of an actual activation. TAC was inexperienced in taking its gained units to war. Now, after many years of minimal inclusion of the Guard, the staffs did not foresee the problems of going to a contingency operation. Fortunately for the Birmingham unit, the transports required to take them to theater were several days late, giving time to tailor the unit-response package.²⁴

Three things were immediately made clear in this action. First, volunteerism can be an important part of Air Force rapid response. It works well, and the unit and the Air National Guard can stand and deliver. Second, granting the request for a modified UTC signaled that the Guard was willing to adjust on this issue. In the interest of being involved in carrying out the war effort and being as supportive as possible, the ANG was willing to make adjustments. Third, by asking and pressing for inclusion, the executives had assured the use of their resources, when they had a sympathetic and cooperative leader at TAC.

The Strategic Air Command had all bombers on active duty, but a large portion of the air refueling tankers were in the reserves. The air refueling units were a necessary asset to support the forces. For many aircraft to get to

the theater and for the fighters to continue the operations, the refuelers were crucial enough to set the operations tempo. Asked for volunteers, they responded so quickly and in such numbers that SAC was quickly overwhelmed. Twelve units were tasked, and initially each responded directly to Headquarters SAC seeking advice. The coordination activities proved so complex that SAC delegated much of the responsibility to its Eighth Air Force, and by mutual agreement, to the units and NGB.²⁵

The units in turn had to iron out many of their own problems, and to coordinate among themselves. As an example, the refueling units at Rickenbacker ANGB, Ohio; Knoxville, Tennessee; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were grouped together. Each unit was left to its own devices on how to handle the rotation of personnel planned to go to the AOR. At Pittsburgh, for example, the personnel were to be rotated every 17 days during the Desert Shield phase as the buildup continued. The shipment of equipment called for other plans. The initial war plans called for the Military Airlift Command to provide massive airlift capability, but these plans proved unrealistic when so many units were mobilizing. The units were left to provide organic airlift, that is, with their own aircraft. Rickenbacker and Knoxville had K-loaders to load heavy equipment, while Pittsburgh had to borrow the neighboring AFRES C-130 unit's sole K-loader. Though the AFRES unit cooperated fully, it was deemed prudent to have Rickenbacker and Knoxville carry the heavy equipment. Such coordination among and between units was commonplace as the volunteers were moved to the theater.²⁶

In the anxiety to enter the fray, the ANG leaders possibly overextended, which had a negative effect on sustainability. They wanted to be proactive, but in their dealings with most commands, provided more support than could be absorbed, setting a precedent they could later regret. In the desire to provide the needs of the customer, they did not wait and assess the real requirements of the gaining MAJCOM.²⁷

MAC regularly augments its fleet with reserve aircraft, yet in the early days of their buildup a problem arose over who pays and who is in charge. ANG training missions are normally funded out of ANG funds, yet those flown for MAC are funded by the gaining command. There was some confusion over who was paying for what, who had what type of control, and whether, for example, a backfill mission flown to Panama was in support of Desert Shield. Despite these questions, the ability to carry out the mission was not affected. Operators, correctly assuming somebody would pay for them and their gas, flew as needed. Those in units and commands, at NGB, and in resources and in services, (particularly in supply, fuel, accounting and finance, and personnel) were left to sort out and correct all the support problems.

Among units gained by the Military Airlift Command, the use of volunteers presented no conceptual difficulty and was practiced regularly. Using C-5s and C-141s, MAC staffers were attuned to using active duty and AFRES aircraft and crews, even sharing the use of aircraft in associate reserve units collocated with their active duty counterparts. The addition of the comparatively small elements of one C-141 unit at Jackson, Mississippi, and the C-5 unit at Stewart Field, New York, made the integration of the ANG

contribution rather easy. After clearance had been given for American troops to arrive in Saudi Arabia, the Mississippi unit flew the first American aircraft to land there in support of Operation Desert Shield.

The C-130 units provided more of a challenge. Although used to working with MAC in missions, they were not as attuned to the command's internal functions such as centralized scheduling; moreover, the system was quickly overwhelmed with units and individuals volunteering to serve. Initially more volunteers were accepted than could be feasibly used. Though many aircraft were sent to the theater, more were used in backfill missions than were sent overseas. Units also had a difficult time assessing the precise number of personnel being activated in support of Desert Storm, since many ANG C-130s routinely are called to active duty to fly missions, and assessing the precise cause was problematic, and did not effect activation of crews and aircraft.²⁸

An example of advanced preparation for use of volunteers in a contingency situation is the 193d Special Operations Group, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The only unit gained by the Air Force Special Operations Command, it has been called for numerous contingencies, including operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause. To facilitate involvement there is a preconsent agreement between AFSOC and the governor of Pennsylvania allowing the unit or elements of it to be activated without preconditions and without having to consult the governor as long as the unit and personnel are available and willing to assist the Air Force. Members of the unit are required to sign forms agreeing to volunteer as available without requiring consultation with the state.²⁹

Other states also have preconsent agreements for air defense and air refueling units, but all are tied to distinct conditions that have no relation to a contingency operation such as Desert Shield. Most are geared to an outdated cold-war scenario and are designed to respond to potential attack on the United States. They can be activated only when the Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) reaches a particular level and are planned to respond to an air defense alert or in response to a MAJCOM single integrated operations plan (SIOP) or dispersal plans.³⁰

Volunteerism has distinct advantages in the early stages of a response to a conflict, and it is generally preferred by airlift and air refueling commanders as the way to employ their units. While preparing a study on volunteerism in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, ANG Col Michael Killworth interviewed many of these commanders, and found them to be especially amenable to this method if they could rotate their people in and out of theater every few weeks. It allows a commander to select among personnel, selecting the most qualified or those for whom it would be most convenient, and to not select those for whom the call-up would be disadvantageous. This means far fewer complaints than in past conflicts and less concern from Congress, the administration, or the active duty elements over the participation.

Lost in the argument was the idea that the causes of most past complaints from reservists had been eliminated. There were far fewer Individual Ready Reserves (IRR), generally prior service members assigned to the inactive reserves and often recalled as filler to reserve units. None were assigned to

any ANG units, and few to any other components. Other complaints were from those who had "volunteered" to join the ANG as an alternative to the draft, and from people who, once called, would be tasked to sit in place with clearly outdated equipment and would not be serious players in any conflict. The memory of past complaints, rather than the reason for them, was strong.

Volunteerism has, however, several drawbacks that were apparent in the initial phases of Desert Shield. Most of these drawbacks did not affect the overall operational capability of the Guard, but were a problem in relation to constraints or lack of preparation for a new scenario. Among these at NGB level was the lack of planning guidance on the solicitation of or use of volunteer forces. At the unit level there were coordination and personnel problems, and, more seriously for the long term, were problems of unit effectiveness and training when part of the unit is missing.³¹

In relation to the Air Force, the Air Staff Mobility Plans Division (AF/XOOTX) was not certain as to how to account for volunteers in the status of resources and training system (SORTS) data. They were even uncertain as to how it should be reported, and this left the SORTS data a questionable account as structured. At the units, commanders were not given guidance on how to reflect the use of their volunteers. In the reports, the unit commanders were tasked to evaluate their units C-status, or capability to be operable. This was done by a numbering system such that C-1 was fully capable, and C-4 reflected lack of being able to go to war. When a unit lost enough people and aircraft it would not have the proper C status to be considered operable. When do the deployed people and equipment count as unit members or toward unit effectiveness? If deployed aircraft do count, how long is it before the unit loses the effectiveness in training at home. SORTS data continued to be briefed for the duration of the war, even by units uncertain as to its meaning, and to executives who had to learn what to ignore when reviewing the data. A document of little value, it was not replaced with a more effective system, and is testimony to the longevity of SOPs, even when they have outlived their usefulness.³²

Many unit commanders had brought the SORTS problem to the attention of ANG leaders, yet the problem persisted. In their argument, the commanders were concerned with the validity of the document for several reasons. First, did it measure readiness? If so was it coordinated with the criteria for an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI), one of the basic Air Force evaluations of unit effectiveness and readiness. Commanders knew that they could be C-1, or combat ready, and not be able to pass an ORI. They also knew that in a competitive environment passing the ORI was not good enough, that an "excellent" or "outstanding" was expected. They were also told the SORTS criteria was not graded, but that if they did not do well enough their positions could be threatened. At the same time they were tasked to report the C-status.³³

Frustrated, the unit commanders knew they were being graded. They also knew that the headquarters even threw in counting methods that enticed them to give false accounts. Special codings were allowed, for example a unit with insufficient chemical warfare defense ensembles (CWDE) could report that it was C-1 except for gear that was back ordered. Since it was back

ordered, it did not count. The document became a frustrating example of incomplete information. Since it was better than no information, it was used, but needed to be cleaned up to become a more meaningful document.

Soon after the start of Operation Desert Shield there was a greater need for certain types of manpower and a need for an orderly accession of available reserve components. This led to the consideration of involuntary accession of the reserves, a more complicated process than activating volunteers. It also involved a number of decisions that were not considered in the planning phase. The involuntary call-up phase during the Persian Gulf War was very complicated and needs to be viewed in different ways at different levels. To review decision making at the national level, it is easier to look at basic considerations and review the sequence of events chronologically. Unit-level actions often occurred in clusters that did not follow a specific time sequence, and they are more readily studied topically. At the outset of Operation Desert Shield, national leaders in both the administration and the Congress saw the possibility of involuntary activation. Members of each had a set of considerations. They recalled the negative precedents of past calls, and they knew the potential political turmoil, especially if there were numerous casualties or if the troops merely sat in the desert waiting without the prospect of being used to win a war. Still, the services, particularly the Army, are structured in such a way that the use of reserves was imperative in any major conflict. The force would not be sustainable without this support structure, especially that of the Army Reserve.

The administration and Congress were also concerned about the message sent by calling up the reserves. Traditionally, the reserves were called up only as a last resort and were a diplomatic signal that the nation was gearing for war. In the early days of Operation Desert Shield, numerous factions anxiously sought a peaceful settlement to the potential conflict. Opinion polls about armed action indicated mixed feelings by both the American people and the Congress. In accord with United Nations sanctions, goods bound for Iraq were embargoed, and many Americans hoped the Iraqi government would respond by exiting Kuwait. The Iraqis also held civilian hostages from many lands, and a threatened attack could endanger them. Sending American forces into harm's way without giving serious alternatives a chance would be risky and foolish.

Congress needed to know how the reserves were to be used. Congress, as much as the Department of Defense, was the architect of Total Force Policy and had a vested interest along with the reserve components on their use in this contingency. Sen Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wisc.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and Congressman Montgomery, a long-time friend of the reserve components, all had prepared publications expressing concern for the use of the reserve components.

To make a decision, the administration and the Congress needed to know how long the conflict was to last, how many reservists would be used, how long they would be needed, and whether they were part of a presidential call-up or a partial mobilization. Early in the buildup, these were not easy

numbers to derive, yet decisions required an idea of the realities of the potential conflict.

The Department of Defense needed to consider what resources were needed from the reserve components. At the time of Operation Desert Shield a drawdown was being implemented in Europe, and American forces were beginning to withdraw from Germany and other points in Western Europe. Would they be diverted for use in the Middle East? Would the administration send home troops from Europe while simultaneously calling up the Guard and Reserves? Would active duty forces be adequate for the conflict? Were the reserve components sufficiently equipped, trained, and appropriate to the task?

The Army strongly favored calling up combat support and combat service support elements but none of the combat elements. The Army view on this was so pronounced that when calling up artillery units they declared them combat support rather than combat units.³⁴ The most striking Army problem was dealing with the roundout brigades. Roundout brigades were specifically structured so that a division had two active duty brigades and one reserve component brigade, with the reservists activated if the division went to war. When the Gulf War became imminent, the Army shifted plans and substituted active duty units, in one case even substituting a Stateside school brigade for the Army National Guard unit. Problems of dealing with the active duty elements remain more pronounced among the senior services. The Navy and Army want only support elements.

Not surprisingly, the Air Force consideration focused on support elements. In the active duty culture, the focus had always been on putting steel on target, and the emphasis had been put on the combat commands. For years the Air Force leadership was willing to lose to or share support aircraft with the reserves—especially airlift and air refueling. With a contingency, such as Operation Desert Shield, rather than a total war in a European scenario, they had adequate fighter and bomber resources to engage the enemy. The Air Force needed an immediate continuing response of the support aircraft, and much of this was taken care of by volunteerism.

In this contingency, several specialty areas needed more personnel than could be accessed by volunteerism. Among the larger were the medical, security police, communications and aerial ports. In smaller specialties such as linguistics, the need was immediate yet rather narrowly defined. These people were needed in the theater of operations and as backfill: that is, they were needed to fill in for active duty personnel removed from their bases to serve in-theater. Their needed length of involvement was uncertain.

The reserve components generally concerned themselves with core tasks, implementing their plans and making certain that "total force" was part of the action. An early and special concern of each group was the use of core tasks. For the Army National Guard, with a strong tradition of being a combat arm, the idea of being only support was particularly onerous. The failure to request use of the roundout brigades was particularly grating. Other components, such as the Navy Reserve and Army Reserve had long been structured by the parent service as support elements.

In the Air National Guard, the leadership at National Guard Bureau had to take into account the core tasks, the plans, and the methods of implementation. They knew the need to be a player, or "part of the hunt." They also faced the challenge of helping select the units to go, deciding when they would be needed, and how long they would be used. They had to work through their staff to make fast changes to regulations such as AFR 28-5 and to bolster the program at the Combat Support Center.³⁵


Implementation of this program became complicated and confusing. All the various players in the call-up process quickly realized that they were not singing from the same sheet of music, even when the title read the same. At the outset, the national leaders of reserve components began to campaign with their respective services and with Congress for inclusion. Within the services, the early responses varied depending on the gaining command, the nature of the work to be done, and an overall perspective of the organization. Within Congress, the response tended to be positive; after all, Congress had pushed for total force and had a vested interest in seeing its successful implementation.

Even with this vested interest, Congress and the administration had to view this issue pragmatically and assess the political impact. Though the political leaders did agree to include the reserves a look at two maps shows a problem they were well aware could develop, that if a sizable number of reservists were activated, and the results were negative, they could pay dearly in any reelection bid.

Two maps of "Reserve Components Total Mobilization by State" are on the following pages. They are based on figures of the total number of reservists eventually mobilized during the conflict (though the figure does not include the number of volunteers) and shows some interesting figures. The first, figure 6, depicts the ratio of reservists called to the total population of the state. As an example, the figure for Arkansas, 1:471, means that one out of every 471 residents of the state was mobilized in a reserve component of the armed forces. In New Jersey the figure is 1:1701. The reason for using the ratio method is to take into account the total population of the states and the relative impact. The total number mobilized in Arkansas was 4,989 and in New Jersey was 4,543. This would appear to be nearly the same, and many map viewers would not be aware that in 1990 Arkansas had 2,350,725 residents compared to New Jersey's 7,730,188.

To make the data more usable another map, figure 7, gives the number of reservists called per 25,000 population. This would mean that in a typical community of 25,000 the number called in Arkansas would be 53, and in New Jersey would be 15. These interesting differences can be attributed to a number of factors, including urbanization and regional cultural traditions.

The real point is, though, that the numbers are high enough to explain why Congress and the administration had concerns about using the reserves. Regardless of the exact ratio, there was an influence in practically every part of America. Taking two towns of about 25,000 residents each, that 53 people were likely to be called from Rogers, Arkansas, or 15 from Paramus, New Jersey, was not the critical factor. What was critical was that in either



Source: Based on total number called/mobilized in all reserve components for Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Does not include number serving in volunteer status.

Figure 6. Ratio of Reservists Called to the Total Population of the State

community, almost every resident would know and identify the war with someone called. This was no longer the less visible presence of an all volunteer and career force, this was friends and neighbors. Politicians knew that if this war went sour they could expect severe and immediate repercussions for their participation. (ANG ratio figures alone are not included in the maps since the Air Guard statistics alone were not the factor influencing policymakers. ANG statistics are discussed in chapter 5.)

The first announcement by the DOD on the use of an involuntary call-up came on 15 August 1990.³⁶ On 19 August, SECDEF Dick Cheney notified the deputy secretary of defense to prepare for the implementation of Public Law 10 *US Code* 673(b). Cheney directed his deputy to notify the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and have him ready to brief and show his plan on 22 August.

On 22 August the president authorized a call-up under 673(b).³⁷ Senator Nunn responded with a press release supporting the decision to order members of the Reserve and National Guard to active duty under the call-up law. Nunn noted this as recognition of the essential role that the Reserve and National Guard have in the armed forces as part of the Total Force concept.³⁸

That same day the president issued an executive order giving stop-loss authority to the secretary of defense.³⁹ This gave him the power to suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to service members essential to the national security. Five days later, the secretary delegated this authority to the service secretaries, within certain bounds. Stop loss would only affect members who were or were about to be engaged in the conduct or direct support of missions in the AOR, defined at this point as the Arabian peninsula. It was aimed at preventing the loss of personnel with skills critical to the war effort.⁴⁰ The secretary of the Air Force did not opt to invoke stop loss immediately for either the active duty or reserve components.

On 23 August the SECDEF authorized the service secretaries to call members of the Selected Reserves (no Individual Ready Reserves), but limited the numbers. The Army could call 25,000; Navy - 6,300; Marine Corps - 3,000; and Air Force - 14,500; for a total of 48,800. Pressed to explain how this would work, Pentagon spokesperson Pete Williams replied that the Air Force could, by 31 August, call 1,002, and by 1 October could call another 13,474, for a total of 14,476 from both the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. The first concern was for strategic airlift crews for the C-141 and C-5 heavy transports. The plan was to phase in the people to meet service needs. He explained that the numbers were not given to the services by the secretary, but that they were the numbers given him by the services of their own needs. These figures were "notional maximums." The Air Force expected the majority of the early call-ups to go to the Kuwait theater of operations (KTO). Of the units to be called, Williams was not specific, yet he went on to note, "But, as a general matter, reserve units that work as units will deploy as units."⁴¹

Questions showed how the times have changed, and also showed how quickly the government could respond to problems. For example, in earlier call-ups, the issue of medical insurance had not been particularly important. It was not a "given" assumption in American society. During the Vietnam era,

the young people coming in were often drafted, and were not already protected by employers' medical insurance. The call-up in Desert Shield affected people who already had coverage and after the war would be returning to their old jobs. They did not want their insurance to lapse, creating a condition where illnesses would be reassessed as "preexisting conditions." Noting the problem the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM) asked federal agencies and departments to pay medical insurance on activated reservists and to keep their jobs open.⁴² The latter was guaranteed by law, but agency heads needed to know what they would do if reservists were in the group furloughed if the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget law forced closure of their position. Keeping the insurance paid meant that the returning service members and their families would not be terminated by carriers for having "preexisting conditions."⁴³

To assist in handling needed changes on 24 August 1990, Senators John Glenn (D-Ohio) and Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) requested help from Stephen M. Duncan, assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs in drafting legislation. Specifically, they sought inputs on the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act provisions relating to civil liabilities. Of particular concern were portions relating to residential leases, home mortgages, installment contracts, insurance, and reemployment rights. The deadline for response was 10 September 1990.⁴⁴

Meanwhile the call-up of the reserves began, and the secretary of defense operated the plan unlike the way reservists had expected. They were expecting call-up by units, but the services and reserve components were thrown a curve with the call for a maximum number, the implementation of which had never been practiced before. The services called for a maximum number, or ceiling, in the call-up. They also specified what career fields and positions would be filled. The idea of calling units and meeting these criteria was mathematically impossible.

For example, with the need for aircrews and aircraft, and a SECDEF directed "notional maximum" of 1,002 people in AFRES and the ANG coming on board by 31 August, it was obvious that even a single unit with 1,200 people could not be called. With the low numbers, the call would essentially be limited to aircrews and maintenance personnel, with a minimum of leaders.⁴⁵

This left Air Guard leaders in a quandary. How could they support the cause and act quickly to be included while preserving the basic concept of unit integrity? They could not. Moreover, the Air National Guard had already shown a willingness to create a tailored UTC for calling up the Birmingham unit. In the MAC community, it was also common practice to call up only aircrews with a minimum of the command structure or support personnel, a concept readily accepted by ANG and AFRES leaders. What unfolded was a continuation of the policy seen at Birmingham with the volunteers, and was not a planned, deliberate action. The nonfighter units would be allowed to participate in small component packages, as they had done in the past.

Fighter units were still to be called as a unit, or at least close to this configuration. The view at NGB was that fighter units, as a combat force, required close intraunit communication to function, with elements trained together. To call less than unit-sized packages would decrease fighting effectiveness.⁴⁶

On 29 August the *New York Times* reported that this was the first major test of Total Force Policy. The article pointed out that reservists were fighting to overcome the low esteem accorded them by their active duty counterparts, who regarded them as ill trained and ill equipped. Though this focus was aimed at the Army, the article did not state this clearly, and the Air Guard was touched by the same brush. National Guard leaders were defensive about the articles that were portraying them in this light, knowing that such articles could affect the desire of the administration to call up a questionable force.⁴⁷

On the same day, another problem was reported involving calling up the reserves. Concern was expressed about how corporate America was going to respond to the call-up of reservists. Would they make a pay differential for employees losing money in the call? Responses varied, and some companies announced how they would deal with salaries and—an item of growing importance—with the benefits package. Much changed in America since the last major call-up, and mobilization revealed areas that had not been considered or had received little action.⁴⁸

Concerned with the call-up, some members of Congress were quick to offer advice on selected areas. On 11 September, Congressman John D. Murtha (D-Pa.) wrote to Secretary of Defense Cheney about how the dispatching of medical personnel overseas had left many military hospitals understaffed and forced to scale back services. The care needed was provided by CHAMPUS, the more expensive military insurance option, through local hospitals. Murtha viewed this as unsatisfactory and urged the secretary to call up reserve medical personnel on a one-for-one-basis to replace those sent overseas.⁴⁹

On the same day, Secretary Cheney and General Powell testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. In that meeting, Sen Alan Dixon (D-Ill.) asked why, with 2.1 million on active duty and drawdowns going on in Europe, was the use of reserves even being considered. He asked for minimal use of the reserves. Also at the meeting, Sen Trent Lott (R-Miss.) wanted to know why the roundout brigades, particularly those in his own state, had not been called up as required in the existing plans.⁵⁰

By September it was clear that this was unlike any past call-ups. In a poll on 3 September, *Time Magazine* reported that 70 percent of all Americans favored the call-up of the reserves.⁵¹ Another article a week later in *Time* reported that reserves this time were much more attuned to serving and that there was little grumbling. This positive response was a political bonus for the administration, and reflected well on the call. On 28 September, the Department of Defense released data that of the 27,000 reservists called to active duty, there were only three “no shows.”⁵²

On 17 September, the Secretary of the Air Force implemented stop-loss authority. Active duty and activated reserve personnel in critical units or Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) were extended. A change a few days later extended applicability to reserve units alerted for active duty with activation dates established. Later changes added more AFSCs to the list. Judge advocates at NGB were tasked to review the document for applicability to the Guard. Though they questioned the applicability to units that had not been

activated the issue remained a moot point since the activation was not by units but by UTCs and most commanders had had the leeway to solve issues at their home bases before they became legal cases.

By late September, General Powell publicly said that the military would try but could not promise to rotate units in the Persian Gulf every six months. This gave people a figure to hang onto, even though the caveat given was that this was only a goal.⁵³ On 24 September, the Department of Defense delivered an interim report to Capitol Hill concerning Total Force Policy. Its finding was that reserve components work well in unit or individual missions that do not require close intraunit coordination and are less effective where unit training and cohesiveness are important. This meant that missions like strategic airlift or support were effective and that ground combat and ships' crews were less so. This perspective received widespread criticism in the Congress for being incomplete and nonresponsive. There was a growing criticism in Congress for the failure to call up more reserve components.⁵⁴

ANG executives were concerned about the lack of use of combat units. They knew of the Army's contentions that Army combat units in the reserve components needed at least 60 to 90 days of postmobilization training to be ready. The Army also contended reserve units could not work effectively on maneuvers, which required complex levels of coordination. In the early weeks of Desert Shield the Air Force showed no inclination to using ANG fighter units, and there was concern in the ANG about being "part of the hunt." The ANG executives knew that their forces were ready to respond immediately, and were concerned that the arguments being presented by the Department of Defense in the congressional testimony were incomplete and not relevant to the Air Guard.

In the Air National Guard, units practiced and planned to be ready for call-up within 72 hours. Because pilots made up a small portion of the overall unit, additional training time was allocated to them without significantly altering the unit budget. Pilots average 107 days annually of active duty, and are combat ready at any time. Their Army counterparts were unable to do this, since "shooters" make up a large percentage of the organizations. The Army is forced to reconcile itself to a recall that includes postmobilization training, often of 60 days or more, to bring units up to required levels of combat readiness. Air reserve units do not have this interlude and the time between call-up and implementation is negligible.

The fact that Air Guard fighter units were not being called up had less to do with their training or proficiency than with the understanding of core tasks in the Air Force and the availability of fighters on active duty. The core of the Air Force is its bombers and fighters, it held onto these more tenaciously than it did support aircraft when resources were diverted to the reserve components. When the war broke out, there were insufficient support aircraft in the active duty force but enough bombers and fighters.

The core of the ANG was also in the fighter force, so their use in the call-up was important. As a result, the command engaged in various tactics to assure inclusion. General Killey and Lt Gen John B. Conaway and other ANG executives met with General Russ, the TAC commander, and with members of

Congress. Legislators actively sought these meetings, especially when they sensed foot-dragging in carrying out their wishes.

Congressman Montgomery was one of the first to express concern over the use of combat forces from the reserve components. Montgomery, a retired Army National Guard brigadier general, was a long-time friend of the reserve components and had carefully monitored their interests in Congress. In early October, he urged Secretary of Defense Cheney to include the reserve combat forces. Many representatives had already asked about the call-up of the Army's roundout brigades, but Montgomery made it clear that he was interested in the broader view across the reserve components. Cheney indicated that he and the DOD were studying use of reserve combat units.⁵⁵

In collateral activity, Senator Nunn attacked the failure to recall the reserve components in prior contingencies, contending that it sent the wrong message. To Nunn, the administration told the reserves their skills and training were not usable in a contingency. The senator also contended that the active duty forces were told, "we can't afford to rely on the reserves." At the same time Nunn cited inadequate rationale and blocked the attempt to extend the reservists active duty from 180 to 360 days. He had four reasons for doing this. First, if a national emergency existed, it needed to be declared and the whole question of length of time for the call-up would be put aside. Second, he had not received a clear proposal on why the Department of Defense wanted the longer term. Third, he proposed a method of calling up Army reserve combat units and not counting the postmobilization training as part of the 180 days. Last, he was concerned this was breaking a contract with not only reservists, but their employers and others who had made plans on the basis of a 180-day call-up.⁵⁶

On 24 September, Congressman Aspin issued a memorandum on recent proposed amendments to the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act. In it he discussed how the Navy had lost \$348 million in new ships, and strategic defense initiative (SDI) had lost \$600 million to cover the nearly \$1 billion needed to make changes for the war. Several of these additional costs related to the reserve components. Among these was the adjustment of reserve component physician/dental officer pay to make it equal to active duty pay. Also, variable housing allowance (VHA)—a bonus paid to members living in areas with high housing costs—would be paid to reservists on the same basis as active duty members. Congress budgeted \$174 million for these two and imminent danger pay costs for all service members in the Persian Gulf. Another \$36 million was earmarked for C-141 airlift, and much of this was for funding the reserve component airlifters.⁵⁷

On 15 October, House Armed Services Committee members Les Aspin, Beverly Byron, and Sonny Montgomery issued a white paper entitled "Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Reserve Components: Missing Lessons for a Future Forces Structure." In it they attacked the reluctance of the active duty establishment to call up combat units, with a particular emphasis on the Army and the Army Reserve and Army National Guard.⁵⁸

Though it had earlier blocked the extension of use of reserves in a presidential call-up to 180 days, Congress had to look at this issue again. The

Army had contended it could not call up combat units because it was limited to 180 days and would need possibly 100 days to train the units and ship their equipment. On 18 October, Congress passed Public Law 101-511, extending the limit of the reserve call-up to 360 days, but only for combat forces in the Persian Gulf in fiscal year 1991. The law, aimed at prodding the Army, had little direct effect on ANG units but kept DOD aware of congressional interest in reserve component combat units.

On the same day, the Department of Defense announced that planners were at work on a plan to rotate combat troops in and out of theater every six months, while combat support and support troops would rotate every 12 months. The rationale was that combat personnel were at greater risk and deserved to be rotated more frequently. This policy could not mesh well with the 180-day limit on holding the combat support and support personnel, nor could it meld with the plan to extend the combat troops to 360 days.⁵⁹ On 28 October, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the CENTCOM commander, said that he could not use the Army's reserve component combat troops because of restrictions on the amount of time required to bring them up to combat readiness and on their subsequent availability in-theater. To some, particularly those in the Army reserve components, this smacked of a conspiracy; and it caused those in other reserve components to be concerned about their parent organizations. The Marines had balked at calling reserve combat units, while the Navy had continued its history of neglecting its reserve components and had given little support for combat capability in that arena. The Air Force, ANG, and AFRES developed a good working relationship, but core interests of the organizations led to careful and measured dealings in the combat forces.

On 8 October, the reality of the war was brought home to the ANG by the deaths in the AOR of Lt Col Stephen G. Schramm and Maj Barry K. Henderson, fliers of the 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Birmingham, Alabama. Killed when their RF-4C Phantom reconnaissance jet crashed, they were the first ANG fatalities. Though the loss was sobering, mobilization was not deterred.⁶⁰

As the pace of the call-up quickened, Congress took pains to show its support of the military members. In September, the Department of Defense had announced the reservists would not be getting a variable housing allowance until they had been on active duty for 180 days. After this six-month point the VHA payments would be retroactive to the first day, but many guardsmen were burdened by this delay when their families were trying to pay rent or make the house payment in an area such as Boston or Washington. Congress changed the rules on 29 October, providing the reservists with benefits comparable to their active duty counterparts. Reservists could also sell back their leave days at the end of their active duty tour.⁶¹

As the war tension heated up and the need for combat troops increased, the number called up from the reserves went up. On 6 November, the Marines announced the first call-up of combat units, declaring that their reservists would be taken from units, not as units. Two days later the president authorized the mobilization of three large Army National Guard tank units,

with about 4,000 guardsmen in each. The armor units would undergo additional mobilization training before deployment overseas, according to Pentagon officials. The president simultaneously announced the military would build up for an offensive option.⁶²

On the next day, 9 November, SECDEF Cheney announced that the plans to rotate the troops were being dropped. Those in-theater and those coming would be there for the duration. The secretary quickly found that this was a hot topic; three days later a senior Pentagon official announced that the rotation was being worked out, and that the first out would be those exposed to the greatest dangers. These would be rotated out as units, not individually. On 13 November, Cheney told a closed door session of the House Armed Services Committee that rotation was not a dead issue and that he had not yet made up his mind.⁶³ Two days later, Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams said that there was no hurry in developing a rotation plan and that all personnel in the Persian Gulf would be there for the "time being."⁶⁴ Planners were left uncertain and units had no valid information to relay when there was no policy on rotation and no agreement on its implementation.

That there was no policy at this juncture is not surprising, the oddity was that the leadership brought it up in such uncertain circumstances. Saddam Hussein had American hostages in Iraq, numerous nations still were pursuing a peaceful resolution to the crisis, and the decisions of the United Nations and the Coalition were not yet firm. To make commitments in this setting was unrealistic.

By mid-November, another reality of reservists going to war came home. A National Guard nurse captain sued a Santa Ana, California, health clinic that fired her after a term of active duty. She told the *Los Angeles Times* that her suit was in part to protect the rights of reservists who left their civilian jobs during the Persian Gulf crisis. The rights of reservists to come back to their jobs, and legislative safeguards in other areas, had been protected since World War II. Legislation such as the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act limits action that can be taken against reservists or other service members, such as protection that keeps dependents from being thrown out of rentals.⁶⁵

Some of these statutes were antiquated at the start of the Persian Gulf War, and contained dollar limits that had remained unchanged since the 1950s. For example, anyone paying more than \$180 a month for a home was assumed to be so affluent as not to need protection. This may have been valid in the fifties, but not by 1990. Congress obligingly changed the rules, adding this to the list of concerns. The legislative level of concern and speed of action meant problems were corrected promptly. Managers at various levels had a difficult task disseminating the new rules to the units and updating all the appropriate manuals and directives pertaining to each of the changes now flowing out of Congress and the Department of Defense.

By 25 November the Department of Defense announced that 80,000 reservists and 230,000 active duty members were deployed to the Persian Gulf. Fewer than 100 sought to be released from their obligations. A DOD release on 13 December reported that only 33 military personnel applied for

conscientious objector status during the war—of whom 19 were in the reserve components and 14 in the active duty forces. None were in the National Guard.⁶⁶

A feature article in the *New York Times* on 3 December detailed preparation of an Army National Guard tank battalion headquartered in Rome, Georgia. The unit was preparing to go to Fort Stewart, Georgia, and on to Fort Irwin, California, for postmobilization training. The article noted that their influence went well beyond the Army, to a test of the policy integrating the reserve components and the active duty in preparation for armed conflict.⁶⁷

By 4 December, the Air Force announced one AFRES and three ANG fighter units were alerted for possible call-up in support of Operation Desert Shield. These would be the first fighters activated from the reserve forces, an action resulting from heavy campaigning by the Guard. Direct contact between Generals Killey and Russ again resulted in action, as it had with the call of the Birmingham unit.⁶⁸ The direct solicitation of the Secretary of Defense by Representative Montgomery and others, the pressure by Senator Nunn, and the active solicitation by unit commanders created the pressure needed to ensure the use of reserve component fighters.

Though the Air Force agreed to use fighter units, in the expanding roles of Operation Desert Shield, it was clear that support elements were more desired. The Air Force clearly placed a call for selected AFSCs to augment the force, with a special emphasis on security police, medical personnel, and others needed to maintain the active duty in the conflict. Six Air National Guard security police units were alerted for possible activation. It was clear that most reserve component squadrons would not be called as units, but rather would be called as UTCs within the squadrons. Little consideration was given to the needs of the units, and the assignments made clear that past plans were not to be the guide. The plans for an entire unit deploying into a European war scenario had provided the units with valuable training and direction, yet were no longer germane in a world that now offered the likelihood of regional conflicts.

Most medical unit members were used as backfill, filling in at active duty installations where the medical teams had been sent to the Persian Gulf. Reservists answered the call, and were immediately put to work, yet there was a clear need to either revamp the training program or the use of medical personnel. They either needed training to reflect the new reality, or they needed to be assigned to work they had trained for. In Desert Shield they were often doing valuable work, but not that for which they were trained. Neither were they trained for a regional contingency, but were still preparing for the European war.

By mid-December, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell told a congressional committee that he was considering asking Congress to double the length of the tour of called reserve component units. This was aimed at preserving critical skills in the Gulf, and would extend to one year from the six-month limit of active duty service for the 110,000 reservists summoned to perform support jobs in the Persian Gulf and at other military facilities.⁶⁹

By mid-December, the American press was expressing concern about the status of women in the armed forces. Over the past 25 years, the number of

women in the reserves and on active duty had increased significantly. The media wanted to know what happens in the services when women, especially single women with children, are sent to the theater of war. Investigations revealed that the number of single men with dependent children in the service outnumbered the single women with children three to one, negating some of the concern. They also found that the reserve components required military single-parent households to prepare written agreements guaranteeing preplanned alternative care.⁷⁰

In mid-December, many Americans were not sure where the war was going. The Iraqis released their foreign hostages, including the Americans, eliminating a concern of a number of Americans.⁷¹ Americans remained divided on whether to apply military force to the situation in the Middle East. Still, the United Nations Security Council had approved Resolution 678, authorizing the use of armed force if the Iraqis did not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January. Five foreign ministers of the UN Security Council pledged to Saddam Hussein that he need not fear an attack as long as he pulled out of Kuwait by 15 January. The Iraqis were not backing down. By mid-December, they were calling up all their reserves and were drafting most healthy men between the ages of 18 and 34, bringing their armed forces to a strength of 1.5 million. Despite the buildup, there was no certainty that this was going to be a war.⁷²

On Christmas day, the DOD sent home the Alabama Air National Guard's 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, which had volunteered for active duty on 24 August. It was replaced by involuntarily activated unit members, most from the 152d Tactical Reconnaissance Group, Reno, Nevada.⁷³

On 27 December, the Air Force began to quietly call and send hundreds in the reserve components to fly and maintain combat planes. Two Air Guard fighter units, the 169th Tactical Fighter Group, McEntire ANGB, South Carolina, and the 174th Tactical Fighter Wing, Hancock IAP, Syracuse, New York, had large elements of the units called to active duty.⁷⁴

In the opening weeks of the new year, it became more clear that the Iraqi forces were not going to withdraw from Kuwait and were strengthening their positions. Secretary of State James Baker made one last effort at peace in a 9 January meeting with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz, with negative results.⁷⁵

On 9 January, the secretary of defense said that he was preparing to ask the president for authority to extend the tours of reservists now in the Middle East and to activate more. He wanted to keep thousands on active duty beyond the six-month limit, and had to switch to the mobilization law authorizing a call-up of up to 1,000,000 reservists. He said that he would not call up the million, but that he needed the law to extend the six-month limit.⁷⁶

On 8 January, President Bush requested a resolution from Congress supporting the use of force. The Congress responded and began debate on 10 January, aware of the need to act before the 15 January ultimatum deadline given the Iraqis. After three days of debate, on 12 January the Senate approved the use of military force by a close vote of 52 to 47, and the House approved by a vote of 250 to 183. The vote passed a joint resolution and clinched the president's ability to operate the war without question of legislative approval.⁷⁷

On 16 January, the president complied with the resolution and informed Congress that peaceful means had failed to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait. He consequently directed the beginning of the air campaign. Operation Desert Shield comes to a close, and the new action, Operation Desert Storm began.⁷⁸

On 17 January, in a show of solidarity the Senate voted 98-0 commending and supporting President Bush and the American troops. Until the start of the war, the legislative branch had significant input, but now, following tradition, once the war started, the Congress threw its support behind the administration, and less political infighting occurred. The president and the DOD received near total support from the Congress.⁷⁹

On 18 January, President Bush authorized the call-up of the Ready Reserve and a partial mobilization. This authorized up to one million reservists being called for up to two years. The 200K limit of the presidential call-up was no longer a planning factor. The following day, the secretary of defense announced preparations to summon another 170,000 members of the reserve components, mostly those in the Army.⁸⁰

The Army responded immediately with a mobilization of 20,000 in the IRR, which consisted largely of individuals who had recently separated or retired and who were not part of the Selected Reserve, or active units in the reserve components. Many elements within the military, the Congress, and the administration knew that past mobilization of groups had negative political repercussions. The IRRs voiced the most complaints in earlier call-ups, and felt put upon to serve a second time before others were called once. Only the Army called IRRs, so they were not an issue for the Air National Guard. They were also no problem for the Army in a brief and popular conflict. Had the war gone on for some time, or had it been more lethal against the Coalition forces, these least voluntary of volunteers might have portrayed a different image of the reserve components, as they had done in the past.⁸¹

Near the end of Operation Desert Shield the Army also mobilized combat units, but with some problems. On 6 February, about 70 members of the Louisiana Army National Guard went AWOL from Fort Hood, Texas. All were in the 156th Armored Regiment of the 1st Battalion, activated in December and transferred to Fort Hood for mobilization training on 21 January. All subsequently returned, ending an embarrassing fiasco and misunderstanding.⁸²

Shortly after this episode, Senator Nunn acknowledged that the reserve components were taking longer to get into shape than anticipated. He planned to reexamine questions on the feasibility of roundout brigades and their relationship to active duty elements.⁸³

On 14 February, the Army announced the removal from active duty of the head of the Georgia Army National Guard's 48th Infantry Brigade, the roundout element of the Army's 24th Infantry Division. The unit had been training at Fort Irwin since 4 January, the longest rotation in the training center's history. Most active duty soldiers spent only 20 days there. Lost in the media coverage of this was the concept that plans called for reserve component units to spend 60-90 days in retraining prior to departure to theater. At the same time, many conflicting views were making all sides look

inept. Several Army Guard allies at the National Guard Association of the United States came out and announced that the National Guard units were every bit as ready as their active duty counterparts. This was clearly implausible when the units received only one-fifth the training time of their active duty counterparts, often lacked the proper equipment or training facilities, and had little experience in the maneuver training emphasized in programs like that at Fort Irwin. Personnel could have as good, even better, quality than active duty personnel, but they could not be as ready. On the Army side, documents surfaced showing evaluation teams had evaluated these units as fully combat ready only months earlier. The Army had to back off and allege that these evaluations were only intended for comparison with other reserve component units and the criteria were not up to active duty standards.⁸⁴

In the Air Force, this remained a lesser concern since air reserve component units had more extensive training, and a significantly higher percentage (8 percent Army versus 27 percent Air Force) of full-time personnel. In the Air Force this concern surfaced more in relation to specific support career fields or missions than to combat or flying operational units. This was because in some career fields, such as aerial port, the number of full-time personnel paralleled the Army numbers.

On 23 February, the ground offensive commenced, and the beleaguered Iraqis were defeated in the next 100 hours. They were forced to accept all conditions placed on them by Coalition forces, and Operation Desert Storm concluded on 27 February.⁸⁵

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
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Source: ANGRC/DO, briefing documents, 1990.

Map 3. Tactical Control Units—AC and W Units.

Chapter 4

Mobilization *Impact on the Home Units*

Air National Guard units do not view mobilization in terms of overriding political issues as do headquarters units; rather, they emphasize how to operate the unit in upcoming conflict. In Operation Desert Shield/Storm, members were anxious to be involved and most responded pragmatically and effectively. Unit leadership faced pressing human problems, dealt with individuals, and made decisions that kept airplanes flying and systems functional. Still, many of them experienced problems that generally involved regulations, communications, or inappropriate training.

Because plans for war were often ignored by headquarters, practical people at the units had to use common sense, compensating for regulation and plan irregularities to make the system work. Most of these people planned to be called up as a unit—they were trained and ready for war—and they assumed adequate guidance from regulations, and headquarters would help in making decisions. Unit personnel had no idea that they would be asked to alter UTCs at a moment's notice, that they would find basic regulations impossible to follow, that rules would be changing midstream, that the pay system would have problems, or that they would receive ambiguous guidance, including conflicting message traffic. They did what they felt was right, and the command, control, and communications system worked well enough to iron out the difficulties.

This chapter addresses the complexities of unit activity and is organized topically. Some items relating to command relationships and unit movements are saved for the next chapter, which discusses participation by activated personnel and units. This chapter assesses command and control, and volunteerism. It reviews the human resources topics of personnel, family support, employer support, rotation policy, and compensation. It also addresses readiness and training, equipment, communications, transportation, and logistics.

One of the earliest problems, one perceived in many units as the cause of the greatest difficulties, was the tailored UTC. Most unit members and their leadership were of the opinion that they "train as a unit, fight as a unit." Ingrained in training had been the need to work as a team. Many members might only train one weekend a month but had done so for years, fitting a particular niche in the team. The full-time guardsmen (27 percent of the members of the ANG) worked together all the time. In fields like aircraft maintenance, unit averages often ran over 15 years' experience compared to

less than three in most active duty units. By most accounts, ANG aircraft maintenance function at the squadron level was more effective than its Air Force counterpart. Time and a sense of purpose and accomplishment created a bond and close-knit, well-trained, and well-coordinated functions.

When told that only selected members could be activated, or when individual volunteers were sought, this cohesion was threatened. Many members were unaware that Air Force and DOD planners had the capability or desire to break down units. Most supervisors and commanders were aware of the use of the UTC in mobilizing selected elements, but even then unit cohesion would be maintained. Leaders were generally aware of the protection afforded by Congress when it mandated that only units could be called up. Aware of this, many within the group saw the tailored UTC as a betrayal by NGB leadership.

Higher level unit officials were caught in an undesirable situation. They knew and accepted the position of NGB, yet the same leaders who had often told their people that they would deploy as a unit now had to sell, or at least implement, the tailored UTC and retain their own credibility and that of the organizational executives.

With the tailored UTC came an unplanned local personnel problem. Knowing they possessed inadequate information on the details of unit operation, NGB allowed the local units to decide who would participate in that unit. This way when a unit was notified that it needed to provide 12 security police, it could make its own selection. Moreover, until the mobilization the leaders at NGB had to participate with the states and had questionable authority and control of the units. They needed the participation of the local units and their states to make the system work.¹

Unit leaders pondered several questions. Do you send your very best? Do you ask for volunteers? Do you discourage female members from going to a culturally different Saudi Arabia? What of those with personal problems—should they be exempt? Is the exemption permanent or temporary. If permanent, should the member be considered for removal from the unit? What of the handful of members that were being carried by their comrades—the minimal participants? Should they be excluded, and considered for elimination?²

Tailored UTCs affected the use of equipment. Existing UTCs had been carefully planned to include the exact mix of personnel and equipment. Tailoring the new mixes created special problems. The responsibility for preparing the UTC normally rested with the gaining command, but under these circumstances, the units had to quickly put together the necessary equipment levels. They did so, but they had not been trained to do so.³

The tailored UTC influenced command and control. Traditionally, units had planned to deploy with their own leadership, and unit commanders who had planned to deploy with their units were now being asked to stay home. As an example, a unit would be asked to provide 13 security police, an element from the medical community, and three transporters from the resource management squadron. Noticeably missing, however, were the requests for command officers. Requests for flying elements often did not include anyone

in the grade of O-6 or higher. Units were often unaware that CENTAF and the MAJCOMs were doing the same thing with active duty units and were facing great pressure from large numbers of colonels and generals who did not want to miss the opportunity they had planned a career for. At the local level, this looked like a conspiracy to exclude Guard leaders.⁴

Within the units, command and control was not a problem during peacetime. During the call, however, there were several command issues that had to be ironed out. With the tailored UTC, who was in charge of the people sent? In peace, the administrative and operational control are at the unit; during a presidential call the administrative control of members remains with the home unit and the operational control transfers to the gaining command; and in a mobilization all control is relinquished to the gaining command. Existing unit plans were based on the concept of the entire unit being called and the support going with the unit. For people being pulled from the unit, the new situation had its problems. Fortunately, NGB and most units recognized the nature of the situation, and since large elements were retained at home, the administrative control was retained by home units even during the mobilization.⁵

Command and control was a problem in the interface between the unit and those headquarters issuing directives. Units were often uncertain as to who was in charge at a given time, and there were inadequate measures for NGB and the gaining commands to communicate requirements to the units and state headquarters.⁶

A communication example affected C-130 units early in the buildup. Prior to Operation Desert Shield most of the MAC-gained C-130 units closed in the evening and left the gate guard to answer the phone, trusting that headquarters had an alert roster and could call the commander or his/her representative at home. This standard operating procedure was effective for years but proved inadequate during the war. After complaints from MAC and Twenty-first Air Force, the units established 24-hour operations, ensuring that unit leaders would be readily accessible.⁷

At state headquarters and in units, the lack of secure communications systems made it difficult to consult the different levels in the chain of command. Specifically, the problems were associated with a lack of equipment, with facilities that were not open around the clock, and with facilities not being collocated with the user.⁸

Even in the recent past secure voice and fax equipment was expensive, and the Air National Guard, like most military organizations, was slow to acquire this equipment and to transition into its adequate use. As a result, when the conflict broke out and the need for these devices became apparent, the equipment was not present, particularly at state headquarters. Though these instruments would not have solved all the communications problems, they would have helped people that needed to be kept informed. Numerous commanders reported having secure conversations on their STU-III phones, but lacking secure fax equipment they had to wait for message traffic. When

it arrived much later, it was often in conflict with the conversation, and problems that appeared to have been resolved had to be refought.⁹

In the earliest stages of the buildup, the resources provided by the Air Guard were all on a voluntary basis since the presidential call had not been initiated. In this phase, there were questions over who was in charge, and who provided support. The AFR 28-series regulations gave no guidance on the use of volunteers and who would provide the logistics support. This meant that responding units had to provide their own logistics tail. In a possibly lengthy wartime situation this made no sense, but this typified a concern facing unit commanders. Who paid the bill was a basic question, as this affects the unit's ability to function. This issue was not resolved in a timely manner.¹⁰

Fortunately, unit commanders knew the need to support the war effort and treated this financial responsibility dilemma as a headquarters problem. For them who paid the bill was less important than getting the job done. They also knew they could perform effectively, and most were certain that the funding would eventually flow. Moreover, the commands immediately stepped up to the most pressing need and provided military pay account (MPA) man-days to fund the personnel requirements. The delays that did occur were usually the result of inexperience and the confusion associated with the immense change in daily patterns at both headquarters and the units.

For managers in the support areas, these financial problems were real and consuming, and significant message traffic went back and forth establishing who would make the payments. These problems, which did little to adversely affect the operational effectiveness of the units, were eventually resolved. They did, however, require people in the support fields to waste thousands of manhours on issues that should have been clear to start with.¹¹

Commanders had to make decisions relating to volunteerism. In the voluntary calls for Grenada or Panama, observers knew that these actions would only take a few days, and would involve a relatively small group of military members. It was quite different, however, in the case with the Iraqis. This was the first time unit commanders or managers had to be concerned if a presidential call or mobilization occurred.

Under Title 10 USC 672(d), individuals could be ordered to active duty only with their governor's and their own consent. Though not clearly stated, it had always been implicit in the law that the unit commander and the adjutant general would be notified. MAC and SAC had extensive past experience using volunteers, especially among aircrews, whose use was well coordinated at all levels. As the buildup continued and members were solicited in other career fields such as security police, firemen, and medical personnel, the requests often went directly to the functional area supervisor. Since no SOP created a single point of contact at the units, and inexperienced people were in a hurry to get a job done, proper channels were circumvented. Command and control became more difficult for commanders, managers, and state headquarters. Even in the harried atmosphere of the buildup, all requests were coordinated before the member departed, but they did so without the benefit of clear, established procedures.¹²

The reasons for failure were in part due to problems with regulations. Guiding regulations were out of date, ambiguous, and in cases conflicted with each other. Lacking adequate Air Force or internal guidance, the commands and NGB issued conflicting directives. Personnel sections at numerous installations had problems keeping up with the changes. When the decision was made to declare AFR 28-5 invalid and to use the interim draft in its place, most units had nothing to refer to. Even with the draft, rules regarding volunteerism remained ambiguous. At the same time, units were receiving crisscrossing requests from MAJCOMs, numbered Air Forces, NGB, CENTCOM, and state headquarters—receiving multiple changes in a day or even an hour from the same office. In most cases, units had good relationships with the gaining command, and the confusion was not the result of any animosity; rather, it was the result of inexperience and uncertainty. As an example, the staff at NGB was swamped with inquiries and had to turn much responsibility over to temporary staffers brought in from field units. Unfamiliar with headquarters procedures or requirements, their responses were often treated with less respect in the field than those that came from trusted sources. The process repeated itself in many support and operational areas of control. The effectiveness of the units masked much of the confusion and “fog of war” coming in from other sources.¹³

The early confusion was also the result of a lack of practice. While units rehearsed their mobility processing on a frequent basis, they had little practice in coordinating with MAJCOM and ANG staffs. The idea of working with multiple headquarters had been inadequately exercised for a variety of reasons. For the headquarters, the ANG was not amply staffed to deal with 92 different flying units and numerous other elements in preparing exercise scenarios that would tax the coordination skills of the participants. Moreover, neither headquarters ANG nor the units could have predicted the tailored UTC or other items that were not in the plans, so for this they could not be faulted for a command failure.

Major commands and ANG had conducted command post exercises (CPX) to train upper level management. In these the participants learned the basics of how the commands worked with the units, how to access the reserve components and incorporate them, how to work with the CINCs and how to deal with the varied elements under their control.¹⁴ Still, the commands and NGB remained inadequately evaluated on their ability to conduct wartime actions. While operational exercises were realistic for the aircrews, the exercises and war games were insufficiently realistic to plan how and where reserve components would participate. They also lacked the depth and reality to truly tax or query all elements in the system as to how they would operate. They did not have a methodology that could force the support systems to realistically participate and demonstrate how they would perform.

At the outset of the Persian Gulf conflict commanders ran into a dilemma. If they failed to provide volunteers, they were not supporting the war effort in the only way the Guard could contribute in early August. If they did

participate, they could lose enough personnel and equipment that the unit would lose its SORTS rating as combat ready and be ineligible for call up.¹⁵

This became a vital issue at the state headquarters level, and several states declared their units could not send volunteers. The governor had to approve volunteerism (unless the state had a preconsent agreement, and even these required a threat to the United States and a raised DEFCON status for every case except the 193d Special Operations Group in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania). At the state level, the causes for concern came from two directions. First, the concern was that units should be called as units, and if part of the unit volunteered, this might negate the opportunity for the remainder of the unit to participate. The second factor was a spinoff of the National Guard's relationship with the Army; and at state headquarters, this thinking was often aimed at Army National Guard units but applied to the air side as well. (The reasons for the Army not desiring volunteers from Guard units involve historical and contemporary political issues between these components that are not germane to this paper, and are consequently not discussed.)¹⁶

In one state, the disagreements over volunteerism resulted in an open dispute between a wing commander and the adjutant general. The wing commander insisted he would allow his people to volunteer and was himself volunteering. The state headquarters appears to have been ambiguous on this movement at first; later, the adjutant general decided this would not occur. At one point, the two argued on the flightline in the presence of a congressional representative from the same state. The adjutant general retired shortly after the incident and the unit continued with its volunteer program.¹⁷

In another state the headquarters immediately declared that there would be no volunteers, and units from that state, understanding the situation from the outset, did not counter this directive. For units, it was desirable that the direction from the state be well reasoned and important that it be clear and unequivocal. Failure of the state headquarters and the units to agree could hamper the effectiveness of individuals and the organization.¹⁸

Dealing with the individuals who volunteered was often difficult. Numerous important rules had never been considered. Members had to be reeducated about their rights and obligations, and how their voluntary service would be credited and how long they would serve.

In most cases commanders were granted considerable leeway on selecting who could go in both the voluntary and involuntary calls. Leaders had to make the frustrating decision of denying some people the chance to go. In some units, those who had served in Vietnam were told to wait so those who had never served in a war could gain experience. In others, the most experienced had to be retained or those too high in the grade structure were specifically turned down by the requestors. A variety of factors influenced the commanders, but they were usually the final arbiter on participation at the units.¹⁹

Important in the decision on the part of members who were volunteering was the length of rotations. Generally, rotations varied from 15 to 30 days, and the length was set by agreements between the units and the gaining MAJCOMs. As an example, the 171st Air Refueling Wing at Pittsburgh set up

a program to rotate in and out of the AOR, changing flying and maintenance personnel every 17 days. In this way the unit could give credit for annual tours while on a rotation, use as many people as possible, and sustain the volunteer effort as long as possible. After the call-up, these rotations were stopped and personnel retained in place for the duration. However, during the volunteer episode, commanders and schedulers were intensely busy trying to retain and schedule members on a rotational basis. This had not been part of the plan for any war effort, yet was responded to as a necessity of this type of conflict and the nature of the call-up.²⁰

In some cases, members volunteered for a tour without having the specifics ironed out. Members volunteering for a 90-day presidential call were in some cases startled and upset to find that this was lengthened by a 90-day extension and then further by the mobilization. A person seeing a "voluntary" 90-day tour extend into a year was likely to get upset. Many of these members had told employers they would only be gone 90 days and were concerned about possible repercussions.²¹

In dealing with employers, members and unit leaders found two items were paramount. First was the understanding of employment-retention rights, and second was the right of the employer to know what was going on. As to the first, members were concerned that if they volunteered they would not be protected by the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act and could lose their jobs. On this the law was clear they retained these rights. Of the second, the issue became thornier. When a member was recalled involuntarily most employers were patriotic and reconciled to this occurrence. The problem came when a member had voluntarily left the job to go to war, when it was not required.²²

Volunteers in the first week or two of the buildup knew it would take a while to gear up the mobilization machinery and to make a political decision as important as calling up the reserves. During this time, they were generally able to get time off and report to their units. After that, employers wanted to be able to make plans, too. If the employee was to be called up and sent to war, most employers agreed to find a replacement and to guarantee that the job would be waiting on return.

In many cases, units had active Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) programs and had explained the program to employers and solicited their support. The good will cultivated paid off, but even with good will, the employers needed an ability to plan their programs. Upsetting to employers was the repeated request by employees to leave work as a volunteer. In one state, the adjutant general appeared on a television newscast and proudly announced that all guardsmen serving from that state were volunteers. In a sense they were, for the members were asked if they would serve in a call-up. Employers immediately called commanders and supervisors in the units to find out if their people had volunteered or were serving involuntarily. Though technically protected by the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act in either a voluntary or involuntary call, employers had a distinct preference that their people not volunteer. Many members feared denial of future promotions or opportunities as retribution for voluntarily

leaving the company, and unit commanders put in many hours assuring employers that their people were being called up.²³

Unit commanders were particularly challenged by volunteerism since many were pushing hard or being pressed for inclusion of their units in the war. Some had to find out what the limitations of volunteerism were, and the issue was not simple. One commander was directly tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff office to bring his communications unit and as many personnel into the program as quickly as they could volunteer. Having several officers who were serving on AGR (active duty) tours, he immediately volunteered them for the task. Serving in a state where the adjutant general had quickly announced a no-volunteer policy, he faced a problem. Are AGR members on active duty considered active duty Air Force or are they subject to the control of the governor and the adjutant general? The personnel, who by then were all in the AOR, were queried if they wanted to come home or if they were volunteers. Several wanted to come home, and were returned since agreement had been reached that they were not in the same category as active duty Air Force. The members were serving in a capacity that had not existed in earlier call-ups and, in the eyes of their commander, had been hired as AGRs in part to preclude any such question. Such incidents, while not surprising, do prove embarrassing.²⁴

As the crisis in the Gulf progressed, and the presidential call was invoked, members who had volunteered began to wonder if they would get credit for participation on a voluntary status. Equity and fairness have long been vital concerns in the American system, and efforts were made to assure that those called would be treated fairly.

The specific concern was that when a unit is called to active duty in the presidential call, the limit is for 90 days with a possible extension of 90 more. A member who might already have served 45 days on active duty could want credit for service already served. This problem in time became widespread enough that the assistant secretary of defense for manpower, reserve affairs, installations, and environment issued a memorandum on 30 January 1991 titled "Policy for Credit of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Service Against 10 USC 673 Service Periods." It stated that prior voluntary service would be counted. The document was issued at that level because command and Department of Defense guidance had been conflicting and was creating a stir among those who felt they were being treated unfairly. Ironically, reserve component members serving Title 32 AGR tours were not covered in part because they were not active duty Air Force.²⁵

A concern voiced by many unit commanders and members was the fear that volunteerism and the agreements to create tailored UTCs, when used together, could promote the use of the Guard as a filler organization. Most members perceived their unit as not just for training purposes, but as a combat unit ready to go to war in that function. They shared a common fear that agreement to dismember the units at will would allow the active duty components to plunder for selected needs while destroying unit cohesion.²⁶

A final set of considerations on volunteerism at the units was the effect on morale. MSgt Joe Pierce of the 109th Tactical Airlift Group, Schenectady, New York, coined the phrase "Sandier than thou," (from the contact with desert sands) for those who felt increased self-importance, or "holier than thou" as a result of their wartime service. Commanders in units expressed like concerns and worked hard to recognize service in the call-up or mobilization while being certain all members of the units knew they were part of the whole.²⁷

In the human resources areas, units faced some of their greatest difficulties. Personnel, compensation, family support, and employer support topped the list of concerns. In personnel functions, many commanders had to make quick decisions on hardship exemptions. Two kinds were evaluated, personal and community. In each the commander had to evaluate if there was a more substantial need for the member by the military or by the family or by the affected community. The benefit of leaving this to the commanders was the expeditious handling of the cases. Some concern was expressed that this was not being handled by an unbiased central board, but three reasons mitigate against a central board. First is the need for quick resolution of the problem. Second is the ability of the commanders to understand local and individual situations. The other is the need for commanders to retain authority in their own units.²⁸

Another concern was dependent care. Millions of Americans viewed the televised footage that showed a reservist going off to war and leaving an automatic teller machine (ATM) card with his children along with directions on how to get the money from the local bank. Such scenes were also picked up and carried by the print media; yet despite such horror stories, few such difficulties actually existed.²⁹

Much of the early apprehension stemmed from concern about the number of single parents and military couples. While multiple family members being in the same unit was a common occurrence in the Guard, only 1,673 (1.4 percent) of assigned personnel were military couples with dependents. In many cases, both were not members of the Guard, but both were in the military. Single parents accounted for 6,813, or 5.8 percent of assigned personnel. No data was available on gender of the single parents in the National Guard, but in the active duty military, 75 percent of the single parents were male. This figure was in startling contrast to the civilian sector, and was one reason why the question of excluding female single parents was not seriously entertained in the military.³⁰

Women made up an increasing proportion of military units, and by the start of Desert Shield made up 13.9 percent of the active duty Air Force, 12.7 percent of the Air Force Reserve, and 13.6 percent of the Air National Guard. For most commanders the question of dealing with women in the conflict had more to do with how they would function in the Persian Gulf cultures than with whether they could do their jobs or would be a problem as single parents.³¹

To preclude problems, single members and military couples were required to have viable dependent-care plans and have on file a completed NGB form 357. This form designated who would be caring for dependent children in case

the member was called to war. Members of the Air Guard did return home to take care of children in emergency cases. In one example a member had to relieve her 70-year-old grandmother who could not deal with her grandchild. The number of such instances, while not readily available, was quite small, and apparently not significantly different from that of other branches of the service.

The processing of personnel in the mobilization went smoothly at most bases—especially at those that had extensive practice at this exercise. The only slowdowns were those that could be expected. For example, when people in practice drills were asked if they needed a new will or if their finances were in order, and most responded affirmatively simply to avoid slowing the line. In a real wartime situation, the line slowed considerably when as the reality set in and people realized that this was their last chance to rewrite that will. Units using software programs designed to print “instant” wills found their lines moved much more quickly.³²

Briefings in most of the mobility processing generally went well. Units generally found that less is better. The desire was to find a balance between covering necessary details and going into so much detail that the members lost track of what was covered. People inundated with information tended to tune out even the significant data.

The families of the personnel were also a matter of great concern at the units. The responses of the units varied in level of preparedness and capability. Guidance to units was from ANGR 211-1, *National Guard Family Program*, 8 January 1986. It assigned responsibility to the state adjutant general to “develop and implement a family program that supports both the Army and Air National Guard.” Oversight of the program flowed from the National Guard Bureau family program coordinator to the state family program coordinators (SFPC) and to unit commanders.³³

The Air National Guard lacked the informal family support net found in the active duty Air Force, an element especially common in those units with frequent deployments. Neither did many ANG members have experience in dealing with activation, and this unwelcome and unexpected experience was particularly trying on families. For many families, the military member had close ties and a camaraderie with others in the unit, but the rest of the family knew only that the member was off to this other job one weekend a month. Social interaction between the families was lacking.³⁴

Fortunately, living in a community for years, most members had close contact and strong attachments to their home areas. They had a strong sense of community, and the community had a strong bond with them. At the time of the departure of their military members the families turned to the unit for information and to their communities for support. Most communities were eager to help during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Corporate sponsors were enthusiastic supporters and in many instances they even volunteered to assist before being asked. Some unit leaders with a memory of Vietnam participation were startled by the level of support. When war correspondents reported any shortages at the front, be they shortages in cookies, insect repellent, sunscreen lotion, or even at one point Snickers candy bars, the

unit's internal logistics system to the front was frequently inundated with more commodities than it could easily handle. In some communities local support of families was so effective that amused commanders cited family reports that neighbors were helping with tasks and getting more done than if the member had been home. Viable family support and community involvement programs gladly incorporated this local support.³⁵

Many units set up programs that reached out to every family, some even adding the families of active duty members who had moved back to their home communities. They made sure families had as much information on their loved ones as could be released. To make sure the units had up to date data for dependents the OSD published *Ordered to Active Duty—What Now?* for distribution. This publication helped explain the rights and benefits of called up members and their families. Though it duplicated some of the information given by most units, it was a welcome addition and was forwarded to all families of activated reservists.

Many guardsmen were aware of the assistance being given to their families. Although it is impossible to mathematically calculate its effectiveness, the family support program was one of the best features implemented in the war. Those who were not being called up were able to help with these support programs, and many found this a way to feel a part of the war effort of their unit. Commanders and unit family support organizers also received offers of help from dependents, retirees, and concerned local citizens.³⁶

Leaving the program under the state gave an opportunity for those at state headquarters to help after the units had been mobilized. In many states the assistance from headquarters was valuable in instituting the programs. In Tennessee a statewide program aided all units in the state. With the help of state staff, spouses, members remaining at home, and a coalition of others, the program enhanced the value of the state staff to the members. It also served those who remained behind and who felt the frustration of being unable to serve with their compatriots. They could also serve at home and gain value from their service.³⁷

Employer support, an item of considerable concern prior to the conflict, was quite positive. Many companies made sure their members retained their benefits package, an item of growing concern and importance. Members also retained seniority in most organizations, and few were hurt by their absence. Some were hurt, however, like the nurse from Santa Ana, California, who was fired upon her return. The number of such incidents was small enough that they were reported in the national press, and though there may have been other incidents that were unreported the general response was one of support. Most employers were patriotic enough to realize that the temporary loss of their employee was a small price to pay.³⁸

For ANG members called to active duty under the call-up and mobilization, another problem was pay. Almost every unit reported problems with the Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS). Early in the buildup, military pay officials realized that military members who were prisoners of war could not be paid through the reserve pay system (JUMPS-RF) and that all people called up

should transition to JUMPS, the active duty system. The transfer system had been tested before on a small number of cases and appeared to work. The ANG coordinator at the Military Pay Center double-checked with his counterparts; they and the accounting and finance directors at National Guard Bureau agreed to make this transition for all those going on active duty. This included presidential call-up, when pay normally remained a unit responsibility.³⁹

At the units, finance personnel could no longer monitor the pay and were unable to answer queries from members or their families about pay problems. Many families were frustrated because they were not certain what they were to be receiving and they often needed the money immediately. Adding to this, the members were later to find that their W-2s were in error, often by thousands of dollars. For the units, the transition needed to be one where they could be included in the ability to monitor and help local people. Also, many pay personnel had been left at home and the mobilized members often felt they had no one to turn to who could help them. Fortunately, the vast majority of the people were paid, and the system eventually covered them all. The biggest problems remaining were with the W-2s and with the need to update the system, an area that has since been implemented.⁴⁰

While in most other pay categories the reserves and active duty were identical, they were not the same in some categories that required special time-in-service elements. One such category was the variable housing allowance (VHA). This was another "fairness" issue that made it to Congress and was corrected in later legislation, but not during the war. VHA is a special bonus paid to service members serving in a high cost-of-living area, so that a member sent to Boston or San Francisco or any of several other high cost-of-living areas would receive compensation to offset the higher costs. Under the existing laws at the beginning of Operation Desert Shield a person had to be assigned to such an area for a minimum of 140 days to draw VHA. This rule was to preclude people collecting the allowance for temporary stays or short tours in these areas when other allowances might make up the difference. The problem for reservists under the presidential call-up was that orders were for 90 days and could subsequently be amended for another 90. If called to active duty, a Manhattan resident would not collect the VHA until he had accumulated 140 days, while an active duty member from the same locale would be collecting immediately. Most members, and especially those in the enlisted ranks from these high cost-of-living areas, were already experiencing a cut in salaries and families were being denied VHA at a time when they were having to adjust to the lower income. Granted, it would come in a lump sum after the 140 days, but in that five-month period families had bills to pay and did not need this headache. At a time when they had minimal access to pay system information, pay sections were receiving innumerable calls relating to when and whether VHA would be paid. Members were paid their VHA, but the circumstances were not good for the members, their families, or the units.⁴¹

Yet another problem for the unit pay people was the issue of basic allowance for quarters (BAQ) for single members without dependents. Guidance provided

in the *Department of Defense Military Pay and Allowances Entitlements Manual* was ambiguous on how this would be handled for recalled reservists. According to some interpretations, a single member called to active duty would not receive BAQ, since quarters were being provided in the assigned location. Others viewed activation as a temporary duty (TDY) assignment and believed that the member should retain BAQ at the home station. For a single member called to active duty to be told that the house payment at home did not matter to the system, that he had a free tent, was not a welcome piece of news.⁴²

On 31 October 1990, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Personnel issued a memorandum clarifying the policy. It established that single members would receive BAQ, that their home station would be regarded as their PCS location, and that service on active duty would be considered a TDY assignment. This brought relief to many, but also required changes in many pay records to reflect the final interpretation.⁴³

Fortunately for the units, the Congress and the Department of Defense took immediate action on pay and personnel problems that were identified, and corrected many problems. This action placed an unfortunate work load on the support areas, but it is generally regarded as a small price to pay for correcting the original inequities.

Readiness of reserve forces for Operation Desert Shield was well beyond that of any previous call. Units were prepared for the combat and ready for mobilization. Still, units had difficulty in meeting paper requirements that allowed a tracking of the units' preparedness.

To track the units, headquarters used SORTS, which in turn relied on the unit commander to report the situation accurately. Commanders, forced to play an awkward numbers game, were involved in more than just theoretical gamesmanship. As an example, did the members who were serving as volunteers count as part of the unit? If not, the unit was not combat ready and could not be called up. These concerns were not felt by most operators at the units, and the commanders of most units quickly realized that their concern was more with the operation of the unit function and support of the war than with concerns over the numbers games. Aware of their unit responsibilities, commanders, together with their gaining commands and in coordination with other units, took care of the pressing needs. For example, tanker units had a responsibility to meet war needs and to fulfill the needs of the single integrated operations plan (SIOP) while providing the necessary tankers for other missions. They also were aware of the required training needs for those who were not sent to the AOR. Balancing these requirements was far more pressing than filling out the SORTS data in a way to play a game.⁴⁴

What of the war readiness spares kits (WRSK) and their relationship to SORTS? If the level was below the 30-day requirement for a war, the unit was not ready. But where did the 30-day requirement come from? It had come in response to a perceived cold war threat, the Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Central Europe, and was predicated on not being able to readily access spare parts. Was this realistic for the Persian Gulf scenario? Not at all. But

planners in the Pentagon needed something to work with and relied on SORTS. Once again the corrections needed in preparation for a contingency war were recognized, yet had not been implemented due to the incredibly slow and cumbersome process required to change the regulations.⁴⁵

Many state headquarters expressed concern about the use of SORTS as a device for identifying unit readiness. They knew that units in their state could be considered unable to answer the call when the real problem was with the ability of the system to correctly ascertain the situation. The MAJCOMs and NGB initially shared this concern, which declined as the war plan unfolded and the need for large numbers of units diminished.⁴⁶

A different kind of problem existed for units that were ready, but had out-of-date equipment. An example was the A-7 aircraft. Unit commanders, especially those with desert warfare experience, were frustrated at not being able to go to war. They were excluded since an A-7 unit was insupportable in the theater because of the logistics tail required, and CENTAF did not want an insupportable piece of equipment. This underscored the desire of Air National Guard leaders to modernize the force by replacing outdated equipment. In most cases these shortcomings were scheduled for correction, and all A-7s were to be dropped from the inventory in just a few years. Communications units that faced similar problems were already receiving gear in some units as the war broke out, and in some cases the equipment was rushed to the units just in time for the call-up.⁴⁷

Many units were short of required equipment at the start of Operation Desert Shield, an obstacle to readiness shared by many reserve and active duty units. The most common problems included chemical warfare defense ensembles (CWDE), medical supplies, computers, life support, and WRSKs. There were shortfalls almost across the board in these in MAC-gained C-130 units. In other units the higher priority had aided some, yet they too, experienced some shortages. Both F-16 units called up (McEntire ANGB, South Carolina, and Hancock ANGB in Syracuse, New York) experienced shortages, with the most notable being the shortage of electronic counter-measures (ECM) pods at Syracuse.⁴⁸ The reconnaissance unit at Birmingham had shortages of certain chemicals and film, and had difficulty getting the equipment to the theater, but that topic will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter.

To aid the units, National Guard Bureau formed "ready team" personnel to visit and provide assistance to selected units alerted for call-up. These teams were particularly helpful in the logistics, aiding in the preparations required by changing UTCs and other new requirements levied by the contingency. The teams were given the authority to furnish funds and to expedite the acquisition of critical assets. This proved to be a key component of logistics readiness.⁴⁹

In most units the training had been adequate, and personnel were ready to go to war. Probably the subject of greatest concern was one that had been a thorn in the side to many personnel, the use of CWDE. The equipment was unpopular, uncomfortable, and of questionable effectiveness. Throughout the organization people had heard of episodes where members testing the

equipment in the hot Florida summer had passed out from heat exhaustion or dehydration. When personnel were made aware by the news media and their unit trainers that Saddam Hussein had chemical warfare agents and had used them to kill thousands of Iranians and even his own countrymen, the perspective altered. In one unit in Kansas, the refresher course for using the ensembles had not only 750 members of the wing taking the class, but 250 from other units. Life-support personnel at several units reported it was the first time they had conducted the training with such attentive groups.⁵⁰

Notes

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10. Air Force Regulation (AFR) 28-5, *USAF Mobilization and Planning*, 29 May 1980, paras. 9-10; and Col Robert Lutz, ANGRC/LGX, Andrews AFB, Md., interview with author, 14 April 1992.
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13. *Lessons Learned*, 106-9; Decroo interview; and Col Herbert R. Horn, Jr., TAC/RA, interview with author, 2 June 1992.
14. Mr Paul Rice, Air National Guard Readiness Center, Operations Exercise Section, interview with author, 8 April 1993.
15. *ANG Lessons Learned Report*, 83-84; and Brig Gen Paul Pochmara, 113 FG/CC, interview with author, July 1993.
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20. Lt Col William Rinehart, 171 ARG, Pittsburgh, Pa., interview with author, 12 April 1992.
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22. Ibid., 23.
23. Brig Gen Robert G. Chrisjohn, Jr., 171 ARG/CC, Pittsburgh, Pa., interview with author, 12 April 1992; and Col James Bassham, 164 AG/CC, Memphis, Tenn., interview with author, February 1992.

24. Lt Col Lester L. Preiss III, 224 JCSS, Brunswick, Ga., interview with author, March 1992.
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31. *Ibid.*
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33. *ANG Lessons Learned Report*, 74.
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37. Brig Gen Kenneth U. Jordan, Tennessee AG for Air, Nashville, Tenn., interview with author, 23 March 1992.
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39. Lt Col Howie Derrick, ANG RC/FM, Andrews AFB, Md., interview with author, 15 April 1992; and Decroo interview.
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Chapter 5

The Deployment

In the deployment phase, the questions to answer were where, who, how, when, and why. Where did the guardsmen come from and where did they go? How many went? Who were they and how did they get selected? Why did the system work the way it did?


The Air National Guard mobilized almost 12,000 members and called over 10,000 more to active duty through voluntary activation. The peak use of volunteers came on 23 August 1990, when 4,036 people from 87 units were serving. Mobilization peaked on 12 March 1991, when 11,365 members from 112 units were on duty representing 48 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.¹

Precise figures, which vary slightly depending on the sources consulted, require a measure of caution. Certain considerations made it difficult to find exact numbers of volunteers. Would aircrews sent to Panama count? Not normally, but what if it was a C-130A crew replacing a C-130E crew so the latter could go to the AOR? Was a tanker refueling aircraft on the way to the theater doing routine training or was it supporting Operation Desert Shield? The mathematics of volunteerism is questionable. On the other hand, the number in the partial mobilization is specific, though even it has minor statistical anomalies.

Many statistics depend on mobilization data only and require cautious use since they are an incomplete demonstration of ANG participation. They include no figures for volunteerism or the many participants remaining at the units who kept the parts going to the front or supported those activated in other ways.

Appendix B contains an entire listing of the units mobilized and the deploy locations of these units. On the peak day of participation, the mobilized came from several commands, and many career fields. Figure 8 shows the number used by command.² The figures do not include voluntary activation, in which the SAC and MAC figures are significantly higher. These commands flew support missions throughout the campaign. Numerical data on voluntary participation is difficult to obtain and because of the volatility of these numbers, and should be considered as good estimates rather than absolutes.

Participation by functional area reflects the Air Force needs (fig. 9). Over one-quarter of those mobilized were in the maintenance fields and were necessary to work with flying units.³ Though there was some mingling of personnel, most ANG maintenance personnel remained with associated units or were at least in organizations largely containing other ANG members. The number called was roughly the number assumed necessary to maintain ANG aircraft.



12 MARCH 1991, PEAK STRENGTH DAY

Source: ANGRC/DPMGR

Figure 8. Operation Desert Shield/Storm—Involuntary Mobilization Peak Participation

Their lack of participation startled most resources squadrons (supply, fuels, transportation, and related areas). Many ANG workers in these squadrons were active at the home units, but these were largely volunteers or full-time personnel. Of those activated, many were transporters, who were used in a variety of positions. Generally activated in small groups—four seems the most frequent size element—they were most frequently used as backfill. Called up in small numbers, and without any local leadership accompanying them, these people often had difficulty adjusting to the new situation. As so often happened in backfill situations, these temporary additions were welcomed by the host base. Frequently they were not integrated into the local command structure, or they worked in a setting different than their home station. Master sergeants who enjoyed working on vehicles found that the local protocols would allow them only to supervise, yet they had limited supervisory jurisdiction in this setting. Though most had productive tours and were recognized for their contribution, the experience was often stressful and came in a setting without support from “home folks.”⁴

The combat communications figures were low, but in part reflected the lower percentage total of members in this field. Participants came from many units, often only one or two coming from a given unit. The only unit with large-scale participation (105 called) was at McEntire ANGB, South Carolina. Lack of a greater call was partially attributed to lack of sufficient state-of-the-art equipment in the reserve components. Members were particularly upset, though, because the bulk of the Air Force capability in this field rested in the Air Guard, yet few of them were called.⁵

Many of those called went to the AOR and found the situation challenging and not what they planned on. Geared largely for maintaining combat communications, many were asked to set up base communications systems, which was not the same, but they were largely successful at that task.⁶

Flying squadrons provided almost 15 percent of the personnel. Here the participation varied and principally represented units flying variations of F-4, F-16, KC-135, C-5, C-141, and C-130 aircraft. Though SAC- and MAC-gained units were technically listed in most data banks as mobilized and retained at home units, the bulk of mobilized flying personnel were either in-theater or were commuting to it. Of the flying personnel called to active duty, the largest number were in SAC refueling units, significantly outnumbering any other category. Next were the airlifters from MAC, followed by the fighter and reconnaissance units at TAC. Finishing the lineup was the 193 Special Operations Group (SOG), the only unit gained by the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC).⁷

Mission support, a small career field, was underrepresented with 35 people called, especially considering the chemical warfare threat. Several unit commanders expressed concern over this in postwar evaluations of the lessons learned from the war.⁸ Medical professions, which represented over 20 percent of those called, served the dual function of backfilling for active duty medical personnel sent to the Persian Gulf and providing the needs for aeromedical evacuation in the AOR. The high cost of keeping medical professionals on active duty and the difficulty in recruiting nurses and physicians forced greater reliance on those in the reserve components. Most nonflying medical personnel were backfill, filling for active duty counterparts sent to the AOR. Generally, their work paralleled their civilian experience. This contrasted with their military preparation as a second echelon response in a European war. Deference to their rank and profession put them in a different situation than most backfill reservists. Usually they were greeted at their new base, assigned duties corresponding to their training, and allowed to practice medicine as needed. The greatest difficulty many faced was not in the new, temporary location but in handling the situation at home. Difficult to replace or substitute for in their communities, they were often called to deploy in 24 hours, giving little time for them to take care of personal business. Exacerbating the situation was the fact that gaining hospitals often did not need all the personnel sent or did not need them immediately. Medical service guardsmen were aware of the need for 24-hour capability to respond to wartime emergency but felt the call could have been handled with less sense of urgency for backfill missions.⁹

Using the medical community in backfill appears in part to have been a political decision. Granted, their training role was outmoded, and the new role was partially suggested by internal sources in the Department of Defense. It was, as noted in chapter 3, aided by Congressman Murtha when he wrote the secretary of defense and pleaded for this use as a measure to cut costs on CHAMPUS, the military medical insurance. Murtha wanted to reduce the need for military use of civilian hospitals when personnel capable of substituting were accessible in the reserves.¹⁰

Mobile aerial port squadrons (MAPS) contributed 391 participants, and that figure also must be seen in context. As previously noted, the Air Force had long relied on the MAPS units for wartime surge activity, and many had responded in the volunteer phase before the initial presidential call, handling much of the earliest surge. When the call came, the need had declined slightly.


Wing/group headquarters provided less than 4 percent. Though below the comparative number assigned, the figure is a significant and positive departure from the past, when almost no National Guard headquarters personnel were sought for participation in armed conflicts. Though some came as flyers, the presence of at least 15 colonels and one brigadier general in the theater of operations was in sharp contrast to the desire during World War II to weed out the leadership.

Engineering and Services (ES) civil engineers trained to put together new military complexes in a harsh environment. Only one ANG civil engineering unit went to the theater, but it constructed and took down temporary facilities. Though there were airfields, there often were no facilities to accompany them. Base Recovery After Attack Team (BRAAT) training in runway repair was not tasked, but the after-action reports suggested that earlier deployment for training had come as close as possible to preparing troops for the movement to the theater and for combat readiness.¹¹

This category also included firefighters, and many of them were upset over their role. Trained to fight aircraft fires and save lives, they were generally assigned a backfill role, replacing active duty personnel already in-theater. A number of them resented being placed in a perceived role of a second stringer, alright for use at home in an emergency but not up to the first-string action of the AOR.¹²

The final ES group was services, which provided a broad range of base services. It was another group used largely as backfill and was in a situation similar to the transporters. Often sent in small groups to bases where they were filling in on a temporary basis, these services were not integrated into the total force in the way they planned. The need for one group—food services—was distinctly brought into question. The active duty forces had used contract services for saving money on food services, and thus there were inadequate numbers of trained personnel in this specialty when the war broke out. Americans watching television saw their high-tech military, alone among the allied forces in Desert Shield, unable to serve hot meals to its troops. This was alleviated by the action of Persian Gulf allies providing food service. The presence and availability of third-country nationals (TCN) to work in food service made these functions viable. Because they were available, some military observers questioned the value of retaining food services in the reserve components. The most frequent rejoinder has been that the availability of TCNs in another war would be questionable.¹³

The pie graph in figure 9 depicts mobilization of a small number of state headquarters personnel in the conflict. Though these personnel were not normally tasked in a wartime, a number of Army liaison officers (ALO) were assigned there, and all those listed as state headquarters personnel were ALOs.



12 MARCH 1991, PEAK STRENGTH DAY

Source: ANGRC/DPMGR

Figure 9. Operation Desert Shield/Storm—Functional Area Mobilization

Security police were a large group called, and they faced one of the most frustrating tasks. Frequently called as small units, they were used to increase security for their home installations, as backfill at Stateside installations, and in-theater, often at installations where they were among the few guardsmen. Oddly enough, their training had not required them to have a security clearance, which caused problems when they deployed. They needed the same qualifications and capability as the active duty security police. Frequently acknowledged as experienced and dedicated, they were frustrated when required to handle high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), new weapons, and other unfamiliar items.¹⁴

The activated members of the ANG deployed to many places. Accurate data were difficult to obtain, and most statistics remain incomplete. Figures given by the ANG Contingency Support Center for the peak day strength listed 5,537 in the continental United States (CONUS); 5,130 in-theater; and 692 in outside the continental United States or the theater. SAC air refueling units show the inconsistency of the statistics. All called, including those who formed provisional wings in the AOR, were listed as assigned to CONUS and their home units since they were technically TDY from their home location. In reality, thousands rotated to the Persian Gulf AOR. The lack of a single repository for data on deployment made it difficult to find the locations of all units at any given time.¹⁵

Activations remaining in the CONUS were those split between backfill and those remaining at the home units. As an example, many security police had to remain at the home unit to provide increased security during the war. In SAC- and MAC-gained units, varied levels of manpower met the needs of units with elements involved in the AOR. Most others were involved in backfill and

provided for the needs of active duty bases that had already deployed members to the theater. The largest such group was the medical community, which provided much of the Stateside military medical care. Other support functions were scattered to military facilities throughout the United States.

Outside the United States, the forces went either to the AOR or to other bases, mostly in Europe. Examples of the latter include medical personnel sent to backfill in England. In maintenance SAC-gained guardsmen worked in Moron, Spain. There, facilities provided services for the KC-135E tankers at a point outside the congested theater, but much closer than home units. Over 200 flyers and support personnel from Quonset Point, Rhode Island, flew to England to provide C-130 airlift in the European theater, filling for active duty units unavailable for their normal rotation to the area.¹⁶

In the AOR, CENTCOM established the needs, generally following the request of the CENTAF commander. The leadership sought from the Guard a combination of operations and selected support functions and scattered them throughout the theater. Generally the ANG flying resources merged with Air Force components, yet retained much of their own autonomy and leadership within provisional wings and squadrons. Support elements varied, often depending on the specific career field.

CENTAF leaders quickly established a hierarchy and identified the needs of the area. They had a structure in place at the time of the mobilization (fig. 10). The air forces of the United States were organized into four provisional divisions, all headquartered at Riyadh, the administrative capital of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.¹⁷

Fourteenth Air Division (Provisional) (14 AD(P)) was composed principally of fighters and fighter bombers (fig. 11). Its structure showed the blurred line developing between SAC and TAC doctrine and purpose. The Air Force could no longer differentiate the missions of these commands with the clarity offered in the 1950s and 1960s. The mix of airplanes in 14 AD(P) included varying versions of the A-10, F-15, F-16, F-111, and the F-117. Its subordinate elements scattered to nine theater locations.

One of these, the Fourth Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional) (4 TFW(P)) at Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia, was home for two major ANG flying units, and the largest ANG communications element in-theater. The 157th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) at McEntire ANGB, South Carolina, and the 138th TFS at Hancock Field, Syracuse, New York, became the core elements for units of the same name. As a core element, it was the principal unit, but could be augmented by other personnel from a variety of sources. The 240th Combat Communications Squadron (CCS), also from McEntire ANGB, was to provide base communications.

Other combat communications people were assigned to the 33 TFW, at Tabuk, Saudi Arabia. First assigned was the 228th Combat Information Systems Squadron (228 CISS), Knoxville, Tennessee, which served in a voluntary status. It was later replaced by a consortium of 81 communicators mobilized from 17 units in nine states, with the majority being from the California Air National Guard.





Figure 10. USCENTAF Provisional Air Divisions



Legend:

ALCS (P)—Air Logistics Control Squadron, Provisional
 AREFS (P)—Air Refueling Squadron, Provisional
 ASOCS—Air Support Operations Center
 CSG (P)—Combat Support Group, Provisional
 ECS—Electronic Combat Squadron

MMS (P)—Munitions Maintenance Squadron
 RECW (P)—
 TAS (P)—Tactical Airlift Squadron, Provisional
 TASS—Tactical Air Support Squadron
 TFS—Tactical Fighter Squadron
 TFW (P)—Tactical Fighter Wing, Provisional

Figure 11. Fourteenth Air Division Organization

Some communicators served at the headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, helping to provide communication links throughout the theater. Included in this group were members of two unusual squadrons—the 224th Joint Communication Systems Squadron (224 JCSS), Brunswick, Georgia, and the 290 JCSS, MacDill AFB, Florida. Both units reported directly to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and were the only such units in the Air Guard.

Another division, the 1610th Airlift Division (Provisional) (1610 ALD(P)) provided the airlift and aeromedical evacuation needed within the theater (fig. 12). It was composed mainly of MAC C-130 units, one SAC tanker unit, their support elements, aeromedical evacuation sections and aerial ports. While the aerial ports were assigned to all the bases in-theater to handle cargo, the flying units were assigned to seven bases.

At two of these bases, the Air Guard units formed the core of squadrons. At Al Ain, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the host unit, the 1630th Tactical Airlift Wing (Provisional) (1630 TAW(P)) contained three units, of which two were principally drawn from the Air National Guard. The 1630th Tactical Airlift Squadron (Provisional) (1630 TAS(P)) was made up of elements of the 130th Tactical Airlift Group (130 TAG), Charleston, West Virginia, and the 136 TAG, Hensley Field, Dallas, Texas. The 1632 TAS(P) was from the 139 TAG, Rosecrans Field, Saint Joseph, Missouri. At Al Kharj, one of the two squadrons in the 1670 TAG(P) was the 1670 TAS(P), cored by the 166 TAG, Wilmington, Delaware.

Almost 800 medical personnel mobilized and went to the AOR. Most were assigned to three locations: the 146th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (146 AES), Channel Islands ANGB, California; 142 AES, New Castle, Delaware; the 183d Aeromedical Evacuation Flight (183 AEF), Jackson, Mississippi; 156 AEF, Charlotte, North Carolina; and 167 AEF, Martinsburg, West Virginia, all reported to Al Kharj Air Base. The 109 AEF, Minneapolis-Saint Paul, Minnesota; 118 AES, Nashville, Tennessee; 137 AEF, Will Rogers Field, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and the 139 AEF, Schenectady, New York, all served at Riyadh. The 187 AEF, Cheyenne, Wyoming, sent personnel to Turkey.

Of the 144 aerial port personnel formally mobilized in the AOR, 89 were from the 164th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron (164 MAPS), Memphis, Tennessee. Prior to deployment, members learned that the unit would be split on arrival in the theater of operations. It was, and members reported to new or expanding facilities at Al Kharj, King Fahd, King Khalid—all in Saudi Arabia—and in Thumrait, Oman. Another unit, the 146 MAPS from Channel Islands ANGB, California, was initially assigned to King Khalid. Other aerial port personnel served voluntarily at a variety of locations.

The 17th Air Division (Provisional) (17 AD(P)) contained most of the SAC units (fig. 13). It was the most geographically dispersed organization, scattered across eight bases ranging from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean to Cairo, Egypt, with Air Guard tanker units flying KC-135Es at Abu Dhabi, UAE; Cairo West, Egypt; Dubai, UAE; and Jeddah/King Abdul Aziz, Saudi Arabia. At Abu Dhabi, elements of the 126th Air Refueling Wing (126 ARW), O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, and the 160th Air Refueling Group (160 ARG) merged to form a





Figure 12. 1610th Airlift Division Organization



Legend:

ARS (P)—AIR REFUELING SQUADRON, PROVISIONAL
 ARW (P)—AIR REFUELING WING, PROVISIONAL
 BMS (P)—BOMB SQUADRON, PROVISIONAL
 BMW (P)—BOMB WING, PROVISIONAL
 CAMS (P)—COMBAT AIR MOBILITY SQUADRON, PROVISIONAL
 SRS (P)—STRATEGIC BOMBING SQUADRON, PROVISIONAL
 STRATW (P)—STRATEGIC BOMBING WING, PROVISIONAL

Figure 13. Seventeenth Air Division Organization

tenant unit—the 1712th ARW(P)—at the base. At Cairo West, the 141 ARW, Fairchild AFB, Washington, and the 128 ARG, Mitchell Field, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, merged forces to become the base host unit, the 1706 ARW(P). At Dubai, elements of the 160 ARG, Rickenbacker ANGB, Columbus, Ohio, the 171 ARW, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and the 134 ARG, McGhee-Tyson Airport, Knoxville, Tennessee, merged to form a tenant unit, the 1713 ARW(P). The situation at Jeddah was slightly more confusing, and elements of eight wings participated in the creation of the 1701 Strategic Wing (Provisional) (1701 SW(P)) and were in its subordinate unit, the 1709 ARW(P).

The 15 AD(P) was the umbrella organization for almost everybody else who did not have a home (fig. 14). Here were the Wild Weasel electronic warfare unit, tactical reconnaissance, the Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC), various EC-130s, OA-10As of a tactical control wing, EF-111s, the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, and assorted missions that did not neatly fit the SAC/MAC/TAC mold.


Within the 15 AD(P) Shaikh Isa Air Base, Qatar, was the home of the Air National Guard's 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW). Starting with volunteers from the 117 TRW at Birmingham, Alabama, after Christmas 1990, they were replaced by members of the 152d Tactical Reconnaissance Group (TRG) from Reno, Nevada.

The Air Force sent six ANG security police units to the theater, most in UTCs of one officer and 43 enlisted members. The 174th Security Police Flight (174 SPF), Syracuse, New York, had the unusual experience of serving in a package of over 500 people sent from the 174 TFW to Al Kharj. At Cairo West, the 127 SPF, Selfridge, Michigan, and the 112 SPF, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, served with guard units other than their own. The 140 SPF, Buckley Field, Colorado, served at Khamis Mushait, Saudi Arabia, the home of the F-117 stealth fighters. The 122 SPF, Fort Wayne, Indiana, went to King Fahd.

King Fahd Airport was also the home for two other ANG units. The 193d Special Operations Group sent two EC-130s and personnel to do psychological warfare and electronic missions. The 188th Civil Engineering Squadron (188 CES) was the only ANG civil engineering unit sent into the theater.

Getting all the personnel and equipment to the theater was an accomplishment but was not done in the way most units planned. Three units, the 171 TFW, Syracuse, New York; the 190 ARG, Forbes AFB, Kansas; and the 130 TAW, Dallas, Texas, are used as case studies. Each unit represented a different command, and though all were flying units, the lessons have broad application.

The first of the case studies is the 190 ARG. When the Iraqis invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the 190th was under the command of Col Charles M. Mick Baier, a pilot with Trans World Airlines. The group had 10 KC-135E tankers at Forbes ANGB, Topeka, Kansas, and was to maintain two on alert in support of the SIOP. Working under a quad deputy system, it had a deputy commander for operations (DCO), Lt Col Merle S. Thomas; a deputy commander for support (DCS), Lt Col William F. Parker; and a deputy commander for maintenance (DCM), Lt Col William B. Blakely. A deputy commander for resources (DCR)



Legend:

- ACCS—AIRBORNE COMMAND AND CONTROL SQUADRON
- ALCS (P)—AIR LOGISTICS CONTROL SQUADRON, PROVISIONAL
- ASOCS (P)—AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER
- AVS (P)—AUDIO VISUAL SQUADRON, PROVISIONAL
- AWACW (P)—AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL WING, PROVISIONAL
- CSG (P)—COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP
- ECS—ELECTRONIC COMBAT SQUADRON
- JSTARS (P)—JSTAR SQUADRON, PROVISIONAL
- MAS (P)—MILITARY AIRLIFT SQUADRON, PROVISIONAL
- OSW (P)—OPERATIONS SUPPORT WING, PROVISIONAL
- STRATW (P)—STRATEGIC BOMBING WING, PROVISIONAL
- TAIRCW (P)—TACTICAL AIR CONTROL WING, PROVISIONAL
- TCS (P)—TACTICAL CONTROL SQUADRON
- TFS—TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON
- TFW (P)—TACTICAL FIGHTER WING, PROVISIONAL
- TRS—TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON
- WXC (P)—WEATHER GROUP, PROVISIONAL

Figure 14. Fifteenth Air Division Organization

position was vacant. The primary mission was to support aerial refueling and training of personnel.¹⁸

August began as a normal month. The flying unit, the 117th Air Refueling Squadron (ARS), under the command of Lt Col William F. Lyle, was scheduled to fly 280 hours. This was scrapped with the invasion, and the 117th converted from a training to an operational unit. On 2 August, SAC, working through NGB, queried Colonel Baier about the availability of aircraft and volunteer crews. At the unit UTA on 4-5 August, members were polled about their availability. This information was returned to NGB and SAC.

On Monday, 6 August, activity was off to a normal start until that evening. Colonel Baier received a phone call from the command post and learned that something was happening and that he might have to return to the base. At about 2330L, he was called back to the Command Center, where he immediately called NGB. He was informed that Forbes would operate a tanker task force (TTF) supporting aircraft flying east.

Fuels and maintenance personnel were immediately recalled to the base to prepare for TTF operations. Aircraft schedulers were called at about 0300L, and the first aircrews called at 0430L. Colonel Thomas, the DCO, was recalled from leave and by the following evening was alternating with Colonel Baier on the battle staff.

At 0300L on Tuesday, 7 August, the battle staff coordinated the launch of an aircraft to Offutt AFB, Nebraska, to pick up an Air Force satellite communications (AFSATCOM) unit and take it to Milwaukee, Wisconsin. At 0400L, the battle staff officially convened and declared the unit to be a 24-hour operation. Several aircrews briefed at this time were directed to stand down but be ready for recall in 30 minutes. This allowed personnel to get personal affairs in order.

At 0600L, Colonel Baier informed the Kansas adjutant general (AG), Maj Gen Philip Finley, as to the status of the 190 ARG. Baier requested a meeting with the AG and was scheduled for 1500L. At 0930L, the executive staff support officer (ESSO) for air, Col Steven R. Reynolds, arrived from across town at the state headquarters and was briefed on the situation. From 6 to 10 August there was almost no other contact with state headquarters.

The unit now faced three taskings: maintain the alert commitment to SAC; operate a tanker task force from Forbes; and deploy to support air operations in the Persian Gulf. This would all be done with volunteers since no presidential call was invoked. By 1000L, the unit had a new DCR, Lt Col William Hodge, and supply and transportation were reorganized to operate on a 24-hour basis. During the day, the personnel section was unable to obtain clear guidance from either SAC or NGB on how to cut orders. Local personnel then decided that all of them would serve on special training days. Base administration worked through the day, only to have a decision rescinded and all personnel placed on MPA man-days provided by SAC. All orders had to be recut, while administration was being asked to help run the mobility processing.

That evening, two aircraft arrived from the 141 ARW, Fairchild AFB, Washington, the parent organization of the 190 ARG. They were deployed to backfill for 190th aircraft and to support the TTF. Along with them in a show of support was Brig Gen Dennis B. Hague, the 141st commander. At 2230L, the logistics support manager (LGX), MSgt Nancy Stout, worked with Colonel Parker and Colonel Hodge to develop a logistical plan for deploying unit assets. The plan called for the unit to support six aircraft at a bare base operation. An active duty UTC of 154 maintenance personnel and a standard aircrew to aircraft ratio was assumed at this time. No operation plan (OPLAN) was cited as reference, and the unit was having to meet the requirements of a "tailored UTC" and to provide the numbers needed at the receiving end in CENTAF.

At 0600L, Wednesday, 8 August, LGX convened a meeting with representatives from the Maintenance Support Squadron (MSS), Resource Management Squadron (RMS), Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (CAMS), Operations, and the medical clinic. Since no plan existed for the mission, they were to turn in personnel and equipment requirements listings by 1400L. At this point, the mobility processing center was established, and personnel processing was split between two buildings on base.

During the day, new deployment tasking was received directing the unit to go to King Abdul Aziz Airport at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Departure would be on 10 August and arrival after sunrise on 11 August. Unforeseen problems emerged and affected mobility. Medical records showed many personnel needed immunizations, and several were overdue for physicals. The flight surgeon had to be called in to handle this problem. The chemical warfare gear was noted on a backorder receipt, but this was not the answer to a problem. Chemical warfare supplies were located and successfully procured from the host unit 384th SAC Clinic, McConnell AFB, Wichita, Kansas. Chemical warfare masks were located at an Army National Guard unit and released on a hand receipt.

The combination of tailored UTCs and access to only volunteers meant that some positions would be filled by personnel who had never occupied a mobility position. These people had never been required to go through chemical warfare training. Others had little experience at handling personal weapons. In the past, people not tasked to go through the unpleasant chemical warfare course had avoided it. Now, modern communications provided videotape of the grisly work Saddam Hussein's chemical agents wrought on his own people and the Iranian armed forces. When the disaster preparedness personnel offered a refresher course to those who wanted it, over 600 unit personnel responded plus 150 from other units in the area. Security police put in overtime training personnel in weapons qualification.

As the materiel and personnel deployment lists came in to the unit, clearly airlift would be required. Needs were explained to SAC, NGB, and MAC. Planners continued to assume that airlift would be available. Simultaneously asked by hundreds of units on an urgent basis, MAC could not provide airlift. LGX now had the equipment, but without airlift could not even publish an

official load plan. All that could be done was to assemble the equipment and hold it.

The beginning of a long day started at 0100L on 9 August. Colonel Blakely assumed command in the temporary absence of Colonel Baier. That day the official request went out for volunteers to deploy to an unknown location. (The location had not yet been publicly released.) LGX had the list of numbers of people needed by AFSC and a number limit. The tailored UTC could now be filled as units provided the names.

Mobility processing officially began at 0700, and problems immediately surfaced. Many volunteers had no mobility position assigned, and had to assemble deployment bags and equipment for personal use. RMS faced shortages in people for the 24-hour operation and had to issue a call for assistance. Volunteers came forward and SAC provided MPA man-days. LGX published a requirements listing and directed shops to check it. This eliminated some guesswork and helped identify shortfalls in WRSK and mission support kits (MSK). Informal lines of communication solved most problems as unit supervisors sought pragmatic solutions to problems.

The loading of equipment on unit aircraft began at midday. Due to a shortage of boom operators to monitor procedures, transportation personnel loaded the equipment and worried about weight and balance later. Prioritizing the loading also became a problem. It was not working, and loading stopped until someone could clearly be in charge of this process.

If this was not enough, earlier the unit learned it would receive one C-5 aircraft to help in the airlift. At midday, that airlift changed to two C-130s, significantly decreasing the carrying capacity. By late evening, the word came in that there would be no MAC support. Now the high-priority material stacked up in the yard awaiting MAC had to replace equipment already loaded on KC-135s.

By the afternoon of the 9th, the unit leaders also realized that they might need food and money for the deploying troops. There was still uncertainty about where the supplies and troops might arrive in-theater and what would be awaiting them. A vehicle was dispatched to pick up 5,000 meals-ready-to-eat (MRE) located at McConnell AFB. Not knowing the per diem status, the accounting officer picked up \$20,000 for distribution. The money turned out to be unnecessary and was returned.

The chaplain's services were needed in the morning. Told that the chaplain was to be deployed, the chaplain's assistant called several local clergy who earlier volunteered to help. By 1700L, 17 civilian clergy were on the base offering assistance.

The legal office started early in the morning and was augmented by attorneys from the state headquarters who volunteered to help. During the next 17 hours, they prepared over 200 documents, with many people requesting new wills and powers of attorney for spouses or parents.

As the evening wore on, group leaders recognized that a midnight meal would be necessary. Volunteers in the services squadron stayed on to prepare

the dinner. Nonservices personnel, including several of the officers, helped work the lines in the dining facility.

Although 9 August was a 20-hour day, the work went more smoothly than anticipated. The work did not get sloppier through the day, though fatigue may have contributed to two safety incidents. One member loading an aircraft had a forklift come down on his foot. Another had his foot pinched when the cargo on an aircraft shifted during loading. On the 9th and 10th, more planes came in to replace those called to the front. Forbes continued its operation as the TTF, and other units sent volunteers to help.

At 0330L on Thursday, 10 August, the unit started to load personnel on the first aircraft to depart. This underscored the importance of discipline at this juncture. Each section had its own idea of who needed to be first to leave, and the order of departure had been unclear. Many changes followed, and one section chief simply told his people to get on the airplane. Several other people were released prior to final roll call, and the passenger manifest was not verified or controlled. Five people were not accounted for until two weeks later.

By 0630L, the first of six aircraft was ready to leave, and all of them departed at 30-minute intervals. They carried 200 people and 33 tons of cargo. Another 54 people and 20 tons of cargo remained at Forbes to be shipped at a later date. Shortly after the departure of the last plane, a message arrived identifying the UTC to be implemented and what equipment to take. Airlift support was still needed, but the unit had no information or guidance from SAC, Eighth Air Force, or NGB.

On the day the aircraft departed, the unit started a family support group. TSgt Pam Bowen was appointed noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) and, at the state level, Capt John Andrew, of the Kansas Army National Guard, assisted in setting up the program. Spouses and retired personnel stepped forward, and 48 family members were present at the organizational meeting. Over 600 people were present at the first family support meeting on 13 August. The support group continued for the duration of the deployment. At one point, there were some areas of disagreement in the program, and it came directly under the control of the base commander, Colonel Blakely. With command support, the problems were worked out.

Notified on 12 August that no airlift was coming, the unit decided to fly the personnel and equipment left behind on organic airlift. That meant that they would fly one of their own aircraft over to the forward operating location (FOL) at Jeddah and trade it out for a plane in-theater. Personnel could also be rotated in and out on the aircraft. This procedure was not condoned by either SAC or NGB but was quickly adopted by many Guard installations.

On the 12th, a lesson in cooperation, persistence, and ingenuity was also offered. To complete the move, the unit needed special loading equipment not available in Topeka, including a special truck and a K-loader. The truck was at McConnell AFB, and the commander of the active duty unit owning the vehicle provided a driver and had the vehicle delivered to Forbes. The K-loader was a bigger problem. One was in nearby Saint Joseph, Missouri, at the

ANG's 139th Tactical Airlift Group. The people there offered to bring it down on a flatbed truck. It could not fit, however, so they dismantled it, put it on one of their C-130s, and hauled it to Forbes. The Forbes unit had loaded T-33 engines on trailers borrowed from the 141 ARW at Fairchild AFB, Washington. When the Missourians came to the rescue, they loaded these trailers and engines on the plane with their K-loader. Upon completion of the assigned project, they dismantled it and took it home again.

By this time, the units that had departed were in-theater, arriving even before their active duty counterparts. The KC-135 units on active duty were still required to support the SIOP, and SAC had opted to send the reserves to the war first. Without an adequate logistics system in place at the FOL, units literally phoned or faxed requisitions home for parts. A system put in place at Forbes forwarded parts and people to the AOR. The closure of the TTF on the 13th also freed two more aircraft to handle this job. On the 14th, a message from NGB relieved the unit of any training requirements at home. This effectively released the other two aircraft for the war effort. To keep the supply system operating at home took the efforts of many volunteers, usually serving on tours of less than 30 days. Challenged for the duration, they kept and scheduled adequate numbers in the right fields.

Arriving at the forward location, Colonel Baier and the others found themselves in charge of the American contingent. The commander of the base was a Saudi, but the Americans were, within certain limitations, allowed to function as they saw fit. As the situation in Jeddah evolved, Colonel Baier was selected as the commander of the 1701 SW(P). When later arrivals from the States came in, there was some question over who would be in charge at the base—Colonel Baier or his active duty counterpart? The Saudi commander, a member of the royal family, resolved this noting he wanted to retain the good working relationship established with Colonel Baier. For his efforts in-theater, Colonel Baier received the Legion of Merit.

The second case study was the 136th Tactical Airlift Wing, Hensley Field, Dallas, Texas. This MAC-gained unit had eight C-130H aircraft and 1,000 members, most from the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area. Its mission was to provide intratheater airlift of personnel, supplies, and equipment.¹⁹

Like other units, the 136th learned immediately after the invasion of Kuwait that it might be involved. The leadership was well aware that the immediate need was for volunteers, and that all entities, including state headquarters, supported its participation. The earliest response from the unit was to allow volunteers to go to active duty bases, and 11 left on 9 August. The three from the airlift control element (ALCE) and eight from the mobile aerial port deployed to McGuire AFB, New Jersey.

At 1800L on 9 August, the logistics plans section of the 130 TAG, Charleston, West Virginia, was directed to organize the deployment of a provisional wing to the AOR. The plan called for 558 volunteers, serving 30 days, to be drawn from five ANG C-130H units. The package would be alerted for deployment in 72 hours. One unit selected was the 136 TAW.

At each unit, the quad deputies (operations, services, maintenance, and resources) were to solicit volunteers to fill their respective portions of a tailored UTC. The new UTC would equate to one unit in a call-up. After a few changes, a modified plan called for the new wing to deploy in an initial and a follow-on group. The initial group would take 482 people, most from the flying and maintenance sections and would carry immediately needed equipment such as war readiness spares kits, mobility bags, and other parts and equipment essential to operation. A follow-on group of 558 would fly in on C-141s and would include flying, security police, civil engineering, transport, clinic, communications, and support personnel.

From 10-16 August, the UTC tasking, in-place dates, and destinations changed several times. Despite the repeated need to alter loading plans and all of the maneuvering required, they accomplished all mobilizing actions that could be preplanned. Immunizations, ID cards, active duty orders, and the like were complete for all volunteers who might be going. Equipment was marshaled and aircraft loaded on 16 August.

The mobilization had some problem areas. Equipment problems included a short supply of CWDEs, backordered for years but still unavailable because of the low priority accorded reserve support units. WRSK needs had not been coordinated with anyone experienced in the needs of the theater.

Personnel problems also surfaced. Getting authority to publish orders was often difficult, and fund cites and workday utilization codes were not available in time to publish orders. Departure times, which are not easy to set in a war, were a problem. Message traffic and telephone conversations often did not resolve the problem and only led to further confusion, especially when MAC and NGB had not reached the same conclusion in interpreting the rules and regulations. The accounting and finance inability to enter the JUMPS hampered timely service. Thus, Guard members experienced many problems and a lack of timely resolution, mostly traceable to the lack of interface between the JUMPS and the user facilities that had been under the reserve forces JUMPS-RF.

The process of selecting personnel was not the best. In the petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) section, for the first month of the buildup, the ranking person was a staff sergeant who supervised five airmen. The arrival of an experienced, knowledgeable master sergeant in September in a second group of volunteers alleviated the situation. In other cases, the plan did not include enough of the right people. In mobilization, packages failed to include essential LGX people. Headquarters grabbed those few included.

A final personnel problem was not visible at the time of mobilization. Many people were promised that they were only on a 30-day voluntary tour. This was generally true in the first group, but with the switch to the presidential call, the 30 days turned to 90, and then up to one year. Members were willing to serve but found the change in time and the inconsistency of accounting methods (i.e., credit for time served) irritating, if not deceitful.

The 73 members of the "A package," or first element used, mobilized on 17 August ready for 30 days of active flying in-theater. Meanwhile, they waited.

The aircraft remained loaded for six days, and finally had to be downloaded to accomplish maintenance inspections. On 30 August they received an official destination/in-place date. Reaccomplishing mobility processing and cargo loading, the unit deployed on 4 September.

The unit had no idea what caused the delay. In the rapid buildup, there was some confusion about unit destinations. At the time the 136th and its partners were originally going to depart, the 435 TAW, Rhein-Main AB, Germany, had to send its 37 TAS to Thumrait, Oman. The 16 C-130Es left Germany on 16 August, but learned en route that Thumrait could not accept them. Three aircraft, including one with the commander, Lt Col Robert N. Boudreau, continued on to Thumrait, while the rest diverted to Cairo West or returned home.

At Thumrait, a series of events led to a survey of the field at Al Ain, in the UAE, on 21 and 23 August. The initial survey on the 21st found a dirt strip about 10 miles from Al Ain, and concluded it was unsatisfactory. Upon return, they found that higher headquarters had given them the wrong coordinates for the field. They returned on the 23d and found the base was a newly constructed 13,000-foot runway, designed as the new international airport for the UAE. This was adequate, and on 24 August, the three aircraft continued to Al Ain and started the buildup of that bare base. From 25-28 August, the remainder of the active forces arrived. The search for a new base delayed an earlier plan to merge the 37 TAS and the ANG units at Thumrait. This accomplished, the move took place and the Guard arrived at Al Ain on 7 September, with the 30-day volunteers due home in eight days.

In separate action at the 136th on 24 August, only two days after President Bush signed the authorizing order, 113 members of the 136th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron (136 MAPS) were called to active duty. Along with its commander, Lt Col Susan Bickelmann, the unit was directed to report to Dover AFB, Delaware, to work at the busiest aerial port of the Gulf War. Mobility processing went smoothly for the unit, which departed on 26 August for a planned 90-day tour. Though trained for bare base operations, the unit integrated with several others into the system at that base. Unit identity was lost and members were incorporated into the operation. However, members were brought into the control elements and senior NCOs given supervisory positions.

In the rules of the presidential call-up, the gaining command had operational control, but the unit retained administrative control. This was realistic when calling an entire unit. The problem for MAPs was who has control when the unit integrates into a larger organization. Fortunately, this did not affect the operation since problems were at a minimum. The difficulty for commanders was how to deal with their people when they no longer worked for them.

The presidential call also brought other problems. The new draft of AFR 28-5 faxed to the unit had limitations. Untrusted, it failed to answer some questions. The call-up brought reality to the forefront, and bared the flaws in AFR 28-5. For the leadership of the 136th and its partners, the tailored UTC remained a thorn. It destroyed unit integrity and, without proper support, it forced units to make changes they were ill prepared to work with. Often

lacking expertise in the needs of the gaining location, they made several mistakes on what to bring. WRSKs turned out to be inappropriate for the location and duration. The survival equipment shop brought no sewing machines which were needed to repair flight suits torn in the rigorous combat airlift and the austere conditions of the location.

Personnel decisions were also out of the criteria of standard UTCs reviewed at the unit level. When the tailored products came out of MAC, although the units had some coordination, errors existed. On the first levy flow, almost all the O-5 slots went to Dallas, Texas, and the O-3 slots to Charleston, West Virginia. No slight of either unit was intended, but manning with volunteers was more difficult without spreading the rank. On the first levy, all the intelligence personnel were from Dallas. Rectified on later flows, correction was impossible in the limited time of the first levy.

The 130th, NGB, and MAC asked the Dallas unit to plan rotational replacement of those at Al Ain. General Killey, the director of the Air Guard, visited the base to discuss plans with the leaders and to explain ANG needs to members. The new plan, named the "B package," called for replacements from seven ANG units. Over 200 of those at Al Ain extended, and since they shared the load, the 136th needed to send only 20 members. Eighteen actually departed on 12 September to Dover AFB, where they joined the remainder of the replacements and on the 13th flew on to Al Ain. At Al Ain, no equipment rotated, only people and their personal gear. On 15 September, those returning to Dallas began their journey home.

From the start, active duty elements in-theater questioned the value of the rotation policies and their effect on combat effectiveness and ability to command. The 30-day volunteers offered the program little continuity, especially those who arrived with only eight days to serve. Adding to the problem, the Guard arrived after the command structure was in place.

Even the name of the unit was 435 TAW (FOL)—or "forward operating location" of Rhein-Main AB, Germany. Understanding the sensitivities in blending the Guard and active duty forces, the command agreed to the informal nickname of the 1st DAWG, or Desert Airlift Wing. Presumably some University of Georgia sports fan liked and adopted the name "Dawg." Not until months later did MAC agree to the name changes that made this the 1630th Tactical Airlift Wing (Provisional).

On 26 September, representatives of the 130th, 136th, and the MAC crisis action team (CAT) met at MAC headquarters to plan the next move. With the presidential call-up authority, it was no longer necessary to seek volunteers if the units could get the numbers needed within the limits of the 200K call. They did, and on 4 October, the unit worked with the 130th to break down the fragmentary orders (frags), UTC requirements, and other necessary actions. The unit mobilized its personnel that day; on the following day, it departed for the UAE with 222 people flying from Carswell AFB, Texas, aboard a Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) L-1011.

The arrival of a group in-theater for 90 days smoothed working relationships. Even at the time of the September swapout, the provisional wing had appointed

Col Michael B. Smith of the 136th as the deputy commander for resources. With the October arrival, the command structure became more firmly formed, with Col John R. Wingfield III, Air Force, remaining as the wing commander. Representing the 136th in the higher levels of command, besides Colonel Smith, were the wing vice-commander, Col R. Winston Williams; DCM, Lt Col John W. Cook; and Lt Col Michael W. Leikam, commander of the 1630th TAS(P). Other guardsmen in command included the DCO, Col William L. Fleshman, West Virginia ANG; deputy DCO, Col William D. Peters, Jr., West Virginia ANG; and commander of the 1632 TAS(P), Lt Col Donald G. Buttron, Missouri ANG. By October, there were concerns over how those on call for 90 days would be replaced, or if they would be extended. They had done well. The 136 MAPS personnel, still at Dover AFB, were part of a team that smashed the old Air Force record for amount of cargo loaded in a 48-hour period. Still needed on active duty on Thanksgiving Day, 22 November, they were extended for another 90 days. On 2 January, the 136th members at Al Ain received the same message.

On 18 January, the president authorized the partial mobilization, and lifted the 200K limits. Their tour of duty extended up to a total of one year, with credit for time already served. This did not end the call-ups for the unit. On 25 January, a one year call came to 27 members of the clinic; four days later, 16 deployed to Royal Air Force (RAF) Naughton, in the United Kingdom. The last activation occurred on 13 February, when 13 members of the security police flight mobilized in place to provide increased security to their home base.

The next case study involved the 174th Tactical Fighter Wing at Hancock Field, Syracuse, New York. Under the command of Brig Gen Michael S. Hall, the 174 TFW, its subordinate 138 TFS, and its tenant units had a total of 1,300 personnel and 18 F-16A/B aircraft assigned at Syracuse. Flying fighters since 1947, they had over 30 years experience in a close-air-support role. That experience began in 1958, with the acquisition of F-86Hs, continued with A-37Bs from 1970 to 1979, and A-10As from 1979 to 1988. In 1988, the unit acquired F-16A/B aircraft and continued to practice the close-air-support role. Needed to accomplish this unusual F/A-16 idea, the members were skilled in the techniques needed.²⁰

The unit displayed its skill repeatedly. During the 10 years before the call-up, the 174th had earned an Air Force Outstanding Unit Award three times (1981, 1983, 1985-86). Winner of the Air Force Maintenance Effectiveness Award in 1983, it was selected as the outstanding maintenance squadron in the New York Air National Guard *and* the United States Air Force in 1988. That year it was selected as the best unit in the New York ANG and won the Governor's Cup Trophy.

Unlike MAC- and SAC-gained units, TAC-gained assets were not needed with the same degree of urgency. This gave units more time to prepare for the war and for scheduling unknowns such as tailored UTCs and support aircraft. During this frame from August to November, the 174th prepared for war, and the leadership sought a position on the team that would go to the theater.

In this interim, ANG leadership declared that the fighter units would be called up intact, or at least by viable UTC. Only two fighter organizations were called, the 174 TFG and the 169 TFG at McEntire ANGB, South Carolina, each of which was close to existing UTC requirements. The entire flying unit, maintenance support, RMS vehicles, security police, and other needed support all would go with the unit. This does not mean that the whole unit was called but that it was a viable UTC and it was not combined with other elements.

Time gave NGB and TAC a better chance to pick and choose who would go to war. They based selection on multiple factors, among them the records of the units and the desire of their leadership to be selected. For Syracuse, the combination of the track record and the desire of General Hall and his staff were crucial. Hall was by this time a known quantity to both NGB and TAC and had cultivated a good working relationship with Gen Robert D. Russ, the TAC commander. The unit's record spoke for itself.

By September and October, the Air National Guard Combat Support Center had evolved and responded effectively to unit requests. The 174th maintained good contact directly with the CSC and CENTAF Rear at Langley. CENTAF Rear was the force at TAC headquarters that communicated between CENTAF and activities in the states.

The unit was asked about its ability to meet the needs with internal "volunteers," which this time meant those volunteering to be called. Despite an enthusiastic response, not all AFSCs could be filled. More experienced and senior base personnel officials were pleased that not one person requested exclusion from a call-up. This was in contrast to the *Pueblo* crisis in 1968, when a number of members sought exemption from the call. The exact reason for this was difficult to learn, but unit leaders attributed it to recruiting. They knew that the quality of the all volunteer force, and particularly of the unit at Syracuse, reflected a type of people who would not remain on the team unless facing a catastrophic occurrence in their lives.

Gathering information for the call-up, unit supervisors and the base command structure selected those who were to go, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. Among the married couples in the unit, only one spouse would go so the other could remain at home. The leaders were also concerned about how many senior NCOs should be used in the maintenance field. Their skill and experience would be valuable to the unit, but taking the senior NCOs and leaving few at home could have created a problem. Two concerns surfaced. First, how could senior personnel be retained at home if needed. The second was the need to retain the lessons learned and maintain continuity. Senior people, particularly Vietnam-era veterans, did not have sufficient retention time. If they left the unit shortly after returning from the Gulf conflict, their combat experience would be lost. Despite these concerns, the unit elected to use the senior enlisted personnel to give the greatest experience to those going into conflict. Senior officer personnel (O-6 and up) were specifically excluded by CENTAF, just as they had been in many active duty units.

Communicating the preparations to headquarters was often irritating. During this time, the need for information was greater and more urgent. The

174th was to send morning reports and information with daily and weekly counts to Headquarters, New York ANG, NGB, TAC, and CENTAF Rear, and no two wanted quite the same information or the others' format. Minor differences or additions were sought. NGB wanted to know the number of technicians and females, the New York ANG wanted the numbers by AFSC, and CENTAF Rear wanted numbers showing UTC effectiveness. As a result, they frequently filled out almost identical separate reports.

Meetings with the TAC and CENTAF Rear people made it clear that the 174th would be a part of the 4th Composite Wing (Provisional). A new unit, the 138 TFS(P), comprised the like-named flying squadron and its maintenance support. Other personnel would be assigned to 4 CW(P), and mixed with active duty people already in-theater from the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina. The 4th arrived at Thumrait on 9 August and was to move forward to a bare base at Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia, while the Guard fighter units would be joining it.

To assure inclusion of enough of his people to the command structure, General Hall got permission from General Russ to contact the commander of the 4th, Col Hal M. Hornburg. In telephone conversations with Colonel Hornburg, Hall secured an agreement to bring four lieutenant colonels for the staff, beyond the people staying with the 137th. Colonel Hornburg accepted Lt Col Billy Rose for the Command Post, Lt Col Brent Richardson as the ADO, Lt Col Paul J. Richter as the assistant RM, and Lt Col Robert H. Purple as assistant CSG commander.

At home members knew they might be going to the Middle East, but were uncertain of when they would go. In August, they were alerted to be ready when it looked like Saddam Hussein might direct an attack on Saudi Arabia. They were alerted again around Labor Day and near Thanksgiving. Finally, on 28 November the first members were activated, and 18 services personnel prepared to go to the theater. On 30 November, they left for a six-day trip to Al Kharj. They encountered delays en route, including a stay of a couple of days in Riyadh.

Colonels Purple and Richter wanted to be with their unit in-theater but were unable to travel with the services package. They were instead sent by the unit on a commercial carrier to be at Al Kharj when activity started there. Their Trans World Airlines flight was late arriving in Paris, and they had a one-day delay after missing the connecting flight to Riyadh. The next day, they came in on Saudia Airlines. At Riyadh, after figuring out how to use the local phone system, they checked with American military authorities on how to get to Al Kharj. No one was sure, so they spent the night in local military facilities at a location nicknamed Cabin City. The next day, they received a number to call; and after a few other connections, they found someone who was going to Al Kharj and could load them and their gear into his pickup truck. They arrived at a true bare base and had the opportunity to be there from the start of that base's buildup.

On 3 December, the flying unit received formal call-up notification. The unit remained in alert status, awaiting the departure date. On 20 December,

the security police flight deployed to Al Kharj. The 44 members had an uneventful trip. The 18 F-16s and 282 personnel left for the Gulf on 2 January. The processing of the individuals and the deployment of the aircraft went smoothly. The unit was prepared for the inability of MAC to provide the needed resources. Plans had called for a host of C-141s or C-5s to transport the unit. That was not to be the case. Only six C-141s could make it, and much of the follow-on was to be sent over on any aircraft available.

As with the tanker units, this was a blessing in disguise. Those who went over on the first aircraft with only the bare necessities could assess the needs in-theater. By faxing and calling requests home, they could have follow-on aircraft bring only needed items. For example, plans called for sending tons of a special soap designed for use without water. A quick field test resulted in the cancellation of the remainder of the shipment. Larger items such as aircraft engines could rotate in as needed. With the only F-16A models in-theater, the ANG units had difficulty plugging into the Air Force supply system. It was more effective for the unit to call home and have parts sent Federal Express or shipped on the next plane.

The remainder of the personnel trickled out of Syracuse: 11 on 5 January; 105 on 9 January; and six more on the 13th to bring the total to 516 personnel. All went to Al Kharj and filled the positions largely as planned.

In the deployment, one item of equipment became a conspicuous problem. The 174th had F-16s for only a year when called. The unit had not had time to install or train with ECM pods, a device that would make it harder for the Iraqis to lock onto targets. Efforts to get them before departure were not entirely successful, and the unit rushed to gain expertise on this piece of equipment. At several levels, the need to work with the ECM pods had not been emphasized, leaving the crews at a disadvantage in the deployment to the Gulf.

At home, the unit formed a family support group. The community involvement was so great that the unit at times had to ask people to hold back. Unit cohesion was evident as the alumni or retirees from the organization, along with those who stayed behind, and participants from the community worked in concert to help the families of those who left.

These case studies have been limited to three representative organizations. Although the methods of the units were different, there is enough variety to cover other units. The absence of nonflying units in these cases was not done with any prejudice toward them, but was the result of one or more of three factors. First, many activated in a less complex manner than the flying units. Second, for many fields, only a few people were activated. A third factor—a flaw of the author—was lack of ready access to the history or details of some of these nonflying units. The details of the medical units, security police, and communications needed to be gathered and shared within these communities and with the ANG leadership.

There are, however, certain aspects that need to be covered that were not addressed in the discussion of the case studies. The selection of leaders, for example, showed how much the armed forces had changed. This is worth noting, especially after recalling remarks recorded in chapter 1. At that time,

the National Guard officers were not trusted, and almost all in the grade of O-5 and higher were fired in the midst of a world war. In the Persian Gulf War, with over one-quarter million in the reserve components involuntarily called up, less than 12,000 were in the ANG. Of this, about 7,000 served in the Persian Gulf. Remarkably, among these 7,000, the Air Guard had at least 15 colonels and one brigadier general. The enlisted ranks included many chief master sergeants, though here the specific figures are difficult to find.

Some of the methods of leadership selection have been alluded to in the individual accounts. There is also some difference by command and by needs at the time of this conflict. For example, the SAC commanders opted to retain their active duty forces at home in support of the SIOP. This was near the core of SAC doctrine and paramount in the thoughts at the time. The elimination of the alert since then has created a different situation. At the time, though, SAC got much of its force and leadership from the reserve components. From the start, unit structure included the ANG leadership. The SAC-gained units also could set up much of their own programs in moving forces to the theater, and often were arriving at facilities at the same time as their active duty counterparts. Leadership problems could therefore be resolved from the outset, allowing for immediate inclusion of the Guard members.²¹

MAC-gained units or members were generally placed in wings in which the leadership was from the active duty forces. The active duty units often had been the ones who set up the installation, as at Al Ain, and had a head start in the local leadership decisions. In these situations, the ANG leaders were incorporated into the leadership but generally were not in the top position. For those used in backfill positions, or in additional requirements such as aerial port, they received supervisory positions and incorporated directly into the units, especially after the mobilization.²²

The TAC units had the greatest time to "politik" and quite naturally did so. They also were selected because of the historical excellence of the units. Still, the leadership had time to go to bat for their own team, as noted with General Hall and the team from Syracuse.²³

For decision makers, there were certain factors that tended to stand out. The units had excellent records and a capable support for the leader. While the exact selection processes varied by gaining command and position, decision makers considered perseverance, planning, connections with a sponsor, unit record, personal record, and luck. In specialized career fields, the ability of unit leaders were evaluated, even if at a rank below O-6. Lt Col Stewart Teer went with his communications unit out of McEntire, heading the largest Air National Guard communications package and tasked to provide the needs of the base at Al Kharij. Lt Col Danny Coker, 164 MAPS commander at Memphis, was selected to be the commander of the 1680 ALCS. At Memphis, his unit had been selected as the outstanding Air Reserve component unit in MAC. It had repeatedly won awards from both Twenty-first and Twenty-second Air Force. The unit's record of participation with MAC and its scores of "outstanding" on Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI) helped, too. In the last ORI report, the inspectors even

remarked that Colonel Coker's unit was the best they had ever seen, and remarked on the ability of its members as innovators.

This ability to lead groups that could innovate and adapt to changing conditions was important. Higher-level commanders wanted leaders in war that could do what was necessary and were not afraid to deal with change. These were the people that made things happen. They did not wait for results: they planned and executed for them.

Air National Guard leaders also learned what type of person not to select for leadership. In one case, a man was regarded at home as a good officer and commander. Versed in the operation of every area in his unit, he dazzled inspectors and state staff with his versatility and knowledge. Even in support functions, he was knowledgeable about every operation. None in higher positions realized that he tried to be involved in every decision. In a war-zone setting with a requirement for quick decisions, the resentment bubbled to the surface. Workers complained that he was siding with others against them, that he was not listening to them or allowing them to make decisions. As their irritation grew, the commander lost control of his unit. By the time these volunteers rotated back home, the state staff was alerted and had to act. This was another case to prove the old adage that more people are fired by subordinates than superiors. When the trust in his ability was lost, his leadership evaporated.

Grooming senior leadership for wartime is a greater problem for the ANG than for the active duty Air Force. The effectiveness of most of these leaders was not in doubt, or their credentials as officers, but the question was the level at which they were the most effective. By tradition, the Guard was a local organization, and the focus remained local. Headquarters experience was seldom an aspiration for unit members and was inconvenient for all but a geographically fortunate few. Members grew up in a unit, and membership over 30 years was not unusual. This made it difficult for ANG commanders to develop experience in dealing with host countries, with embassy personnel, and in taking care of contracting and accounting and finance problems in another country. They also had less experience in the wartime operations of a wing or higher level. The greater use of reserve component senior officers in this conflict made it worthwhile to know how much they would be used, and in what ways, especially as the percentage of the force in reserve grew.

Some problems for units involved equipment shortages, a problem often shared by active duty units. Finding enough chemical warfare defense equipment challenged most units. Communications equipment at deployed locations was often inadequate to the task, and small copiers and shredders could not handle the deluge of paper. When partial units deployed, they needed land radios, often the same ones still needed at home.

Specific mission areas experienced other difficulties. In MAC, CONUS airlift was at times confusing. The Air National Guard operations center and the MAC airlift management branch (MAC/DOOM) agreed on control coming through MAC/DOOM. Units would still get calls from the numbered air forces requesting help. This was not surprising; the NAFs still had missions to fly

and a shortage of equipment. Still, units answered their calls to the frustration of the ANG operations center management. As a result the command and control was not smooth or well coordinated. For those deployments, an advanced echelon (ADVON) team could have identified many problems at gaining bases and could have helped the unit bring just the right equipment. Airlift crews (both SAC and MAC) received insufficient information on loading difficulties at many installations. As a result, they landed at bases where they found no K-loader or any other necessary or helpful item of equipment, and had to change plans to adapt to this problem. In units like the one in Pittsburgh, available and helpful AFRES neighbors with a K-loader saved the day.²⁴ At McEntire, loading equipment to accommodate a KC-10 was not available. Often schedules were predicated on the use of one item like a K-loader, and doing the mission with a forklift added significantly to the time required. This frustrated deploying aircraft and units.

In other instances, incompatible equipment frustrated the commanders and the unit's ability to take part in the war. The Air Force excluded A-7 units because these outmoded aircraft were found only in the reserve components. Though most units were in an upgrade process, this did little to ease their frustration during Operation Desert Storm. Two reasons prevented deployment of the aircraft. First, sufficient fighters were available in the active force. Second, these older aircraft would have placed an additional strain on the logistics system. Combat communications facilities experienced the same problem. With two-thirds of the personnel in combat communications units in the reserves, few were called, often because they owned out-of-date equipment.²⁵

RF-4C reconnaissance units, on the other hand, had old equipment but were called. The reason here was the reserves' reconnaissance capabilities. Only 16 percent of the reconnaissance assets were in the active force. Badly needed when the satellite surveillance proved inadequate, they had to be called. Even then, they experienced difficulties. For example, when the Birmingham guardsmen deployed, some of the film and chemicals did not arrive until 30 days later.

Arriving in-theater, the people welcoming them did not understand their equipment limitations, since so few on active duty used this equipment. This lack of familiarity with the equipment frustrated the operators. An example was the controversy with the air intercept missiles (AIM-9L). The ANG aircraft from Reno arrived with AIM-9L missiles attached for self-defense. The crews were ordered to remove them for two given reasons. First, they had them and the active force did not, and it would be unfair for one to have them when the other did not. Second, if the RF-4Cs were equipped with a missile, the crews would not do their reconnaissance jobs but would seek a kill as fighter pilots. Familiarity with the units, their mission, and needs would have precluded such thoughts.²⁶

The deployment of units created many situations that challenged all levels within the units. The ability of ANG units to work around challenges attested to their quality. Even so, many changes were necessary. The confusion in the

command structure had to be eliminated quickly. Much of this could be traced back to ineffective support from headquarters personnel, most of whom were competent and conscientious. The problem was one of planning. Because of the bureaucratic thickets, needed regulations were not updated in a timely manner. Plans to fight a new type of war had not made it through, and years after the implosion of the Soviet Union, efforts were still directed toward fighting the Soviet menace in central Europe.

The war that broke out in the Middle East was exactly the type of war predicted for several years. It was the kind the Joint Chiefs of Staff had briefed Congress and the administration about. Though the specific attack was a surprise, the idea was not. The slow machine was simply inadequate to handle the change. As a result, unit commanders continued to practice for the old scenario. Medical units prepared to be in the second echelon facing the Warsaw Pact. Units had beddown locations in Europe where the whole unit would deploy. WRSKs were based on needs for facing the central European threat. The practice took on an aura of the unreal, yet few managers took issue because the system was out of their control, and the leaders failed to force the needed changes. The units lost some control and ability to function effectively in a system they could not correct. They still conducted effective training. Good people wanted to do their jobs, yet they faced problems trying to work around unwelcome, outdated, or unnecessary regulations that hampered their ability to act.

Notes

1. Briefing slide, ANGRC/DPMAR in ANGRC/DOC files, Andrews AFB, Md., subject: Mobilization for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, n.d.
2. Briefing slide, ANGRC/DPMGR in ANGRC/DOC files, Andrews AFB, Md., subject: Operation Desert Shield/Storm Involuntary Mobilization Peak Participation, n.d.
3. Briefing slide, ANGRC/DPMGR in ANGRC/DOC files, Andrews AFB, Md., subject: Operation Desert Shield/Storm Functional Area Mobilization, n.d.
4. National Security Analysts, Inc., *Air National Guard Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Lessons Learned Final Report*, 1992, 33-34.
5. Lt Col Roy Pansey, NGB-SC, interview with author, February 1993; Lt Col Stewart Teer, 240C CCS, interview with author, February 1992; Charles J. Gross, NGB-PAH, "Leaning Forward: The Air National Guard and the Persian Gulf Crisis, 1990-1991," 26 April 1993, 32; and briefing slides, subject: Desert Shield/Desert Storm: A Total Force Success Story, slide no. 10796 7 CF, n.d.
6. Gross, 32; and Pansey interview.
7. Briefing slide, ANGRC/DPMGR, Andrews AFB, Md., subject: ANG Support of Desert Storm, n.d.
8. History, 136 TAW, Dallas NAS, Tex., CY 1990-1991, 1991; and History, 190 ARG, Forbes ANGB, Kans., CY 1990-1991, 1991.
9. *ANG Lessons Learned Report*, 91; and briefing slides, NGB/CF, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm: A Total Force Success Story," slide no. 10796 13 CF, subject: Major Lessons Learned by Mission Area: Medics, n.d.
10. Congressman John P. Murtha, chairman, Defense Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, to Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, letter, subject unspecified, 3 December 1990.

11. Lt Col Barney Hitt, 164 TAG, interview with author, February 1992.
12. Briefing slide, NGB/CF, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm: A Total Force Success Story," slide no. 10796 12 CF, subject: Major Lessons Learned by Mission Area: Firefighters, n.d.
13. Briefing slide, NGB/CF, slide no. 10796 13 CF, subject: Major Lessons Learned by Mission Area: Medics, n.d.
14. *ANG Lessons Learned Report*, 141.
15. Briefing slides, ANGRD/DPM in ANGRD/DOC files, subject: ANG Support of Operation Desert Storm, n.d.
16. After-Action Report for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 164 TAG, Memphis IAP, Tenn., 1991; After-Action Report for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 190 ARG, Forbes ANGB, Kans., 1991; and After-Action Report for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 143 TAG, Quonset Point, R.I., 1991.
17. Stan Morse, ed., *Gulf Air War Debrief* (Westport, Conn.: Airtime Publishing, 1991), 185-96; "The Forces of Desert Storm," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1991, 40; Message, SACLOC, SAC Locations as of 0500L 13 March 1991 (S) (declassified IAW 281905ZJun91 USCINCCENT); Report, MAC/PA, subject: Provisional Wings and Squadrons of MAC Flying Squadrons Assigned to AOR and Origin of Units Composing Them, January 1991; Report, subject: CENTAF Desert Shield USCENAF Beddown Bases and Units in the AOR, n.d.; Lt Col Jim Bertrand, 193 SOG, Harrisburg, Pa., interview with author, 20 March 1992; and Report, TAC/XPM, subject: Unit Organization Diagram, 3 March 1991.
18. Col Charles Baier, interview with author, 2 April 1992; and After-Action Report for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 190 ARG, 1991.
19. History, 136 TAW History, CY 1990-1991, 1991; After-Action Report for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1630th Tactical Airlift Wing Provisional (MAC), Al Ain AB, United Arab Emirates; After-Action Report for Operation Desert Storm, 1630 TAWP FOL, King Fahd AB, Saudi Arabia, 18-31 January 1991; Point Paper Summary, Desert Shield/Storm Participation of 136 Tactical Airlift Wing, Dallas NAS, Tex.; and History of Airlift in the Desert: Circumventing the Iraqis, Al Ain AB, United Arab Emirates, 23 May 1991.
20. Brig Gen Michael S. Hall, Col William A. Forkhamer, Lt Col David Hamlin, Lt Col Robert H. Purple, Colonel Webster, Maj John Murphy, Maj Michael Waters, CMS John H. Gratzer, and CMS Robert C. Smolen, 174 TFW, interviews with author, 12 April 1992.
21. Baier interview; and Lt Col Merlin Tobler, Headquarters SAC, interview with author, 10 July 1992.
22. After-Action Report, 1630th TAWP, Al Ain AB, UAE, 1991.
23. Brig Gen Donald W. Shepperd, NGB/CF, interview with Dr Charles J. Gross, NGB-PAH, 11 January 1993, 8-9.
24. MSgt Raymond T. Hedges, 171 ARG/TMO, Pittsburgh, Pa., interview with author, 13 April 1992.
25. Pansey and Teer interviews.
26. Col Woody Clark, 152 TRG/CC, Reno, Nev., interview with author, February 1992.

Chapter 6

Lessons Learned from the Mobilization

The mobilization for the Persian Gulf conflict provided the Air National Guard with a better understanding of its role and of modifications needed to retain organizational viability. No reserve component had been involuntarily mobilized since the inception of the all volunteer force and Total Force Policy. Significant changes occurred in that time, requiring the organization to respond to changes in technology and ways of doing business. At the macrolevel, the Air Guard achieved total force implementation with the Air Force. At the microlevel, the system functioned, doing well operationally but needing, especially in the support areas, reforms to meet the challenge of a changing world order. In assessing the lessons, they break down into three overlapping categories: those involving entities external to the Guard, those within the broader organization, and those at unit or state level.

Within the organization, the executives (general officers) at National Guard Bureau had a good idea of the direction of the organization. The operators worked hard and effectively to accomplish their mission. At the management level, the problems were not for a lack of expertise or diligence; they were a response to systemic or process problems. The business processes used throughout the National Guard were not effective enough to prevent basic difficulties in logistics, finance, personnel, and general administration. These flawed methods, caused by both internal and external sources, often existed for years. However, they were not considered a problem until the end of the cold war created changes and more urgency than the cold war itself. While the operational capability of the organization responded swiftly, inability to respond with due speed hampered the support areas.

Patterns and known developments leading to the Air Guard participation during the Gulf War are compared, where possible, with past actions. This way the role of the Air Guard emerges and the rationale behind decisions becomes clearer. Also clear are the uses and misuses of history in the preparation for this conflict. In its dealing with external entities, the Air Guard was principally concerned with two areas, organizational structure and technology. Within organizational structure the subject is broken down into three areas: political dealings, force structure, and policy.

In most governmental agencies in the United States and the other world democracies, politics is an important component of decision making. This is the nature of democracies, and holds true in the Air National Guard and other military reserve components. The buildup and the capabilities for the war reaffirmed the need for the reservists to use their political capabilities. In the

1970s, Guard and Reserve organizations capitalized on congressional desire to restrain spending, and eagerly espoused Total Force Policy. These groups were also the inadvertent beneficiary of another political decision—the development of the all-volunteer force. Developed as a response to the elimination of military conscription, the pay necessary to draw AVF recruits significantly increased the cost of the active duty military. This enhanced the position of the reserves as a method to save money. The combination of the AVF and TFP created an environment in which the Guard thrived, and Congress asked it to do more.¹

Asked to do more, and with the active duty components more dependent on the Guard and Reserves, these forces greatly enhanced their quality during the 1970s and 1980s. The force modernization, though far from complete, was an improvement on the reserve forces of the 1960s. While the Army and Navy reserves had more problems in obtaining up-to-date equipment, the Air National Guard added many new aircraft and, along with the Air Force Reserve, achieved the best integration with their active duty component.²

Air National Guard participation in the Persian Gulf War vindicated its portion of the AVF and of Total Force Policy. The reserve components' alliance with Congress, cemented by agencies such as the National Guard Association of the United States and the Reserve Officers' Association, was beneficial and productive. When the active duty components and the Department of Defense sought to delay the modernization and to divert funds from the reserve to the active duty components, it was this alliance that forced the funding and support of reserve programs. A lesson of the war was that without the benefit of this alliance, the reserve components would have been less ready and able to deliver needed support.³

In the developing phases of the Persian Gulf conflict, the Congress looked to experience when discussing the need to call up the reserve components. Some members of Congress could remember a call-up as a political nightmare. They were aware of the problems of World War II and Korea. Some were in Congress during the Berlin call-up in 1960 and even more served during the response to the Tet offensive and the *Pueblo* crisis in 1968. They knew how the complaints had followed. They knew, too, how President Lyndon Johnson wrestled with the idea of using the reserves in Vietnam and decided it was not politically viable. Congress in 1990 had a mixed view on using the reserves. On the one hand, a popular outcry against a call-up would be politically detrimental. On the other, Congress had pushed hard for Total Force Policy and modernization of the reserve components, and this could vindicate their efforts.

Besides dealing with memories of the Vietnam era, the administration had to contend with varied DOD perspectives on the use of the reserves. Repeatedly, the armed forces were skeptical about using the combat arms from their reserve components. The Army was particularly concerned and hesitant to use its roundout brigades, intimating they were ill prepared. Some reserve leaders felt the active component leadership was hesitant to voice this concern too loudly. Such an admission would lead to questions about why they had testified to Congress and in inspections had agreed that these units were combat ready.⁴

Many Americans recalling the Vietnam era had a negative assessment of the National Guard. Whether correct or not, many perceived that the Guard was a home for draft evaders and the force that had botched the incident at Kent State. Writers like *Newsweek's* David Hackworth called the reserves paper tigers and painted a negative picture of these forces.⁵ Most responses to these attacks were ineffective. Vietnam veterans are not likely to repeat such articles in the future, especially after the successes of the Persian Gulf call-up.

In a democracy, political ramifications affect every governmental decision. Looking at the situation in 1990, Congress and the administration could have viewed the call-up with some skepticism. The Guard and Reserves had improved, but how could they explain bringing troops home from Europe and calling up the reserves simultaneously? Also, those memories of past wars haunted them. What could using the reserves net them as a political bonus? What was the benefit?

Only after beginning to call up the reserve components could they calculate the gain. An early finding was that old conceptions were in error or not relevant to this situation. This was not the same type of armed forces seen in the recent past. The active duty and reserve components had changed markedly. Few registered complaints, and reporters noted that the Guard and Reserves were hard to tell from their active duty counterparts. Moreover, the reserve components were almost in unison supporting the war.

Why was this so different? One thing not considered was where the complaints of the past had come from. What had justified them? Most had come from junior members, from one of two categories. Some came from Individual Ready Reservists (IRR) who had completed a tour on active duty and were involuntarily called for another conflict. This was particularly true in Korea. It was also difficult to calculate the number of people who joined the reserves instead of being drafted. These tended to be an unenthusiastic group.

By 1990 there were no draftees in any of the armed forces. The beginning of the all volunteer force in the 1970s eliminated the draft. Still, IRRs existed, and the Army called some up. No other branches of the service used them. Now all branches of the armed forces were all volunteers. Development of the all volunteer force significantly altered the armed forces. With the elimination of the draft and the implementation of an entirely voluntary system, the armed forces could change the ways of dealing with personnel. The initial concerns had been about the added cost. The volunteers simply would not work for the remuneration given to draftees. Branches of the service that were theoretically all volunteer in the draft era in reality received many recruits who joined instead of being drafted into the Army. Many of these did not want affiliation with the armed forces. (Members of the armed forces who served during the Vietnam era can remember antiservice slogans spray painted by members on buildings at their installations.) Management had difficulty prodding these people to achieve a minimum level of accomplishment.⁶

With the end of the draft and the beginning of the all volunteer force, several changes occurred. Pay increased; recruitment became more difficult; more women joined; the reserve components received many costly manpower-intensive functions; and the education level of recruits declined. But the most

significant aspect for managers was that the member's inclination to be part of the organization increased. Their enthusiasm and willingness to do the job compensated for the lower educational standards.⁷

After the initial shock of change, the military began transitioning into an organization that could let its personnel participate more effectively. The groundwork was laid for an organization that could work with its people from top to bottom, knowing they had volunteered and did not want to leave the service. Members from bottom to top could also respond.

For the reserve components, the development of the AVF led to an important decision, the implementation of Total Force Policy in the early 1970s. Though understood by all parties, this policy lacked formal guidance. Both the administration (through the Office of the Secretary of Defense) and the Congress wanted greater involvement of the reserve components. Two key parts of this policy were cost saving and modernization. By placing more high-labor use or wartime use only functions in the reserve components, the Department of Defense could cut costs while maintaining a deterrent posture. Modernization programs planned to make reserve forces compatible with the active duty forces. The failure to maintain interoperability between the reserves and active forces rendered the reserves ineffectual, unusable, or ill prepared in many earlier conflicts.⁸

By 1990 these changes were in place for several years, but much of the nation was unaware of the change in the military. When the Persian Gulf war broke out, many lawmakers, like the public, were not entirely aware of the degree of change. When the reserves were called up, they were surprised by the lack of backlash. The members and the leadership of the reserve components welcomed the call. Moreover, employers and neighbors identified with those called, and the reaction reaffirmed the bond between the American people and their military.

Col Harry G. Summers, Jr., wrote:

Someone once remarked that the old British doggerel about the professional soldier, "It's Tommy this, and Tommy that, and chuck him out, the brute . . . But it's 'Savior of his Country,' when the guns begin to shoot," never applied here in America. It was the "citizen soldier" - the National Guard and the Army Reserve - not the regular who fought America's wars and who was the traditional "Savior of his Country."⁹

Later, Colonel Summers wrote that the reserve components served as the bridge to the American people during the Persian Gulf War. Mr Arnold Punaro, staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee, remarked that "the active services had already gone to war, but the nation didn't go to war until the Guard and Reserve were mobilized."¹⁰

As previously noted, there was a significant level of involvement by the American people because of the extensive participation of citizen soldiers. The war suggested a valuable lesson in the importance of involving the American people in a national crisis. In World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, that connection was through the draft. Lacking that method, the all volunteer force had greater distance from the American people. Knowing this,

the military had deliberately set up a program that forced the administration to use the reserve components in any sizable conflict. That was done and it brought the American people in. With almost one-quarter million American reservists called, almost everyone in every congressional district and community knew someone mobilized. A friend and neighbor called away to war had much greater impact than a professional soldier called away to do what he or she had trained to do.¹¹

Besides domestic politics, the reserves were a part of international politics. Historically, the changes during the cold war directly affected the force structure, manning, and equipment for the active duty and reserve components. The degree to which items could or would be placed in the reserve components was often predicated on the international situation.

Preparations for the cold war occupied American military planners since the Truman era. For over 40 years, they prepared the force structure for confrontation with the Soviet Union and its allies. However, there were important changes and challenges during this time. Still, the Berlin airlift, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Vietnam War all were against a single perceived foe—Marxist ideology. Preparation so focused against a single adversary that other threats received little attention.

During the cold war, many significant matters occupied the military. In the fifties and sixties the Air Force acquired a formidable collection of tactical and strategic weapons. The Vietnam War came along and was the focus during the later sixties and early seventies. After that war, the Department of Defense had to completely review its needs in response to the loss of that war. The services revamped and reorganized. In the late seventies, they had a painful downsizing. In the eighties, they keyed up for rebuilding, including a debate over "Star Wars" and the development of a new breed of weapons.

Occupied by these day-to-day problems, few leaders pushed for a change in the process by which the Pentagon does business. The procedures to affect were so convoluted by the latter 1980s that writing or rewriting a seven-page regulation could take two years to wend through the required coordination and processing. Changing the procedures was extremely difficult. At a time when the information revolution should have been speeding the process, the military eagerly adopted new technology to weapons but often failed to adapt to uses that would help cause a rapid change in its ways of doing business.

As a result, two years after the cold war was over, the military still planned for engagements in the Fulda Gap to stop advancing Warsaw Pact divisions. Deeper into the system, the spare parts, or War Readiness Supply Kits were still predicated on war with the Soviets. Reserve component medical units still prepared for use in a second-echelon position against Warsaw Pact forces. An entire system was still following an old paradigm, often without knowingly doing so. Worse, the Pentagon leadership, by its constraints, was unable to make needed changes quickly and showed little inclination to do so.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait produced many immediate political reactions in America that affected the reserve components. A first involved the basic use of the reserves. Beyond the domestic concerns already given, there was

the fear of the international message given by such a call. Since a first desire in the Operation Desert Shield phase was to avoid open conflict with the Iraqis, the State Department and the administration wanted to show resolve but not appear belligerent. A call-up, something that had not been seriously entertained even in the Vietnam War, seemed to some a message that America was irrevocably committed to war.

The conflict with Iraq demonstrated how much the world and the American military had changed in just the few years preceding it. The cold war was over, the military needed restructuring, the effects of mobilization needed rethinking, and the way of doing business in the armed forces underwent a major change following the implementation of the all volunteer force. Each of these aspects had a different influence on the conduct of the war, and each produced a different lesson.

Internally, the war was an opportunity for the reserve components to show their mettle. The leadership actively campaigned for inclusion. In the Air Guard, leaders like General Killey spoke frequently of the need to "lean forward" and to be "part of the hunt." They knew the need for their organizations to be part of this war. They did not want to carry the baggage that afflicted an earlier generation perceived as avoiding service in Vietnam. They wanted recognition of the worth of their organization. They knew, too, that if they were not used in this conflict, Congress would have to reassess the need for a serious reserve component.¹²

Facing this problem, the reserve leaders dealt with both their active duty components and political leaders to gain inclusion. These leaders were particularly vehement about inclusion of their combat elements. In the Army and Navy, there were serious problems in gaining inclusion, and the Air Force used fewer than in previous conflicts. Concerned by this and what it could do to its organizational image and self-concept, the leadership sought the aid of Congress to assure use of combat units. Letters from Congressman Montgomery and others to Secretary of Defense Cheney sought roles for combat units in the reserves of all branches. This would preserve the role for the reserves in future force structure deliberations.¹³

The Bush administration believed that the new world order required a new force structure. In his speech at Aspen, Colorado, immediately before the conflict, President Bush announced plans to meet the changing needs caused by the collapse of the communist states. He was specific that this was not to be a smaller force with all portions cut equally. This was to be a careful drawdown with a new force developed to meet the current world threats.

Just as planners were trying to assess the role of reserve components, the response to war brought into question the exact role of the reserve components. The small use of reserve combat units made their future uncertain. Some questioning was a reaction to the performance of the Army roundout brigades, present in the war plans but never used in the combat. Whatever the cause, the question remained for all branches of the armed forces.

There was also concern that in downsizing the military, active component leaders would protect the forces most closely associated with their forces'

reason for being. In doing so, they would relinquish support roles to the reserve components while retaining the combat capability.

The need to retain this capability in the reserve components is, for the Air National Guard, rooted in tradition and a perceived constitutional mandate. Many members of the organization do not wish to exchange an F-16 for a cargo or tanker aircraft. These members vigorously sought relief from their elected officials. As a body steeped in the traditions of the law, Congress is just as concerned with the constitutional mandates.

A lesson of the war was that the reserve components generally did well when equipped with comparable equipment, properly trained, and incorporated into the defense team. Upgrading of many reserve components since the inception of the all volunteer force was significant, making all branches more mission ready at the start of the Persian Gulf War. There were, however, significant changes from the cold war era, and the post-cold-war role of the ANG needed definition. Response to this goes in two directions. One, what was the lesson of the war itself? Another involved the perceived world order. Of the first, in this call-up, there were differences from the cold war. First, flyers made up only 15 percent of those called. The desired groups were not the flyers, but the supporting cast—the medical staff, security police, transporters, communicators, and others. Even among the flyers, the bulk of those used were in support aircraft—the transporters and refuelers.¹⁴

With these participants, the ANG validated its portion of Total Force Policy and guaranteed inclusion in future conflicts. The question is whether this is the way the organization wants to be used in future conflicts. In the “new world order” following the end of the cold war, the Air Force and the Air National Guard have had to reassess the role and structure of the ANG. They reviewed the technological and organizational aspects of restructuring.

During the war, the reserve component did not perform some roles as planned. The need to be ready for a war in Europe had long been outmoded, with the new roles unclearly defined. The active duty component wanted support elements. Having the internal capability to fight the war, they had lacked the logistics structure to sustain a combat force since the 1970s. These forces were retained in the reserve components. During the initial voluntary and involuntary mobilization, various support elements in the Air Guard—medical, security police, transportation, aerial port, and communications—were needed. Among the flyers, the transport and tankers were the most immediate and largest needs. Only with political intervention were the fighter/tactical resources even called.¹⁵

The quandary in this lesson is, what to do? The Air National Guard has a proud history of being a fighter organization and wishes to retain this capability. As the active duty forces scale down, they also want to retain the tactical and strategic capability. It is only natural that the commanders would want to retain this capability and to control this asset closely. This leaves the ANG leadership in the awkward position of trying to retain one aspect of organizational tradition while attempting to retain viability. There is a mild note of alarm since the support-oriented Air Force Reserve called almost 25 percent of its personnel, while the more combat-oriented ANG

called only 11 percent. To significantly weaken the Air Guard's combat capability would not be an appropriate action. The realities of the conflict are that at the time of the conflict the active duty components retained much of the equipment of the cold war. The need for other equipment was only slight.

One concern before the war was what equipment the ANG would be using. Leaders requested up-to-date equipment, interoperable capability with that of the active duty components. The war adequately proved the Guard's need for such equipment, which would be more usable in any potential conflict. Several units were still equipped with A-7 fighters, some of which were especially proficient in desert warfare. They could not be used during the conflict because of the difficulty of maintaining a logistical support system in-theater for these aircraft. Despite the bulk of the Air Force's combat communications capability being in the Guard, few such units were called. The most frequently given reason was their lack of capability on new equipment. Though the Air Force was ahead of other services in upgrading the equipment of its reserve components, the lack of interoperability made it clear that active and reserve units needed to use like or at least compatible equipment.¹⁶

Technology was also instrumental in changes to the equipment and to the ways of operating the organization. In the equipment realm, the new communications gear was so sophisticated it even changed some order of battle. In the Iraqi conflict, the initial targets included the opponents' communication system to a far greater degree than in past conflicts. Laser-guided weapons allowed far greater accuracy. "Surgical bombing" became a widely used and understood term. New radar-guided artillery pieces allowed return fire with incredible accuracy. In dealing with equipment, the armed forces developed and used sophisticated systems, especially in the operational fields. Likewise, the structure and doctrine of the forces adapted quickly to the technological needs. Such sophistication did not accompany the support systems. There, computerization merely sped up existing methods of doing business rather than changing to more effectively meet the needs of the organization.

It is the change in processes, or the lack of such change, in the support areas that was the culprit in the mobilization effort. It is important because it is the fundamental ability to call up the reserve components, and the will to do so by the administration and the active duty components, that has made the use of reserves feasible.

The mobilization process in use during the Persian Gulf War needed serious reworking. This was known at the time. The conflicting and confusing regulations—AFR 28-5, the 40-series regulations, even the directives of the finance and other sectors—made it a confusing and labyrinthine process to understand these publications, and even worse to change them. Stories of experienced Pentagon staffers are replete with examples of putting years of effort into minor regulations to help operate the bureaucracy. These staffers face a dilemma. If the regulation does not stop at every possible point of contact, someone left out does not have critical participation, and conflicts arise. If everyone is included, the process moves so slowly as to be glacial.

In this sense, the mobilization process is symptomatic of greater problems, which included a form of gridlock often found in many areas of government. In the Department of Defense, such management problems were outgrowths of the cold war. During the stable years of the cold war, despite changes in administration and significant technological upgrades, the adversary remained the same. A certain predictability and understanding of the adversary evolved, and the need for quick reaction in the operation of the institution was unnecessary. The adversary was not changing, the basic premises of the conflict were unvaried, and even the geographical locations remained reasonably consistent. It was given, for example, that even with the addition of communism in the western hemisphere (Cuba, especially), the conflicts were most likely to be on the edge of the Communist empire—central Europe, Southeast Asia or Korea. Annual exercises became routine. Reforger did not change greatly each year. Almost one-half of the United States defense budget remained in support of NATO, fluctuating during conflicts such as Korea or Vietnam. With this routinization of dealing with the adversary, the Air National Guard and other elements in the Department of Defense felt no compelling need to alter the methods of doing business. They made the changes needed to update their operational capabilities, and as new technology came into the operational areas, the system made needed changes. The Guard continued to perform its mission, but the support areas, lacking such visibility or readily apparent need, were much slower to change. The Department of Defense came to accept that such changes were nearly impossible to carry out.

The mobilization process as implemented during the Persian Gulf War was in need of repair. Beyond the basic internal conflicts (many of which have since been corrected), the process still has structural problems. One involves the relationship between the active components and their reserves. This relationship calls for a delicate balance. If active forces fail to ask for reserve assistance, they are faulted by reserve organizations for not being participants in Total Force Policy. If they ask too quickly, they get queried about why they could not do the job with their own resources. During the Persian Gulf War, active components received both sets of questions during congressional inquiries.¹⁷

If we add to this the number of regulations, directives, and types of call-ups and mobilizations, simply calling up the reserve components gets confusing. This also happened during the Persian Gulf War. Unfortunately, some respond to this requesting more laws and ways of calling up the reserves. The need is simplification of the current procedures and education of the users and coordinators within each command to understand the practical use of each. Rewriting directives to simplify the procedures enhances the opportunities to use reservists under mutually beneficial circumstances.

In dealing with mobilization, the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve are fortunate in having some positive attributes in dealing with the Air Force. Some of these Air Force-unique features are reasons that have made these reserve components so viable. For example, with no need for postmobilization

training air reserve component units are usable in the opening days of any conflict. This contrasts with the Army, which requires maneuver combat units to complete up to four months of training to meet standards. Also, the Air Force can use transport aircraft and call up small crews of six or seven volunteers. This benefit is not available to the Navy when trying to man an entire ship. For the Air Force, the benefits of prompt responsiveness and ability to field small units aids the active component.

Ironically, this issue creates turmoil within the units. There, many members were upset when not called as an entire unit during the war. Some viewed the smaller UTCs as unacceptable. However, this system will probably be used in any foreseeable conflict. Call-up by units is a dead issue, but the need for a real UTC is not. The tailored UTC of the Persian Gulf War worked for that conflict, in part because the leadership was so eager for any type of involvement. ANG leadership probably will not want members called individually on an involuntary basis, except for unusual circumstances (such as for needed language skills). The UTCs will require alteration, however, to meet more realistic requirements. Medical staff will know their use as backfill and probably not as front-line personnel. Training and mobilization needs can alter to meet the realities of a new world.

From 1970 to 1990, the Air National Guard underwent an evolutionary change in its relationship with the Air Force. Much of this was attributable to a small group at the top of the organization. Most noteworthy were the actions of Lt Gen John B. Conaway. General Conaway, a pilot from the Kentucky Air National Guard, arrived in Washington, D.C., in 1979 as the deputy director of the ANG. He progressed through the organization, eventually becoming the chief, National Guard Bureau, retaining that position until the latter part of 1993.¹⁸

As director of the Air National Guard, General Conaway was an active participant in the political process. Dealing directly with the likes of Congressman Montgomery, and other influential congresspersons and senators, General Conaway protected Air Guard funding and expanded the ANG mission. Aided by the National Guard Association of the United States, he articulated his view of the future of the Air Guard. Maximizing his political leverage, he achieved political buy-in on the hill and protected his autonomy and programs.

The results, in the eyes of his colleagues, were successful. The alteration of force structure changed the entire complexion of the Air Guard. They understood the changes, even when support was unenthusiastic. At the start of his tenure, most ANG aircraft were outdated fighters. At the end, it was a mix of variable age transports, with tankers even more effective than their active duty counterparts, and fighters closer to parity with their active counterparts.

The follow-on lesson from Desert Storm was the degree of foresight in this program. By retaining its fighter capability, the ANG kept a core characteristic of its culture. With few reserve fighters needed in the Persian Gulf, the Guard needed lobbying to avoid underrepresentation in the Persian Gulf. Still, the infusion of transports and refuelers assured organizational involvement.

Similarly, the desire to avoid being a pure support (transport and refueling) organization reflected the needs of the organization, and ultimately of the Air Force. The Navy minesweepers showed that when all of any asset is placed in a reserve component, the result is often a lower acquisition and funding priority, with potentially dangerous results. Ill-equipped to be the advocacy headquarters for acquisition of new transport aircraft or equipment, the Air Guard (and the Air Force Reserve) try to avoid these roles. They find it much more desirable to parallel active duty structure where feasible.

Other areas, such as the development of counterdrug missions, are accepted by the Guard. These, however, are difficult to assess to the same degree as preparedness for a war such as the Persian Gulf conflict. The rapidly expanding program is new enough that data on its effect on mission effectiveness, either positive or negative, is inconclusive. Even the scope of "national security" is questioned, since some consider the counterdrug initiatives as an important component of defending the nation.

Relating to the structure is the tradeoff between training and the loss of flags. Even before Desert Storm, most ANG leaders knew the end of the cold war could lead to budget cuts, though probably not to the degree as the active duty. In early discussions, most leaders preferred a program that, if necessary, would cut primary authorized aircraft (PAA) rather than eliminate a unit. No unit wanted to be cut completely, and the consensus was that it would be better for all to have slight cuts. This, in turn, would result in less savings, retaining inherent fixed costs at each installation. To make the additional saving, some suggested cutting exercise participation and flying time. In retrospect, this is an idea that is much more palatable but less realistic in terms of readiness. To cut the exercises and training would leave a force less capable of instant response—part of the Air Force's very reason for being. ANG generals interviewed on this subject were usually in agreement but did not wish to go on record with this perspective. Losing flags is a sensitive issue that few want to be near.

As far as organizational policy, the executives maintained a good view of the big picture. The term *executive position* is confusing since the Air National Guard Executive Council is largely a group of colonels charged with the operation of the Air Guard. These directors have little authority and control, and a very small group at National Guard Bureau retains executive decision-making capability.

The Executive Council of the Air National Guard is traditionally briefed on the mission, goals, and needs of the ANG. Still, its members are not the final decision makers. They spend most of their time handling problems within their directorates, not dealing with general organizational problems. The growth of the directorates required directors to handle more people and to assume more headquarters duties. For example, in the period from the early 1970s to 1993, the Readiness Center (which went through several name changes) grew from about 20 people at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, to a little over 700 at Andrews AFB, Maryland. During this growth, the centers of

power shifted very little. Though headquarters gained at the expense of the states, the top executives did not delegate much power to the directors.

Adding to this is the influence of the state adjutants general (TAG). Here the ability to plan is erratic. Some states have quite successful headquarters, but many field unit commanders believe several state headquarters are of marginal competency. Still, the TAGs have great authority in their own state and often exert influence on policy at the national level.

In this setting, the ANG leadership could be faulted for insufficiently preparing the organization for the Persian Gulf War and for the entire change from the cold-war scenario. They would, however, join the company of virtually every other military leader in the United States, reserve or active duty and every civilian leader in government. During the cold war, there were few incentives to force needed changes. The cold war itself had created a status quo, and most politicians and military leaders were satisfied with the current system. Satisfaction permeated all levels from the Congress and administration on down. For over 40 years, they were afraid to act while the threat loomed. The threat was so ingrained in their thinking that they did not know how to respond once it disappeared.

During the Persian Gulf War, much of this went unnoticed because the most important aspect of the system worked. The resources arrived as needed. The operators proved quite resourceful in carrying out the war effort. Not everything could move so quickly. The plans changed slowly. The basis of the entire planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) cycle, was predicated on having time to make changes. The five year defense plans (FYDP) underwent a name change to future year defense plans (also FYDP) that went to six years simply to structure the needs of the defense budget. The organization was unable to adjust or respond rapidly. The executives monitoring this system understood the results but lacked sufficient knowledge of the internal processes to effect changes.

Aware they were in a quagmire, executives and consultants repeatedly attempted to modify and tweak the system to make it work better. In the support areas, there was a question about whether anyone had a grip on the problem, much less the solution. Proposed solutions were bandages. They were often applied within a single area and not the whole organization. Traditionally, activity in some ANG systems is accomplished in isolation, while other parts of the process are so coordinated that the 17 directors and their staffs share every word.

What had happened in the specific area of mobilization? The Air Force in some areas developed a concept of operations in isolation from the planners in the ANG and AFRES. Different offices of primary responsibility (OPR) wrote different regulations controlling mobilization, each looking from a different perspective. Often, even when the efforts were coordinated, reviewers were not aware of the details of other regulations. Moreover, the results were never tested. Without an inspection of the headquarters functions, they continued writing without testing to see if the whole process worked. After more than 20 years without a recall—and a considerable amount of change in the needs,

capabilities, and even missions of the reserve components—it was too late to be running an evaluation once the test of Operation Desert Storm began.

During the conflict, the mobilization was confusing even to those running the program. Some early suggestions within the Guard included writing additional proposals on how to mobilize. This failed to address the problem. The system was too complicated; the need was to simplify the procedures, not to add another bandage. The reserve components needed to go back to the drawing boards, figure out what they needed to do, and start the process anew. That is, they needed to strip away the layers of regulations, go back to defining what the original mission was, and come up with an entirely new and simpler way of doing it.

In the past preparation of mobilization regulations, there was insufficient long-range planning. Plans, costs, and even the relationship of Air Guard units to their gaining commands remained inadequately addressed. As a result, the mobilization process was not effective as it should have been and tended to be reactive rather than proactive. There is a clear need to adjust to the needs of multiple commands and to better coordinate the call-up by command, NGB, governors, and the units. The mobilization plans need to adjust and be flexible, yet remain true to the core mission of their respective components. They need to be realistic, while reaffirming the nature of the organization.

To do this, the Air National Guard is reassessing business processes. With improved communications, the management needs flattening. Rapid response is essential. To achieve this will require a complete review and rewriting of applicable regulations, which need to go back to a baseline tied to the mission of the Air Guard. Programs like Total Quality Management lead in this direction *if* properly carried out. Other initiatives currently employed in the government such as the IDEF methodology help analyze and plan more effective programs. To properly implement solutions, such analysis methods need wider use in the Guard. They need careful coordination and adherence to the mission of the organization.

An example of an area that needs review is the use of the Combat Support Center (CSC) at the Air National Guard Readiness Center (ANGRC). Little used before the conflict, it proved a valuable resource. The reviewers need to understand not only the formal relationship of the CSC to the field units but to the whole set of formal and informal interrelationships between the units, gaining commands, NGB, ANGRG, state headquarters, and other entities that involve the CSC. Once accomplished, the function can be examined on exactly what, when, and how it does its business, and the guiding instructions can be written accordingly.¹⁹

Equipment was unintentionally misused during the preparations for Operation Desert Shield. This followed an age-old pattern of not understanding ongoing changes in the world. The railroad forced major changes in the organizational structure of armies in the nineteenth century. Advanced communications and computer technology became catalysts of change in the latter part of the twentieth century, but the change was often slow in coming unless forced by a major armed conflict. In the ANG,

communication on various aspects of the mobilization showed the lack of general coordination. For example, different people in separate areas were doing redundant activities and not communicating. In an age when computers were doing amazing feats, a mobilized airman quickly realized that the change of address turned in to the personnel office was not shared with the finance office or with any number of other sections. In a processing line, different people repeatedly asked similar questions. At the headquarters level, the directorates failed to share information and even worked with computers that could not communicate with each other. In the jargon of the communicators, they lacked interoperability. ANG communications units even had difficulty communicating with active duty units because some ANG equipment was outdated. Within functions, silos of information developed, and the computers, expected to revolutionize communication, often failed to live up to expectations. Even the most basic equipment for communications, such as classified fax machines, were not available at many state headquarters or units. Some bases literally relied on runners who drove back and forth to other military installations to deliver messages.

The most basic equipment difficulties, such as the lack of classified fax machines, were taken care of with a simple acquisition. Others are not so simple. Rearranging the communication system and adjusting the culture to computers has been evolutionary, and difficult times lie ahead. Reexamining the business processes will reveal many specifics, and further analysis and review of the needs reveals solutions. Many such projects are ongoing, and they need continuation to completion.

The unit is not only the level where the "rubber meets the road" and the mission is carried out, but it is frequently the point where the military connection to the American people is most apparent. It is therefore militarily and politically important. What happens to the units is basic to what happens to the Air National Guard.

In relating with others, ANG units learned several lessons from the Persian Gulf War. Among the first of these was the need to establish who was in charge. During the war, commanders faced a frustrating set of wickets in trying to decide who was in charge of what at any given moment. Operationally, they let common sense work as a guide, and the mission was carried out. Still, had the war dragged on longer, or had there been a more challenging situation, the command questions could have been more important. In certain situations, the issues were clouded about whether called or volunteering individuals were under authority of their home units or gaining units, or if such authority could be split into operational and administrative control. No commander wants to be placed in a position of being uncertain of his or her authority.

An example of an area needing a cleanup to help mobilization is the data used for the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). During the conflict, this data was of questionable usefulness. After the war, at least one commander wondered why the criteria for an operational readiness inspection (ORI) was so far removed from the SORTS data—data essentially used to

evaluate whether a unit was operationally ready to go to war. The solution involves looking at all data needed to measure the readiness of military units, going back to the basic business practices. Then reassess the need for the information and how it ties to the mission, simplifying and unifying the thinking.²⁰

Headquarters, whether ANG or gaining MAJCOM, owes it to the units to have coherent, realistic policies that include up-to-date regulations, rules, and direction. This includes all areas—training, operations, exercises, whatever. The ANG and the MAJCOMs were unable to meet the unit needs during the conflict. Correcting this is difficult, requiring comprehensive action between units and their affected headquarters.

Early in the buildup, AMC-gained units reconfirmed the need to organize quickly and deploy on a moment's notice. Aircraft and crews from many units merged into a larger element. In the confusion coincident with this, delays and changes or even unknown destinations were commonplace. This confusion cost valuable time and hurt the ability of crews volunteering for limited durations such as 30 days. Still, not knowing all the answers is part of the fog of war and is expected at this stage.

Fortunately, arriving forces in the Persian Gulf were the beneficiaries of Saudi prepositioned materiel and excellent airfields and facilities. Even the ports were overconstructed to handle such a surge. We cannot count on this being the case in the future. Should the US find itself involved in trying to scale down a conflict between nuclear rivals India and Pakistan, for example, such facilities and wealth would be absent. In isolated areas such as Armenia or Tadjikistan, the capability to ship in goods would be even more constrained. The needs of the commands in such a conflict could be quite different.

Refueling units will probably find the lessons of this war altered by the change in the single integrated operations plan. Before the conflict and prior to the dissolution of the Strategic Air Command, the highest priority for tankers was to be prepared to refuel bombers assigned to be a deterrent against a surprise attack by the Soviet Union on the United States. With the end of the cold war, SAC was slow in adjusting to the new world order. During the Persian Gulf War SAC leaders felt that it was more important to be alert and ready against Soviet invasion than to participate in the war. This alert mission ended later and replaying this scenario is unlikely. A side feature to this is that Air Guard leaders commanded many provisional air refueling wings in the Gulf. Over one-half of the approximately 15 Air Guard colonels serving in the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO) were with the air refueling wings. In future wars, the active components are less likely to be as willing to relinquish command as they were in this conflict.

In dealing with airlift, MAC and its users learned early in the conflict how optimistic early figures had been. For example, many units always practiced under a scenario in which many MAC airlift planes showed up to carry the unit to its destination in a timely manner. The participants quickly found that this was unrealistic. In future wars, units will probably arrive in smaller segments, with piecemeal arrival of the support elements. Unfortunately,

before the Persian Gulf War, the weak coordination of these unrealistic support plans raised few warning flags.

For ACC-gained units, one lesson learned was that some combat units had more time to prepare. Selected units like reconnaissance did not. Still, the large active duty fighter community met most needs in a contingency war. The need for reserve combat elements was less immediate than the need for their support functions. As the Guard adds conventional bombers, these forces might expect use, but the requirement for ANG fighter units in regional contingencies is questionable. This does not mean such forces have no value, but that their immediate use in this type of conflict is subject to review.

The relationship of the units to their state headquarters varied considerably and needs clarification. Most states actively supported inclusion in the war, but there were exceptions, including those not wanting elements in their states called in less than unit size. This concern was precluded by the presidential call-up when the states lost all jurisdiction. It was quite another matter when units participated voluntarily and remained under the control of their respective states.

On a more upbeat note, the state headquarters generally did a good job of stepping into the needs of family support. Headquarters personnel, often frustrated by their inability to actively participate in the conflict, were eager and generally proficient participants in the support of all military families in their states, with an especial preference for their own.

Preparation for conflict was a critical element of being ready for this war. Those units most prepared had certain common elements: high readiness standards, participation in exercises, and strong leaders. Well-prepared units with leaders pushing for inclusion tended to be those selected to go. The selection was based on consultation between ANG leaders and gaining-command leaders and on favored units most likely to reflect well on these commands. The choice was based on a combination of personal knowledge of the units by ANG and the MAJCOMs and a variety of measures such as SORTS, ORI results, and exercise evaluations. Decisions made by these leaders came down to their assessments of the qualities of the units and the needs of the Air Force.

The best units had strong leaders. These people made decisions. Placing the maximum control possible in the hands of unit leaders led to better unit capability and freed headquarters personnel to better use their time. It also meant that when the tailored UTCs were used, these unit leaders knew who should go, and selected accordingly. Such leaders also were concerned with their people. The best took the effort to meet every returning member, not just as a group but even those who returned individually and in small groups or who were returning from the less glamorous Stateside duty.

How does a unit get selected for mobilization? The basic rule is to be good, be a volunteer, be known to decision makers, be effective in using political influence, and have good leaders. Strong leaders who wanted to participate were most likely to be included. This included units selected at the beginning of Operation Desert Shield and those selected just in time for Operation

Desert Storm. For example, in the KC-135 community leaders like Colonel Baier in Kansas pushed hard for inclusion ("leaned forward," in the parlance of the time) and convinced both SAC and ANG leaders of his and his unit's capabilities. He was included in the earliest part of the war. In New York, General Hall sought inclusion of his F-16 unit at Syracuse. Hall solicited the help of General Russ, commander of TAC, and the assistance of New York politicians. His unit, though new to the aircraft, prevailed on the theory that they had close-air-support experience. Without the work of General Hall, the unit would probably not have been one of only two fighter units selected from the Guard.²¹

How did participants become known to decision makers? Individually, they were known from working on and leading committees with their peers, having "face time" at headquarters of gaining commands and the ANG. How did their units become known? Partly by results of evaluations, such as ORIs. Apparently just as crucial was inclusion in exercises with the gaining commands. At these times, the unit's ability to work with the gaining command was tested empirically, and the MAJCOM knew what it dealt with. Both personal and unit awareness played in the decision making for inclusion in the war.

In the Gulf War, the Guard had several senior officers (colonels and generals) participating. One general and at least 15 colonels were in the theater. Considering the numbers called, this participation level was high. It was also at a time when most units were receiving notification that O-6s need not apply. How were they included? They consistently leaned forward and pushed. They also had units that met the characteristics described.

Unit commanders and leaders faced other mobilization process problems during the crisis. Handling the matter of the UTCs was probably the greatest single issue. Units had long contended that they trained together and would fight together. To have the units rent asunder was devastating to some. Many perceived this as a betrayal of a promise made to the members and reinforced by congressional wording of legislation guaranteeing the call of units, not members. Explaining to members that units could include UTCs was not easy, especially when the UTCs started being "tailored."

The idea of only calling up units is dead. In future conflicts, there will probably be greater effort to preclude the call-up of individuals by name, but the need of only medical or security personnel is here to stay. It was part of Air Force planning all along and was not part of ANG planning. It is now. Commanders must be able to help their units function in a difficult situation when part of the unit is gone and part is at home. This is an emotionally trying period for a unit and can be more frustrating for families and unit members than a complete unit call.

After the departure of part of the unit, the commander then had the problem of trying to determine SORTS status. Did they still own the people who were gone voluntarily to the theater? How long could they function without sizable numbers of people out of the area? C ratings had been a problem in the call-ups of the 1960s and remained so in the 1990s. The problems with the process were still there, even 30 years after identification.

Some other problems loosely group into two areas: unit operation and personnel support. Lessons learned in unit operation included the need to make rapid adjustments. The need for commanders to be ready to use only selected specialties in the organization was discussed. The loss of all the medical staff could throw much of the unit's plans for mobilization for a loop. These changes created other problems. For example, no documents existed for load planning tailored UTCs. Commanders needing a group ready in three days, and yet having no list of required items, were hard-pressed to accomplish the mission. Even with the load plan, they often found the needed airlift unavailable. They shifted to alternate aircraft or other methods of transportation—even a partial lift now, with more to come later.

There was a special need for supporting personnel who went to war, and especially when some members of their unit remained at home. Units with employer support programs reaped the payoff. The employers and other community members were generally eager to support their personnel as long as the call was mandatory. The volunteer aspect forced commanders and members into a difficult position. Some members felt pressured to volunteer. Though volunteers legally have job protection, in reality employers often view leaving work voluntarily in a different way than an involuntary call to war. Much of this ties to the issue of volunteerism spoken of earlier. Unit leaders also found it important to keep employers informed, because employers, especially in small businesses, found the loss of one or two key employees could be traumatic. Therefore, trying to plan for the return of these employees to the fold was a pressing issue. Unit leaders had to understand this as part of their understanding of the local community and its needs.

Even more important to the members were the families. Those left behind in a reserve family were often in a more difficult situation than their active duty counterparts. For the latter separation and military life were part of their routine. The active components had an internal system for dealing with the needs of the families. Fortunately, the Guard had set up the shell of a program, operated in most states by the state headquarters. Units participated in such programs at the local level. For many, the assistance was not only for members of the units but for the local families of all military forces. Many of these families had returned to their hometown and no longer retained access to their active duty bases. The importance of this was not only to support the families but to provide members remaining at home a way to help the families of those called. This provided a means of greater bonding for the unit, the state organization, and the communities.

For some families, the surprise was the need for calling up more than one member of the family. It is common in the Guard for units to have multiple members from one family. In the cases of husbands and wives, units had to plan for one or the other to remain home if possible, or to have alternate plans if this was impossible. For years these rules had existed, but few units had thoroughly reviewed their real needs. Fortunately, this was not a great problem in this call-up, but commanders got enough taste to know this could be a personnel problem in a future conflict.

Many commanders reported problems caused by failure of headquarters to make timely decisions on important support matters. Some of these problems repeated earlier conflicts—pay, who is in charge, timely issuance of directives, confusing and redundant message traffic, all go with the start of any war. Only with careful evaluation of the mission and reassessment of the processes can these effects be reduced.

One last note for unit leadership. People rotating home need to be welcomed back. Even a departure of three weeks on rotation needs a personal welcome by the unit commander. This is an important rite of passage for Guard members. It is affirmation of their reason for being. Missing this is like missing a child's graduation from high school.

In the final say, what were the most crucial lessons learned from the mobilization for the Persian Gulf War? The most basic lesson was that in the Air Guard, the executives have a good idea where the program is going and are attempting to plan accordingly. The operators, or the workers in the units, acted admirably. They took the initiative and were proficient at their jobs. The managers were competent and worked at their jobs, but they were the focus of the problems. The most notable problems were in the support areas and usually related to the processes for getting the job done. Confusing and conflicting regulations, misunderstanding of organizational needs, and inability to make swift corrections plagued the managers. They need to regroup, flatten the organization, and completely reassess the way business is being done. Throughout the armed forces, there is a need to reevaluate the missions of the various components and how to accomplish that mission. The cold war created an atmosphere in which the rules changed only slowly and the military had the luxury to respond slowly. In a rapidly changing world, and with budgets being cut, organizations must prove their worthiness for retention. This means that the management must assess the Guard's needs and problems and seek solutions by means of creating new processes, or, in 1994 terms, *reinvent government*.


For the leadership of the Air National Guard, the need is clear. While going through the turmoil of a restructuring of the armed forces, they must completely reevaluate their function and evaluate how the organization can better add value to America. They must then carry out these changes and continue the search for even more effective processes.

Notes

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18. Conaway interview.
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20. Brig Gen Paul Pochmara, 113 FW/CC, interview with author, May 1993; and ANG *Lessons Learned Report*.
21. Arnold interview.



Source: Adapted from *Air Force Magazine*, May 1990, 125.

Appendices

Appendix A

Reserve Call-up of Key Events

Date	Decision
2 August 1990	Iraq invades Kuwait.
3 August 1990	ANG volunteers deploy.
22 August 1990	Executive Order authorizes Section 673(b) Selected Reserve call-up.
23 August 1990	Secretary of Defense authorizes call-up of up to 48,800 selected reservists. First ANG units called up.
1 September 1990	ANG units deploy to AOR.
8 October 1990	Stop-Loss rules invoked.
13 November 1990	Executive Order extends active duty period of recalled reservists to 180 days.
14 November 1990	Secretary of Defense increases call-up authority to 125,000; maximum active duty period to 180 days.
1 December 1990	Secretary of Defense increases call-up authority to 188,000.
16 January 1991	Coalition air campaign begins.
18 January 1991	Executive Order authorizes Section 673 Ready Reserve call-up. Permits call-up of up to one million ready reservists for up to two years.
19 January 1991	Secretary of Defense increases call-up authority to 360,000 ready reservists for up to 12 months.
23 February 1991	Coalition ground offensive begins.
27 February 1991	Cease-fire declared.
29 March 1991	Stop-Loss rules lifted.
10 April 1991	Cease-fire signed.

Appendix B

Air National Guard Members Mobilized for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

UNIT	TOTAL MOBLZD OFF/ENL	DEPLOY LOCATION	TYPE UNIT
ALABAMA			
HQ AL ANG	1/0	HOME STATION	STAFF
117 SPF BIRMINGHAM	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
117 SVS BIRMINGHAM	0/9	MACDILL	SERVICES
117 TAC HOSP BIRMINGHAM	8/18	EGLIN/HOME	CLINIC
117 RMS BIRMINGHAM	0/4	MACDILL/HOME	TRANSPORT
117 RMS BIRMINGHAM	1/0	AOR	OTHER
187 SPF DANNELLY FLD	0/17	HOME STATION	SEC POLICE
187 SVS DANNELLY FLD	0/9	HOMESTEAD	SERVICES
225 CCSQ GADSDEN	0/4	RIYADH	CB COMM
232 CCSQ DANNELLY FLD	0/4	RIYADH	CB COMM
ALASKA			
176 SPF ANCHORAGE	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
ARIZONA			
161 AREFG PHOENIX	50/57	HOME STATION	REFUELERS
161 CES PHOENIX	0/12	DYESS	FIRE FTR
161 SVS PHOENIX	0/9	DYESS	SERVICES
161 CLNC PHOENIX	2/12	CARSWELL	CLINIC
161 SPF PHOENIX	0/24	F E WARREN	SEC POLICE
161 SVS PHOENIX	0/9	ELLSWORTH	SERVICES
162 SVS TUCSON	0/18	DAVIS MONTHAN	SERVICES
162 TFG TUCSON	0/10	AL KHARJ	FIGHTER
162 RMS TUCSON	0/4	CANNON	TRANSPORT
162 MED SQ TUCSON	9/27	DAVIS MONTHAN	CLINIC
162 MSS TUCSON	0/1	IN PLACE	DIS PREP
162 SPF TUCSON	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
162 CES TUCSON	0/12	SHAW	FIREFTR
ARKANSAS			
188 SPF FT SMITH	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
188 TAC CLNC FT SMITH	12/34	MYRTLE BEACH	CLINIC
188 CES FT SMITH	0/12	HOMESTEAD	FIRE FTR
188 CES FT SMITH	3/47	KING FAHD	ENGINEERS
189 TAC HOSP LITTLE ROCK	7/17	TRAVIS/HOME	CLINIC
189 CES LITTLE ROCK	2/48	LITTLE ROCK	ENGINEERS

CALIFORNIA

105 USAF CLNC STEWART	2/11	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
129 RMS MOFFET FLD	0/3	HOME STATION	TRANSPORT
129 TAC HOSP MOFFET FLD	10/18	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
144 FIW FRESNO	0/1	DAVIS MONTHAN	EOD
144 RMS FRESNO	0/4	NELLIS	TRANSPORT
144 SPF FRESNO	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
144 USAF CLNC FRESNO	8/19	MATHER/HOME	CLINIC
144 CES FRESNO	0/12	GEORGE	FIRE FTR
144 SVS FRESNO	0/9	LUKE	SERVICES
144 CES FRESNO	0/48	MULTI CONUS	ENGINEERS
146 TAG HOSP CHANNEL IS	8/22	TRAVIS/HOME	CLINIC
146 AES CHANNEL IS	41/74	AL KHARJ	AEROMED
146 RMS CHANNEL IS	0/2	HOME STATION	TRANSPORT
146 MAPS CHANNEL IS	0/50	KING KHALID	AERIAL PORT
146 ALCE CHANNEL IS	0/2	AOR/CHR PT/HI	ALCE
147 CCSQ SAN DIEGO	0/4	TABUK	CB COMM
148 CCSQ ONTARIO	0/4	TABUK	CB COMM
149 CCSQ N HIGHLANDS	1/21	TABUK	CB COMM
162 CCGP N HIGHLANDS	1/4	TABUK	CB COMM
163 SVS MARCH AFB	1/8	DAVIS MONTHAN	SERVICES
163 RMS MARCH AFB	0/4	GEORGE	TRANSPORT
222 CCSQ COSTA MESA	0/8	TABUK	CB COMM
234 CCSQ HAYWARD	OIIS	TABUK	CB COMM
261 CCSQ VAN NUYS	1/8	TABUK	CB COMM

COLORADO

140 RMS BUCKLEY	0/4	GEORGE/HOME	TRANSPORT
140 TAG HOSP BUCKLEY	11/36	HOLLOMAN/HOME	CLINIC
140 SVS BUCKLEY	1/2	TYNDALL	SERVICES
140 SPF BUCKLEY	1/43	KHAMIS MUSHAIT	SEC POLICE
140 TFW BUCKLEY	0/3	AL KHARJ	FIGHTER

CONNECTICUT

103 SPF BRADLEY FLD	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
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DELAWARE

142 AES NEW CASTLE	18/35	AL KHARJ	AEROMED
166 TAG WILMINGTON	61/200	AL KHARJ	AIRLIFT
166 TAG CLNC WILMINGTON	12/24	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

113 RMS ANDREWS AFB	0/4	LANGLEY	TRANSPORT
113 TAG HOSP ANDREWS AFB	10/24	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
231 CCSQ ANDREWS AFB	0/1	AZORES	CB COMM

FLORIDA

114 CS PATRICK AFB	0/3	TABUK	CB COMM
125 SPF JACKSONVILLE	0/6	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
125 SVS JACKSONVILLE	0/9	HOMESTEAD	SERVICES
125 USAF CL JACKSONVILLE	4/14	EGLIN/HOME	CLINIC
125 FIG JACKSONVILLE	0/2	HOMESTEAD	EOD
125 RMS JACKSONVILLE	0/3	UK/SEY JHNSN	TRANSPORT
125 CES JACKSONVILLE	0/12	EGLIN	FIRE FTR
290 JCSS MACDILL AFB	0/20	AOR/HOME	CB COMM

GEORGIA

111 TACPF BRUNSWICK	3/8	HOME STATION	ALO/TACP
116 SPF DOBBINS AFB	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
116 SVS DOBBINS AFB	0/9	MOODY	SERVICES
116 RMS DOBBINS AFB	0/8	MYRTLE BEACH	TRANSPORT
116 TAG CLNC DOBBINS AFB	9/21	LUKE/HOME	CLINIC
165 SPF SAVANNAH	1/32	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
165 RMS SAVANNAH	0/2	DOVER	TRANSPORT
165 MAPS SAVANNAH	0/1	KING KHALID	AERIAL PORT
224 JCSS BRUNSWICK	1/20	AOR/HOME	CB COMM

IDAHO

124 SPF BOISE	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
124 RMS BOISE	0/3	MTN HOME	TRANSPORT
124 SVS BOISE	0/18	NELLIS	SERVICES

ILLINOIS

126 AREFW CHICAGO	65/190	HOME STATION	REFUELERS
126 CLNC CHICAGO	4/14	MULTI CONUS	CLINIC
126 SVS CHICAGO	1/9	WURTSMITH	SERVICES
126 SVS CHICAGO	1/9	GRISSOM	SERVICES
126 SPF CHICAGO	0/46	F E WARREN	SEC POLICE
169 TASS PEORIA	6/14	HOME STATION	ALO/TACP
182 SVS PEORIA	1/8	LUKE	SERVICES
182 TAC CLNC PEORIA	9/32	MACDILL/HOME	CLINIC
182 CEM PEORIA	0/11	HOME STATION	ALO/ACP
182 SPF PEORIA	1/43	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
182 RMS PEORIA	0/1	SEY JHNSN	TRANSPORT
182 CES PEORIA	0/12	PATRICK	FIRE FTR
183 SVS SPRINGFIELD	0/9	CANNON	SERVICES
183 SPF SPRINGFIELD	1/43	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
264 CCSQ CHICAGO	0/1	TABUK	CB COMM

INDIANA

122 SPF FT WAYNE	1/43	KING FAHD	SEC POLICE
181 SPF TERRE HAUTE	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
181 TAC CLNC TERRE HAUTE	8/31	LACKLAND/HOME	CLINIC

IOWA

132 SPF DES MOINES	1/43	HOME STATION	SEC POLICE
132 SVS DES MOINES	0/9	LUKE	SERVICES
132 TAG HOSP DES MOINES	14/32	OFFUTT/HOME	CLINIC
132 CES DES MOINES	0/12	WHITEMAN	FIRE FTR
185 CES SIOUX CITY	0/12	MOODY	FIRE FTR
185 TFG SIOUX CITY	0/1	AL KHARJ	FIGHTER
185 RMS SIOUX CITY	0/2	NELLIS	TRANSPORT

KANSAS

184 SPF MCCONNELL AFB	1/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
184 TAC CLNC MCCONNELL AFB	9/18	TINKER/HOME	CLINIC
184 RMS MCCONNELL AFB	0/4	HOLLOMAN	TRANSPORT
190 AREFG FORBES	64/205	HOME STATION	REFUELERS
190 SVS FORBES	0/9	K I SAWYER	SERVICES
190 CES FORBES	0/12	MCCONNELL	FIRE FTR

KANSAS (Cont)			
190 CLNC FORBES	2/14	OFFUTT/DYESS	CLINIC
190 SPF FORBES	0/47	FAIRCHILD	SEC POLICE
KENTUCKY			
123 SPF STANDIFORD FLD	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
123 TAC HOSP	9/31	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
123 ALCE STANDIFORD FLD	1/2	EUCOM	ALCE
123 SVS	0/9	LITTLE ROCK	SERVICES
123 CES STANDIFORD FLD	0/12	SCOTT	FIRE FTR
165 WFT STANDIFORD FLD	3/7	AOR	WEATHER
LOUISIANA			
HO LA ANG	4/0	HOME STATION	STAFF
159 SVS NEW ORLEANS	0/9	ENGLAND AFB	SERVICES
MAINE			
101 SPF BANGOR	0/32	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
101 AREFW BANGOR	47/50	HOME STATION	REFUELERS
101 CES BANGOR	0/12	MINOT	FIRE FTR
101 SVS BANGOR	0/9	LORING	SERVICES
101 CLNC BANGOR	4/18	BARKSDALE	CLINIC
MARYLAND			
135 TAG CLNC BALTIMORE	3/6	HOME STATION	CLINIC
135 SPF BALTIMORE	0/8	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
135 CES BALTIMORE	0/12	HURLBURT	FIRE FTR
135 MAPF BALTIMORE	2/54	DOVER/HOME	AERIAL PORT
135 RMS BALTIMORE	0/4	ANDREWS	TRANSPORT
175 SPF MARTIN STATE	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
175 RMS MARTIN STATE	0/8	LANGLEY	TRANSPORT
MASSACHUSETTS			
102 SPF OTIS	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
102 FIW OTIS	0/1	DAVIS MONTHAN	EOD
102 USAF CLINIC OTIS	5/22	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
102 SVS OTIS	0/9	HOMESTEAD	SERVICES
102 RMS OTIS	0/5	MACDILL/SEY JHNSN	TRANSPORT
102 FIW OTIS	0/1	MTN HOME	EOD
102 CES OTIS	0/13	WHITEMAN	FIRE FTR
108 RMS OTIS	0/4	ENGLAND AFB	TRANSPORT
267 CCSQ WELLESLEY	0/1	TABUK	CB COMM
MICHIGAN			
110 SPF BATTLE CREEK	0/26	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
110 CES BATTLE CREEK	0/12	WURTSMITH	FIRE FTR
110 RMS BATTLE CREEK	0/6	TYNDALL	TRANSPORT
110 SVS BATTLE CREEK	0/9	HOMESTEAD	SERVICES
127 SPF SELFRIDGE	1/43	CAIRO WEST	SEC POLICE
127 TFW SELFRIDGE	0/4	AL KHARJ	FIGHTER
127 RMS SELFRIDGE	0/4	SEY JHNSN	TRANSPORT
172 TASS BATTLE CREEK	1/11	HOME STATION	ALO/TACP
191 SPF SELFRIDGE	1/43	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
191 CES SELFRIDGE	0/12	CANNON	FIRE FTR

MICHIGAN (Cont)

191 CES SELFRIDGE	0/50	CONUS	ENGINEERS
191 SVS SELFRIDGE	0/9	TYNDALL	SERVICES

MINNESOTA

109 AEF MINNEAPOLIS	21/38	RIYADH/RHEINMAIN	AEROMED
133 SPF MINNEAPOLIS	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
133 MED SQ MINNEAPOLIS	4/16	HOME STATION	CLINIC
133 RMS MINNEAPOLIS	0/4	MCGUIRE	TRANSPORT
133 ALCE MINNEAPOLIS	0/4	AOR/CHR PT/HI	ALCE
133 MAPS MINNEAPOLIS	0/2	KING KHALID	AERIAL PORT
148 SPF DULUTH	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
148 FIG DULUTH	0/2	NELLIS	EOD
148 CES DULUTH	0/12	LORING	FIRE FTR

MISSISSIPPI

HQ MS ANG	1/0	HOME STATION	STAFF
172 TAC CLNC JACKSON	2/8	HOME STATION	CLINIC
172 SPF JACKSON	0/25	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
172 CES JACKSON	2/48	HURLBURT	ENGINEERS
172 SVS JACKSON	0/9	HURLBURT	SERVICES
173 CES GULFPORT	0/12	MACDILL	FIRE FTR
183 MAS JACKSON	48/100	AL KHARJ	AIRLIFT
183 AEF JACKSON	23/38	AL KHARJ	AEROMED
186 SPF MERIDIAN	1/43	HOME STATION	SEC POLICE
186 SVS KEY FIELD	0/9	SHAW	SERVICES
238 CCSQ MERIDIAN	0/1	TABUK	CB COMM

MISSOURI

131 SPF ST LOUIS	1/50	HOME STATION	SEC POLICE
139 SPF ST JOSEPH	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
139 TAG CLNC ST JOSEPH	11/27	TRAVIS/HOME	CLINIC
139 RMS ST JOSEPH	0/2	ANDREWS	TRANSPORT
139 MAPF ST JOSEPH	0/4	AL AIN	AERIAL PORT
139 TAG ST JOSEPH	49/184	AL KHARJ	AIRLIFT
239 CCSQ ST LOUIS	0/2	TABUK	CB COMM

MONTANA

120 SPF GREAT FALLS	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
120 SVS GREAT FALLS	0/9	MTN HOME	SERVICES
120 FIG GREAT FALLS	0/1	LUKE	EOD
120 CES GREAT FALLS	0/12	HOLLOMAN	FIRE FTR
120 RMS GREAT FALLS	0/3	NELLIS	TRANSPORT
120 USAF CLNC GREAT FALLS	7/19	GRND FORKS/HOME	CLINIC

NEVADA

152 SPF RENO	0/17	HOME STATION	SEC POLICE
152 TRG RENO	29/107	HOME STATION	RECON
152 RMS RENO	0/2	NELLIS	TRANSPORT

NEW HAMPSHIRE

157 AREFG PEASE	47/52	HOME STATION	REFUELERS
157 CLNC PEASE	3/16	CARSWELL	CLINIC
157 SPF PEASE	1/43	MALMSTROM	SEC POLICE

NEW JERSEY

170 SPF MCGUIRE AFB	0/44	HOME STATION	SEC POLICE
170 AREFG MCGUIRE AFB	40/37	HOME STATION	REFUELERS
170 SVS MCGUIRE AFB	1/17	F E WARREN	SERVICES
170 CLNC MCGUIRE AFB	4/14	MULTI CONUS	CLINIC
177 RMS ATLANTIC CITY	0/9	SEY JHNSN	TRANSPORT
177 FIG ATLANTIC CITY	0/2	BERGSTROM	EOD
177 USAF CLNC ATLANTIC CITY	10/15	KEESLER/HOME	CLINIC
177 FIG ATLANTIC CITY	0/1	LUKE	EOD
177 SVS ATLANTIC CITY	0/9	LANGLEY	SERVICES
177 CES ATLANTIC CITY	0/12	EGLIN	FIRE FTR
177 TFG ATLANTIC CITY	0/1	HOME STATION	CHPLN ASST
177 SPF ATLANTIC CITY	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE

NEW MEXICO

150 SPF KIRTLAND AFB	1/44	HOME STATION	SEC POLICE
150 RMS KIRTLAND AFB	0/4	CANNON	TRANSPORT
150 SVS KIRTLAND AFB	0/9	HOLLOMAN	SERVICES
150 TFG KIRTLAND AFB	0/2	AL KHARJ	FIGHTER

NEW YORK

106 RMS SUFFOLK CTY	0/3	DOVER	TRANSPORT
107 USAF CLNC NIAGARA FALLS	9/9	PLATTSBURG/HOME	CLINIC
107 SPF NIAGARA FALLS	0/6	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
107 SVS NIAGARA FALLS	0/9	MACDILL	SERVICES
107 FIW NIAGARA FALLS	0/2	SEY JHNSN	EOD
107 CES NIAGARA FALLS	0/12	MYRTLE BEACH	FIRE FTR
108 TCS SYRACUSE	0/1	AOR	OTHER
109 RMS SCHENECTADY	0/5	DOVER	TRANSPORT
109 TAC CLNC SCHENECTADY	2/12	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
109 CES SCHENECTADY	0/15	MYRTLE BEACH	FIRE FTR
109 SPF SCHENECTADY	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
137 MAS STEWART	47/99	IN PLACE	AIRLIFT
139 AEF SCHENECTADY	35/61	RIYADH	AEROMED
174 TFW SYRACUSE	9/400	AL KHARJ	FIGHTER
174 SVS SYRACUSE	0/18	AL KHARJ	SERVICES
174 SPF SYRACUSE	1/43	AL KHARJ	SEC POLICE
274 CCSQ ROSLYN	0/6	ASCENSION	CB COMM

NORTH CAROLINA

118 CS BADIN	0/1	TABUK	CB COMM
145 SPF CHARLOTTE	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
145 CES CHARLOTTE	0/12	CHARLESTON	FIRE FTR
145 MAPS CHARLOTTE	0/1	MCGUIRE	AERIAL PORT
145 TAG CLNC CHARLOTTE	18/26	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
145 RMS CHARLOTTE	0/4	ANDREWS	TRANSPORT
156 AEF CHARLOTTE	24/44	AL KHARJ	AEROMED
263 CCSQ BADIN	0/12	AL JUBAYL	CB COMM

NORTH DAKOTA

119 SPF FARGO	0/6	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
119 SVS FARGO	1/17	MACDILL	SERVICES
119 CES FARGO	0/50	CONUS	ENGINEERS
119 USAF CLNC FARGO	5/14	GRND FORKS/HOME	CLINIC

NORTH DAKOTA (Cont)

119 RMS FARGO	0/2	MTN HOME	TRANSPORT
119 CES FARGO	0/12	VANDENBERG	FIRE FTR

OHIO

121 SPF RICKENBACKER	1/55	HOME STATION	SEC POLICE
121 RMS RICKENBACKER	0/10	SEY JHNSN	TRANSPORT
121 SVS RICKENBACKER	0/9	MACDILL	SERVICES
121 TFW RICKENBACKER	0/2	AL KHARJ	FIGHTER
160 AREFG RICKENBACKER	63/211	HOME STATION	REFUELERS
160 SPF RICKENBACKER	1/38	CARSWELL/MINOT	SEC POLICE
160 SVS RICKENBACKER	0/9	MINOT	SERVICES
160 SVS RICKENBACKER	0/9	BARKSDALE	SERVICES
160 CLNC RICKENBACKER	2/16	MULTI CONUS	CLINIC
178 TFG SPRINGFIELD	0/6	HOME STATION	FIGHTER
178 SPF SPRINGFIELD	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
178 RMS SPRINGFIELD	0/5	SHAW	TRANSPORT
178 SVS SPRINGFIELD	0/9	HOLLOMAN	SERVICES
178 TAG HOSP SPRINGFIELD	11/17	CANNON/HOME	CLINIC
178 CES SPRINGFIELD	0/12	MOODY	FIRE FTR
179 MED SQ MANSFIELD	12/38	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
179 TAG MANSFIELD	2/0	AL KHARJ	AIRLIFT
179 SPF MANSFIELD	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
180 RMS TOLEDO	0/5	MACDILL	TRANSPORT
180 CES TOLEDO	0/12	NELLIS	FIRE FTR
180 SPF TOLEDO	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
180 MSS TOLEDO	0/2	HOME STATION	DIS PREP

OKLAHOMA

137 RMS WILL ROGERS	0/4	ALTUS	TRANSPORT
137 SVS WILL ROGERS	1/17	ALTUS	SERVICES
137 CES WILL ROGERS	0/12	LITTLE ROCK	FIRE FTR
137 TAC HOSP WILL ROGERS	7/22	TRAVIS/HOME	CLINIC
137 ALCE WILL ROGERS	1/3	AOR/CHR PT/HI	ALCE
137 AEF WILL ROGERS	22/60	RIYADH/RHEINMAIN	AEROMED
138 TAC CLNC TULSA	6/9	TINKER/HOME	CLINIC
138 RMS TULSA	0/8	HOLLOMAN	TRANSPORT
138 SPF TULSA	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
138 CES TULSA	0/12	SHAW	FIRE FTR
138 SVS TULSA	0/9	CANNON	SERVICES

OREGON

142 SPF PORTLAND	1/25	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
142 SVS PORTLAND	0/9	MTN HOME	SERVICES
142 USAF CLNC PORTLAND OR	10/23	MARCH/HOME	CLINIC
142 CES PORTLAND	0/12	GEORGE	FIRE FTR

PENNSYLVANIA

111 SPF WILLOW GROVE	1/25	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
111 RMS WILLOW GROVE	0/3	MACDILL	TRANSPORT
112 SVS PITTSBURGH	0/9	LANGLEY	SERVICES
112 RMS PITTSBURGH	0/8	SHAW/MOODY	TRANSPORT
112 SPF PITTSBURGH	1/44	CAIRO WEST	SEC POLICE
112 TFG PITTSBURGH	0/1	HOME STATION	FIGHTER

PENNSYLVANIA (Cont)

171 AREFW PITTSBURGH	53/149	HOME STATION	REFUELERS
171 SPF PITTSBURGH	0/13	DYESS	SEC POLICE
171 CLNC PITTSBURGH	2/14	PLATTSBURG	CLINIC
171 SVS PITTSBURGH	1/18	MALMSTROM	SERVICES
193 SOG HARRISBURG	49/216	HOME STATION	SPEC OPS

PUERTO RICO

156 TFG SAN JUAN	0/1	HOME STATION	CHPLN ASST
156 SPF SAN JUAN	0/17	HOME STATION	SEC POLICE
156 CES SAN JUAN	0/12	MTN HOME	FIRE FTR

RHODE ISLAND

143 TAG HOSP QUONSET POINT	4/12	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
143 TAG QUONSET POINT	62/204	EUCOM/MILDENHALL	AIRLIFT
282 CCSQ COVENTRY	0/15	RIYADH	CB COMM

SOUTH CAROLINA

HQ SC ANG	1/0	HOME STATION	STAFF
169 SPF MCENTIRE	1/43	HOME STATION	SEC POLICE
169 SVS MCENTIRE	1/26	HOME STATION	SERVICES
169 TFG MCENTIRE	58/523	AL KHARJ	FIGHTER
240 CCSQ MCENTIRE	5/100	AL KHARJ	CB COMM

SOUTH DAKOTA

114 TFG SIOUX FALLS	0/1	HOME STATION	FIGHTER
114 SPF SIOUX FALLS	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
114 CES SIOUX FALLS	0/12	TONOPAH	FIRE FTR
114 RMS SIOUX FALLS	0/2	DAVIS MONTHAN	TRANSPORT

TENNESSEE

118 SPF NASHVILLE	1/43	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
118 ALCE NASHVILLE	0/5	EUCOM	ALCE
118 TAG HOSP NASHVILLE	14/20	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
118 AES NASHVILLE	38/61	RIYADH/RHEINMAIN	AEROMED
134 AREFG MCGHEE TYSON	42/88	HOME STATION	REFUELERS
134 SVS MCGHEE TYSON	0/7	PLATTSBURG	SERVICES
134 SVS MCGHEE TYSON	0/4	EAKER	SERVICES
134 CLNC MCGHEE TYSON	5/16	MULTI CONUS	CLINIC
134 SPF MCGHEE TYSON	0/28	GRIFFISS	SEC POLICE
134 SVS MCGHEE TYSON	1/7	CARSWELL	SERVICES
164 RMS MEMPHIS	0/4	HOME STATION	TRANSPORT
164 SPF MEMPHIS	1/25	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
164 CES MEMPHIS	0/12	LITTLE ROCK	FIRE FTR
164 TAC CLNC MEMPHIS	13/18	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
164 MAPS MEMPHIS	4/85	AOR	AERIAL PORT

TEXAS

HQ TX ANG	1/0	HOME STATION	STAFF
136 SPF DALLAS	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
136 MAPS DALLAS	4/89	HOME STATION	AERIAL PORT
136 TAW DALLAS	6/162	HOME STATION	AIRLIFT
136 RMS DALLAS	0/3	KIRTLAND	TRANSPORT
136 TAC HOSP DALLAS	9/18	TRAVIS/HOME	CLINIC

TEXAS (Cont)

136 ALCE DALLAS	0/1	AOR/CHR PT/HI	ALCE
147 MSS ELLINGTON AFB	0/1	HOME STATION	DIS PREP
147 SPF ELLINGTON AFB	0/23	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
147 RMS ELLINGTON AFB	0/5	CANNON	TRANSPORT
147 SVS ELLINGTON AFB	0/9	TYNDALL	SERVICES
147 CES ELLINGTON AFB	0/12	HOLLOMAN	FIRE FTR
147 USAF CLNC ELLINGTON AFB	4/25	LACKLAND/HOME	CLINIC
149 MSS KELLY AFB	0/1	IN PLACE	DIS PREP
149 SPF KELLY AFB	0/17	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
149 RMS KELLY AFB	0/9	NELLIS	TRANSPORT
149 TAC CLNC KELLY AFB	13/36	HOME STATION	CLINIC
221 CCSQ GARLAND	0/1	TABUK	CB COMM

UTAH

151 AREFG SALT LAKE CITY	41/60	HOME STATION	REFUELERS
151 SVS SALT LAKE CITY	0/18	WHITEMAN	SERVICES
151 SPF SALT LAKE CITY	0/39	MALMSTROM	SEC POLICE
151 CLNC SALT LAKE CITY	3/11	CARSWELL	CLINIC
151 CES SALT LAKE CITY	0/12	CASTLE	FIRE FTR
169 ESS SALT LAKE CITY	0/7	AOR	LINGUIST

VERMONT

158 SPF BURLINGTON	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
158 SVS BURLINGTON	0/9	HOLLOMAN	SERVICES
158 USAF CLNC BURLINGTON	4/13	LACKLAND/HOME	CLINIC
158 FIG BURLINGTON	0/1	SEY JHNSN	EOD
158 CES BURLINGTON	0/12	PLATTSBURG	FIRE FTR
158 FIG BURLINGTON	0/1	TYNDALL	EOD

VIRGINIA

192 SVS RICHMOND	0/9	LANGLEY	SERVICES
192 CES RICHMOND	0/12	LANGLEY/ENGLAND	FIRE FTR
192 RMS RICHMOND	0/4	LANGLEY	TRANSPORT

WASHINGTON

141 AREFW FAIRCHILD AFB	51/176	HOME STATION	REFUELERS
141 SPF FAIRCHILD AFB	1/46	HOME STATION	SEC POLICE
141 SVS FAIRCHILD AFB	1/9	HOME STATION	SERVICES
141 CLNC FAIRCHILD AFB	4/19	MULTI CONUS	CLINIC
242 CCSQ SPOKANE	0/1	TABUK	CB COMM
256 CCSQ TACOMA	0/3	TABUK	CB COMM

WEST VIRGINIA

130 TAG CHARLESTON	53/178	HOME STATION	AIRLIFT
130 TAG CLNC CHARLESTON	10/26	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
130 MAPS CHARLESTON	3/89	DOVER	AERIAL PORT
167 AEF MARTINSBURG	31/64	AL KHARJ	AEROMED
167 RMS MARTINSBURG	0/4	MCGUIRE	TRANSPORT
167 CLNC MARTINSBURG	3/12	ANDREWS/HOME	CLINIC
167 CES MARTINSBURG	0/12	HURLBURT	FIRE FTR

WISCONSIN

115 SPF MADISON	1/16	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
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WISCONSIN (Cont)

128 AREFG GEN MITCHELL FLD	70/212	HOME STATION	REFUELERS
128 CLNC GEN MITCHELL FLD	2/12	F E WARREN	CLINIC
128 SVS GEN MITCHELL FLD	0/9	ELLSWORTH	SERVICES
128 CES GEN MITCHELL FLD	0/12	MALMSTROM	FIRE FTR
128 SVS GEN MITCHELL FLD	0/9	MCCONNELL	SERVICES
128 SPF GEN MITCHELL FLD	0/32	AOR/F E WARREN	SEC POLICE

WYOMING

153 RMS CHEYENNE	0/2	MCGUIRE	TRANSPORT
153 SPF CHEYENNE	0/13	IN PLACE	SEC POLICE
153 TAC CLNC CHEYENNE	9/21	TRAVIS/HOME	CLINIC
187 AEF CHEYENNE	24/50	HOME/TURKEY	AEROMED

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